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ABSTRACT
Expenditures for data and analytics may be among the most costly investments an
organization can make, and yet the traditional cost-benefit models that support decision making
about those investments have themselves become outdated approaches – often leaving out the
social and socio-economic factors that are related to development of new capabilities. This
exploratory case study considers alternative perspectives about the construction of the business
case for organizational investments in software used in analytics. As investments in new
analytic capabilities are considered, costs for new technology are often evaluated and weighed
against potential benefits. Although there are many potential points of view that could be
considered, legacy organization development theory and the Socio-economic Approach to
Management (SEAM) provide critical perspective. Cross-model comparisons show how
paradigms of thought can affect evaluation and measurement of costs, benefits and productivity.
Findings from this research are discussed in context with organization development and
capability-building for data and analytics.
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Chapter One
Standing at the center of a large Millennium Hotel conference room overlooking the
Minneapolis skyline, futurist Thornton May addressed a group of business people representing
some of the largest companies in Minnesota. May, named by eWeek magazine as “one of the
most influential people in IT” and by Fast Company magazine as “one of the 50 best brains in
business” also authored a book titled The New Know (2009). Copies of the book, intended for
each participant, were arranged in neat stacks in the front of the room. Smiling cheerfully at the
audience that had gathered, May began his presentation with idea that the amount of data
available within organizations is expanding faster than people can make sense of it. At the same
time, the use of data has expanded to address a broad range of business issues – greatly
impacting the way that some organizations have been able to manage interactions with
customers. Indeed, the use of data has even shaped the way that some businesses think about the
nature of competition, which – in May’s view at least – has resulted in the idea that everyone
from everywhere is competing for everything. “We’ve now reached a point,” May said to his
audience, “where in order to remain competitive, we must know everything: it’s no longer okay
not to know.”
May smiled at the way this assertion had affected his audience. Like many people seated
around me, I shifted uncomfortably in my chair thinking about the sheer challenge of knowing
everything that might be important to my own organization – the key facts that are important
now and that would also be important in the future. Having worked for over thirty years
preparing information used in management decision making and strategic planning, I saw it as
not only a matter of knowing which facts, but also the way that those facts are assembled from
millions and millions of rows of transaction detail that is stored electronically in a repository that
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IT professionals refer to as the “data warehouse.” Data is accessed with a variety of software
tools; in fact, I attended May’s presentation because the team I led preferred to use SAS software
to retrieve data from the warehouse. If it is true that in order to remain competitive we would all
need to know everything, then it seemed to me to that the ability to know everything would be a
matter of leveraging billions of pieces of information for the right reasons and at the right time.
May’s presentation was sponsored by SAS, a leader in business analytics software and
services, which – perhaps not so coincidentally – displays the tagline the power to know. In
2011, SAS – in partnership with Bloomberg Businessweek Research Services – sponsored a
series of meetings they called power breakfasts in eight major cities in the United States. The
tour included Minneapolis, which is home to many SAS customers. Bloomberg, a self-described
leader in business and financial services information (displaying the tagline delivering the
world’s information) collaborated with SAS in order to conduct an assessment of the state of
business information management in the United States – especially as it related to the effective
use of data and the new focus on analytics within organizations. Davenport and Harris, who
have written extensively about companies who compete by leveraging analytic capabilities,
explained “By analytics we mean the extensive use of data, statistical and quantitative analysis,
exploratory and predictive models, and fact-based management to drive decisions and actions
(2007).”
The people that I was teamed up with at the Minneapolis power breakfast were all part of
this accelerating trend. Working on whiteboard walls and aided by an artist, we developed mind
maps that were ultimately incorporated in the national power breakfast research. The mind map
that we generated in Minneapolis identified key challenges with respect to 1) the increasing
amount of time spent on data management, which was decreasing time available for analysis; 2)
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the idea that analysts are decentralized in organizational silos with only informal ways to share
knowledge and resources; 3) lack of integrated governance or coordinated organizational
processes for decision making; 4) the difficulty of attracting and retaining analysts; 5) the
difficulty of developing analytical skills and talent, and 6) the lack of appropriate software tools
for analysts to work with large sets of data (Bloomberg Businessweek Research, 2011, p. 2).
Given these challenges, along with many others identified by the study participants, the
Bloomberg and SAS research ultimately concluded that business analytics is still a field in the
emerging stage.
I think that the key challenges identified by the Minneapolis group are not unlike other
organization development problems related to gaps in organizational capabilities. The current
focus on effective use of data and analytics as a source of competitive advantage, in my view,
has romanticized the relationships between people, processes and technology as if the supporting
organizational resources and structures were already in place. Organization development
practitioners, trained as they are in holistic thinking, regularly face problems that are the messy
outcomes of relationships between people, processes and technology. In my experience, the new
focus on data and analytics has only fanned the flames of discordant organizational relationships
and situations – and has made those messy problems even more difficult to address.
Instead of addressing the need for an increased focus on data and analytics as an
organization development problem, the media coverage associated with business analytics seems
to be driving an increased focus on investments in technology. No wonder the analytics
movement is relatively slow to take off. I believe that the focus on technology is misplaced,
because development of new analytic capabilities and strategies will involve significant
organization capability-building work effort (Davenport, 2006). Davenport and Harris (2007a)
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pointed out that “Some people would simply equate analytics with analytical information
technology. But this would be a huge mistake…it’s the human and organizational aspects of
analytical competition that are truly differentiating” (p. 8).
The focus on data and analytics will also drive the need for change in organizations.
Davenport (2006) wrote that organizational decision-makers must acknowledge and endorse the
changes in culture, processes, and skills that analytics competition will mean for the
organization’s workforce. Mainstream business magazine articles have also highlighted the need
for organizational change in order to build new data and analytic capabilities. A Harvard
Business Review article, for example, pointed out that “Companies won’t be able to reap the full
benefits of a transition to big data unless they’re able to manage change effectively” (McAffee &
Brynjolfsson, p. 66). Davenport and Harris (2007a) also emphasized the need for an
organization development focus to address analytic capability-building. The authors wrote, “We
hope that many academics and consultants will embrace the topic. If this field is to prosper, the
world will have to spend a lot of time and energy focusing on it, and we’ll need all the guidance
we can get” (p. 10).
Statement of the Problem
If, as Davenport and Harris suggested (2007a), development of analytic capabilities
within organizations depends on capability-building work efforts and change initiatives, then
decisions about investments in analytics would ideally address a complexity of organizational
issues. However, it is my experience that a classic construction of costs vs. benefits to assess
investment proposals would leave out many important organizational factors. For example, a
classic cost-benefit construction of the costs associated with software would highlight the
licensing and maintenance fees, implementation costs, infrastructure costs, vendor consulting
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fees and training costs. The analysis would also show how the identified costs would be offset
by benefits expressed as financial savings. Ideally, the analysis would also show that the use of
the software will drive a return on investment. In other words, the investment would save more
money than it would cost to license, maintain and implement the software. For the investment to
be considered viable, the organization may also define a set requirement for a positive
relationship between benefits vs. costs; for example, an organization may require that benefits
would be equivalent to three times the costs. The positive return on investment would not
necessarily need to be experienced immediately, but rather within a specified timeframe. For
example, an organization may require a three year pay-back in order to achieve the desired level
of return, but that can vary based on the nature of the investment.
While the classic business case provides an important itemization of costs, I believe that
it is just one view of the investment that is being made. Other considerations – such as
investments in the productivity, knowledge and capability of people – are noticeably missing
from the analysis. In a classic cost-benefit construction, the positive impact on the productivity
of people is very difficult to quantify as a benefit and is generally dismissed as “soft” savings.
Even if benefits are quantified based on a corresponding time savings for people, that time
savings will be regarded as a potential reduction in costs – as opposed to an investment in the
capacity of people to do more value-added work.

Having worked as part of financial functions for my entire career, I regard the financial
view of investments as an important, even crucial view. In my experience, financial executives
will not consider investment proposals unless there is a full accounting of the costs. The costs, in
the accounting view, are an offset to revenue, and directly affect overall profitability. The
expected savings associated with technology investments will not considered a benefit until they
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actually materialize. Most often, in fact, financial decision-makers do not actually know if
people are going to be more or less productive if they have access to a new technology – or if the
new technology will actually live up to its promises. Good financial managers are wary of
situations where technology might not deliver expected results and only add to costs. Where the
productivity gains from automation were once more clear-cut, more contemporary applications
are part of existing systems that are themselves part of other larger business processes. In other
words, it is often difficult to isolate the expected impact of any one change in a larger web of
work effort – much less quantify costs, benefits, or expected changes in the productivity of
people.
Purpose of the Study
The construction of cost-benefit justifications for business analytics is fraught with so
many complexities that it is tempting to just give up and hope for the best. After all, most
decisions are still made based on judgment – even when the numbers are presented clearly. And
yet I believe there is an unmet need to clarify the nature of investments in business analytics. In
the example of a simple case of an investment in software, there is a need to reframe the analysis
to consider other factors related to development of new analytic capabilities within the
organization. At the same time, though, the current cost-benefit models or views of these
investments do not seem large enough to address the true nature of costs, benefits or productivity
that will be impacted. Although social factors are often deemed soft savings in classic business
case constructions, it seems to me that the opposite is true. I think that the dialogue about these
investments needs to be expanded to also consider other views related to the productivity of
people and the impact to an organization’s analytic capabilities.
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With all these issues in mind, the purpose of this study was to explore ways that the
business case for business analytics would change if it were made based on other perspectives.
To do this, though, it was also important to consider the underlying assumptions about the way
concepts such as costs, benefits and productivity are defined and measured. By exploring
alternative conceptual views of costs, benefits and productivity, I wanted to clarify what it means
to invest in organizational capabilities in business analytics. Furthermore, I wanted to show how
assumptions about what constitutes costs, benefits and productivity can influence the
measurements that are developed, as well as the way the business case for investments in
analytic software might be constructed.
Overview of the Study and Research Questions
Although traditional cost-benefit models are widely used in organizational decisionmaking processes, they tend to leave out social and organizational factors that may influence
overall performance. While the traditional approach to cost-benefit analysis provides important
and valuable information for use in decision making, the development of new analytic
capabilities within organizations demands additional analysis. I wanted to see if there is a way to
add more information about social factors such as the productivity of people, or other socioeconomic factors that would take into account the analytic capabilities that would need to be
developed in order to improve the overall performance of the organization. To do this, I
explored different perspectives about a specific business case that had been developed by a
Minneapolis-St. Paul company. I considered three key components of the case:


Assessment of costs



Assessment of benefits



Assessment of productivity
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There is significant management research that informed the way that I modeled alternative views
of the case, and of course in my review I likely missed some extremely relevant information
developed by thoughtful and creative people. I regret those omissions, but hope to continue my
learning journey after this paper is completed. I tried to select sources that represent a
continuum of ideas about the nature of organizational costs, benefits, and productivity that could
be used to develop schematic models.
Model I: The Economic View
Model I provides a brief grounding on the importance of costs as a factor in decisionmaking about investments in data and analytics. I relied upon the research of Jack Phillip, noted
for his scholarship and development of the concept of return on investment (ROI). Phillips
advocated that business leaders should take a hard look at the costs associated with investment
proposals, and that they also assign accountability for potential benefits. Phillips (2008)
acknowledged the debate about the relative strengths and weaknesses associated with an ROI
approach, and wrote that “Understanding what drives the ROI methodology and knowing its
inherent weaknesses and advantages makes it possible to take a rational approach to the issue
and implement an appropriate mix of evaluation strategies that includes ROI” (p. 1).
Model II: The Social View
Development of Model II focused on the social factors associated with data and analytics.
Jac Fitz-Enz and Richard Swanson are noted thought leaders about social factors associated with
human productivity and motivation. Fitz-Enz (2009) wrote that
…people are the only element with the inherent power to generate value. All other
variables – cash and its cousin credit, materials, plant and equipment, and energy – offer
nothing but inert potentials. By their nature, they add nothing, and cannot add anything
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until some human being, be it the lowest-level laborer, the most ingenious professional,
or the loftiest executive, leverages that potential by putting it into play. (p. xix)
Productivity, as defined by Fitz-Enz, emphasizes the contributions of people, and also represents
contemporary views of job design and performance where productivity can be measured. I relied
upon the work of Richard Swanson to develop the model.
Model III: The Socio-economic View
Decades of French management research conducted by the Socio-economic Institute of
Firms and Organizations (ISEOR) has recently become accessible in the United States. This
research has emphasized the factors associated with the economic potential of the organization,
and as such, provides both a social and an economic view of organizations. The Socio-economic
Approach to Management (SEAM) emphasizes the concept of hidden costs caused by
dysfunctions in the relationships between people and organizational structures. Hidden costs are
hidden in the sense that they are not accounted for in financial statements or other performance
measures in use by the organization. SEAM scholars hold the view that by eliminating these
dysfunctions, there will be immediate results and the creation of economic potential for the
organization. As such, Model III provides a socio-economic view of the case.
Other Related Research
The models developed as part of this research was based on the sources outlined, along
with other literature that is related to the work of the authors. It would of course be possible to
identify additional scholarly research that could provide additional perspectives as it relates to
the case – and even provide the basis for additional models. However, it was not the point of my
research to show a multiplicity of nuanced views associated with the case, but rather to illustrate
how different models will illuminate different perspectives about the nature of the investment in
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analytics. Use of the models will also illustrate how different perspectives will in turn drive the
development of different measures – and ultimately influence a different view of the nature of
the investment.
Research Questions and Areas of Focus
My research considered alternative perspectives as it relates to assumptions about the
nature of investments in analytic capabilities, and explored the question how would economic,
social and socio-economic perspectives affect the construction of the business case for
investments in business analytics? A key premise of this research is that each of the three
frameworks will illuminate different aspects of the discussion about investment in analytics
because 1) they highlight some considerations over others, and 2) the measurements associated
with each framework are different. For each of the three models, I wanted to explore the
following five questions:
1. What are the key considerations or elements that are emphasized as it relates to the
case study parameters?
2. What is the nature of productivity assumed as it relates to the case study parameters?
3. How would the costs associated with the case study be assessed and measured?
4. How would the benefits associated with the case study be assessed and measured?
5. What factors or measures would be included in development of the business case?
By developing three different views of the case, I believed that it would be possible to 1)
explore differing ideas about the nature of costs vs. benefits; 2) explore differing ideas about the
nature of productivity, and 3) explore the elements of each model that are highlighted vs. those
that are de-emphasized. Ultimately these findings will be applied to show how the business case
associated with each model could be constructed, along with the associated measurements.
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Findings from the literature were also incorporated as part of the analysis, especially as it relates
to theory developed by organization development theorists and practitioners, as well as socioeconomic theory developed by Henri Savall and other ISEOR intervener-researchers.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
The literature shows a range of promise and challenge associated with of application of
business analytics. Although there is great possibility associated with use of data within
organizations, there are also important organizational barriers related to people, process and
technology. In order to generate value for business, the literature suggests that construction of
business cases associated with investments in technology will also need to make the link between
technology investments and the strategic plans and goals of the organization. At the same time,
though, these factors are very difficult to quantify as part of a typical cost-benefit business case
construction – especially if those factors include information about the productivity of people,
complex organizational processes or strategic goals.
The Challenges and Promise Associated with Big Data
The focus on business analytics is part of a larger trend where many organizations are
working through some significant information technology (IT) challenges associated with data
management. According to May (2009), “We are now exiting a historical moment of
undermanaged and only occasionally acted-upon information to an environment requiring much
more active, much more intense, much more aggressive information management” (p. 22). One
key driver of this new trend is that a reduction in storage costs has meant that organizations are
taking in data faster than ever before. Where IT organizations once focused on holding down
costs associated with storing data, they are now creating new, more efficient data warehousing
solutions that envision storage of additional data from many non-traditional sources.
Engineers at IBM’s Disk Drive Research Center have estimated that one gigabyte of
storage – which is the rough equivalent of the storage needed for the scanned contents of two file
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cabinets – cost $8.37 in the year 2000, compared to $.01 in 2012 (Gilheany, 2011). There are
different costs for different kinds of storage, but – given the ongoing increase in storage densities
– storage costs are expected to continue to decrease over time. As storage costs decrease, there
will be an associated ability of organizations to take in additional data without increasing costs.
The expanding array of data has been referred to in popular management literature as “big data.”
McKinsey Global Institute (MGI), a business and economics research arm of McKinsey
& Company, defined big data as datasets that are so large that typical database and software tools
cannot effectively capture, store, manage or analyze the information (Manyika et al., 2011). The
MGI report referred to big data as a “growing torrent,” where the amount of global data
generated is projected to grow at 40 percent per year. Already, according to the report, 15 out of
17 sectors in the United States have more data stored per company than the United States Library
of Congress. According to the MGI authors,
Digital data is now everywhere – in every sector, in every economy, in every
organization and user of digital technology. While this topic might once have concerned
only a few data geeks, big data is now relevant for leaders across every sector, and
consumers of products and services stand to benefit from this application. (p. 2)
Big data has also become big business, according to technology industry experts.
"Driven by the attention-grabbing headlines for big data and over three decades of evolutionary
and revolutionary developments in technology and best practices, the business analytics software
market has crossed the chasm into the mainstream mass market," noted Dan Vesset, Program
Vice President for International Data Corporation's (IDC) Business Analytics Solutions. "IDC
expects the business analytics software market to grow at a 10.1% compound annual growth rate
over the next five years" (Vesset, McDonough, Wardley, & Schubmehl, 2012).
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The big business of big data has also translated into profitability for large information
technology companies such as IBM, Microsoft, Adobe Systems, MicroStrategy, SAS, Teradata,
Oracle and Informatica – despite notably difficult economic conditions. For example, the SAS
annual report highlighted record earnings in 2011. Overall SAS revenue increased 12 percent to
$2.725 billion, which the company attributed to high demand for business analytics to capitalize
on big data (SAS Institute, 2011). SAS is not alone in its success due to big data. Other large
companies such as IBM and Informatica are also attributing growth in their analytics businesses
to the emergence of big data and the associated need of organizations to translate that data into
powerful new analytic capabilities.
Considering the expense associated with new data warehouse solutions and associated
development, it is no wonder that organizations are focused on technology strategy and plans
related to big data. In order to offset implementation costs, it makes sense that companies are
looking for business analytics to help solve big issues. A key point of the MGI report is that
there would be huge potential value if organizations are able to leverage new sources of data, and
use the new sources in combination with the data that they already have (Manyika et al., 2011).
Big data, in the view of the MGI authors, has the potential to become the next frontier for
innovation, competition and productivity (Manyika et al., 2011). Examples include 1) making
data more relevant; 2) segmentation of populations to tailor products and services; 3)
replacement/support of human decision making with automated algorithms; 4) creation of new
products and services, and enhancement of existing ones, and 5) the invention of entirely new
business models. The MGI report also predicted that the use of big data will become a key basis
of competition and growth for individual firms: “In the United States, we expect big data to
rapidly become a key determinant of competition across sectors” (p. 10).
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Big data, according to McAfee and Brynjolfsson (2012), even has the potential to create a
management revolution. “Because of big data, managers can measure, and hence know,
radically more about their businesses, and directly translate that knowledge into improved
decision-making and performance” (p. 62). The authors, along with other academic and business
colleagues, surveyed 330 public North American companies. They found that the more
companies characterized themselves as data-driven, the better they performed on objective
measures of financial and operational results (p. 64). In another study, researchers from the IBM
Institute for Business Value partnered with researchers from the MIT Sloan Management Review
to conduct a survey of nearly 3,000 executives, managers and analysts working across more than
30 industries and 100 countries (LaValle, Hopkins, Lesser, Shockley, & Kruschwitz, 2010).
Like the MGI researchers, the IBM and MIT researchers also found that top-performing
organizations use analytics five times more than lower performers.
Tyagi (2003) wrote that even incremental developments in analytics are making a visible
impact. “Dramatic decreases in computing and data storage costs means most large firms can
afford sophisticated analyses” (p. 12).
According to Tyagi (2003),
Advances in analytics are breathing new life into companies’ efforts to create new
businesses and line extensions, improve pricing, and cut costs. Successful
enterprises are harnessing the power of data for better strategic decision making.
The rewards are rapid implementation of new ideas, products, and services, which
result in greater profits and shareholder value. (p. 14)
Bose (2008) pointed out that analysis of data allows “enterprises to have a complete or
‘360 view’ of their operations and customers.” Bose added that “The insight that they gain is
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then used to direct, optimize, and automate their decision making to successfully achieve their
organizational goals” (p.155). According to the Bloomberg Businessweek Research Services
report (2011), companies are looking to analytics to solve big issues, with the primary focus on
money: reducing costs, improving the bottom line, and managing risks.
Effective Use of Information for Competitive Advantage
Davenport (2006) wrote that effective use of analytics may also be used to pull ahead of
competitors, especially if analytic capabilities are leveraged to wring value out of business
processes. Analytics can be applied to not only differentiate the products that customers want
but also how much they are willing to pay. Some analysts have even been able to develop
information that shows the factors that keep customers loyal to a brand. Davenport and Harris
(2007a) found that the most analytically sophisticated and successful firms had four common key
characteristics that they refer to as “the four pillars of analytical competition”: 1) “analytics
supported a strategic, distinctive organizational capability” (p. 23); 2) “the approach to and
management of analytics was enterprise-wide” (p. 27); 3) “senior management was committed to
the use of analytics” (p. 30), and 4) “the company made a significant strategic bet on analyticsbased competition” (p. 32).
According to Davenport (2006), “Analytics competitors understand that most business
functions – even those like marketing that have historically depended on art rather than science –
can be improved with sophisticated quantitative techniques” (p. 4). Knowing what your
customers want before they do, according to Davenport, Dalle, Mule, and Lucker (2011), is an
important marketing objective. A company’s data can, in theory, be used to collect detailed
information about customers – including attributes such as demographics, psychographics,
purchase history, social, mobile, and location information. If information about customers is
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combined with other information that the company already has – for example if customer
information is combined with other attributes such product location and availability – then
analytics can be used to match customers with marketing offers. Analytics can also be used to
learn from customer’s responses and compare results to what had been predicted. Of course,
these new capabilities will also imply new risks, and the ethical behavior of organizations will
increasingly be under scrutiny by its customers (Davenport & Harris, 2007b).
Current State of Business Analytics
Despite the promise of analytics touted in popular management literature, there are also
important challenges. According to the IBM/ Sloan research, the promise of improved
performance has led to the “widespread belief that analytics offers value” (LaValle, Hopkins,
Lesser, Shockley, & Kruschwitz, 2010). According to the researchers, “Half of the survey
respondents said that improvement of information and analytics was a top priority in their
organizations” (p.2). The researchers also reported that “six out of ten respondents cited
innovation to achieve competitive differentiation as a top business challenge,” yet on the other
hand the same percentage also agreed that “their organization has more data than it can use
effectively” (p. 2). Ranjan (2008) wrote that “The business success factor for any enterprise is
finding ways to bring the vast amount of data that are flowing within and across the business
processes together and making sense out of them” (p. 461). McAfee and Brynjolfsson (2012)
similarly noted that although new technologies are collecting more data than ever before, many
organizations are still looking for better ways to obtain value from their data and compete in the
marketplace.
While some organizations have been able to leverage analytics effectively – and even
compete on the basis of analytics – other organizations are still in emerging stages and working
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to build new capabilities (Davenport &Harris, 2007a). The Bloomberg research sponsored by
SAS also found that traditional software tools still prevail, and that spreadsheets are still the
number-one tool used for business analytics (Bloomberg Business Research Services, 2011).
Key Organization Development Challenges
While data management and software tools are key technology challenges, there are also
important challenges with respect to organizational structures, analytic talent and leadership.
Organization structures. Based on the maturity of analytic capabilities within the
organization, decentralized vs. centralized organizational structures can be a key determinant of
success. According to Davenport, Harris, De Long and Jacobson (2001), decisions about how to
structure analytic resources may depend on a number of factors. Perhaps the most important
considerations are the relative sophistication of the analysis, the amount of local or departmental
knowledge that is required, and even the cultural orientation of the firm, since some
organizations have highly autonomous business units. The authors found that more complex
modeling is better done in a centralized group, or even outsourced if the work demands cuttingedge statistical skills. A centralized group may also work better because there is more
opportunity to share knowledge and to leverage unique skill sets. This has led some
organizations to form a Center of Expertise, more commonly referred to as an Analytics COE,
where analysts are centralized in one group.
Analytic talent. Another key organization development issue is the increasing demand
for analytic talent.
According to Davenport, Harris, De Long and Jacobson (2001),
Almost two-thirds of the companies we studied stated that recruiting, developing,
and retaining highly skilled employees with analytic capabilities has been a major
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human resource challenge. The particular skills and experience essential for
transforming data into knowledge depend, of course, upon individual roles and
responsibilities. They also vary with the scope and sophistication of the firm’s
analytic capability. No one individual can possess all the skills needed to
transform data into knowledge. Rather, people in specialized roles work together
to achieve this transformation. (p. 122-123)
According to the MGI Report, there will be a shortage of talent necessary for
organizations to take advantage of big data (Manyika, et al., 2011). “By 2018, the United States
alone could face a shortage of 140,000 to 190,000 people with deep analytical skills as well as
1.5 million managers and analysts with the know-how to use the analysis of big data to make
effective decisions” (p. 3).
Management of analytical talent. Even if appropriate analytical talent is in place in an
organization, management may lack understanding of the value of data and ways it can be
leveraged to take more informed action. Liberatore and Luo (2010) pointed out that “Insights
alone have limited value unless they can be translated into managerial actions, such as improving
operational decisions, redesigning or changing existing processes, and formulating or adjusting
strategies” (p. 315). May (2009) similarly observed that “Most organizations have not yet gone
through the organization learning necessary to extract value from these powerful technologies.”
May added that analytics is a capability built on a range of technologies, practices, and strategic
approaches and that “the ability to create value with the technologies of business analytics is a
function of culture, organization, and analytical skills” (p.175-176). According to Davenport,
Harris, De Long and Jacobson (2001),
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Companies are investing billions of dollars in technologies that generate huge
volumes of transaction data. However, these investments will not live up to their
potential unless firms are able to broaden capabilities – both technical and human
– to convert data into knowledge and then into business results. (p. 120)
Based on this observation, Davenport, Harris, De Long and Jacobson (2001) proposed a
model for understanding how transaction data can be turned into knowledge and – ultimately –
results. The model includes some key organization development components, including context,
transformation and outcomes. With respect to context, the authors pointed out that decisions are
not made in a vacuum. Rather, they are made in a context of business strategy, the skills and
experience of the people involved, the organization and its culture, technology and data. The
authors emphasized that analysis is seen as an iterative way to inform the decision-making
process – where the analysis informs decision making, and the decision-making process informs
additional information that is needed. Outcomes from improved business analytics are not only
seen as financial (in terms of savings or improved profitability), but also as changes in processes
or organizational behaviors.
Investments in Business Analytics
According to Davenport, Harris, De Long and Jacobson (2001), articulating a strategic
business case for a data-to-knowledge initiative will help create organizational support and can
even be used to obtain funding. In the process, the authors say that managers should consider
factors such as the relationship between the investment and core business processes and the
relevance of the information to the performance of the business. According to the authors, these
types of choices constitute the strategic context for investing in new analytic capabilities. The
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more clear and detailed an organization’s business strategy, the more obvious the data and
analytic capabilities it requires.
The literature also implies that evaluation of investments in business analytics should be
based on the capabilities that the organization wishes to build. According to Davenport and
Harris (2007), key considerations may include such factors as ways that the investment will
make the firm more competitive or improve enterprise-wide capabilities. Other considerations –
especially with respect to organizational structures, analytical talent, and management of
analytical talent – imply that investment in business analytics is as much an organization
development problem as it is a technical one.
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Chapter 3
Methodology
It has been said that Graham Allison’s case study Essence of Decision: Explaining the
Cuban Missile Crisis (1971) is among the best (and best-known) examples of case study research
(Yin, 2009). It may also be, as Yin (1981) noted, that Allison’s case study is by now outdated in
the sense that the historical events have faded from memory. Still, over fifty years after the
thirteen days in October, 1962, when, in Allison’s words, “the United States and the Soviet
Union paused at the nuclear precipice” (Allison, 1971, p. 1), Allison’s brilliant case study
provided the inspiration for my own comparatively small investigation of organizational life.
Of course, I know that the issues that I am proposing to address are not those of the life or
death consequences of nuclear war that then President John Kennedy faced. I think about what it
must have been like for Kennedy to know that missiles were lined up, seemingly on the offense,
and yet how he paused and took the time to make sense of the situation, and – more importantly,
weigh the consequences of escalating the situation. In a recent dialogue sponsored by the Wilson
Center and broadcast by National Public Radio, Allison said that Kennedy had faced the very
real possibility that between 40 and 90 million Americans would die if there were a nuclear war
(Wilson Center webcast, 2012). Allison quoted Kennedy as saying that the lesson from those
events was that “Going forward we must avert confrontations that force an adversary to choose
between humiliating retreat and war” (Webcast transcript, page 6).
Allison quoted Kennedy as a way to frame his research and form the title of his book
Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, as follows:
The essence of ultimate decision remains impenetrable to the observer – often, indeed to
the decider himself…. There will always be the dark and tangled stretches in the
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decision-making process – mysterious even to those who may be most intimately
involved. (p. vi)
Even in more ordinary contexts, though, organizational leaders may similarly struggle to
make sense of situations that are fraught with ambiguity and complexity and then weigh the
potential consequences of various courses of action. Each course of action, though, is itself a
result of a set of assumptions about the situation – with some factors playing a larger role in the
decision-making process than others. Borrowing from Allison’s approach, my plan to construct
three conceptual frameworks (and to show a social, economic and socio-economic perspectives
about a software investment proposal) similarly sought to explore the business case narrative to
illuminate what is emphasized or de-emphasized through the lens of each model. As Allison
(1971) wrote, “by comparing and contrasting the three frameworks, we see what each magnifies,
highlights, and reveals as well as what each blurs or neglects” (p. v).
While it is important to acknowledge that my own work was patterned after Allison’s
case study, there is also a key difference in the sense that my purpose was only to explore,
whereas Allison sought to both explore and explain. Allison (1971) wrote in the introduction to
his book that he had a dual purpose for his research. First, Allison wanted to explain the reasons
for unexplained questions and events surrounding the Cuban Missile Crisis, which remains, he
wrote (quoting Harold McMillan), “a strange and still scarcely explicable affair” (p. 1). Allison
noted that at the time he began his research, even some of the most central questions surrounding
the events surrounding the Cuban missile crisis had not been answered.
Second, Allison wanted to explore the influence of unrecognized assumptions upon our
thinking about events like the missile crisis. It is Allison’s second purpose that inspired my own
approach. In the construction of my research, I did not seek to explain why people make the
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decisions they made – but rather I wanted to explore ways that different conceptual models could
potentially frame a decision-maker’s thinking about the nature of the decisions to be made and
the way that a case is logically constructed.
As Allison (1971) wrote,
Answers to questions about why the Soviet Union tried to sneak strategic offensive
missiles into Cuba must be affected by the by basic assumptions we make, categories we
use, our angle of vision. But what kind of assumptions do we tend to make? How do
these assumptions channel our thinking? What alternative perspectives are available? (p.
v)
The distinction between the objective to explore vs. explain is an important one, because
the objective drives the form of the research. Stake (1995) pointed out that “a distinction
between what knowledge to shoot for fundamentally separates quantitative and qualitative
inquiry” (p. 37). In this way of thinking, my research is qualitative. As Stake wrote,
“Quantitative researchers have pressed for explanation and control; qualitative researchers have
pressed for understanding the complex interrelationships among all that exists” (p. 37).
Allison did more than just explore the three models. Allison also wanted to find out
whether one of the models did a better job of explaining events of 1962 than another model.
Allison ultimately found that each of the models did a better job of explaining certain aspects of
the crisis, or in framing provocative questions -- but that no one model provided an entirely
satisfactory view of events (in the sense that Allison’s central questions were definitively
answered). My research, in contrast, developed models in order to drive open-ended exploration
and discussion about what it means to invest in business analytics and develop new capabilities
within organizations.
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The Three Models as Paradigms
The research outlined in this proposal was also inspired by Allison’s methodology in the
sense that a social, economic and socio-economic view of the case is based on a set of basic
assumptions that may or may not be explicitly identified by the people involved; indeed, these
assumptions may even be taken for granted. For example, it may be that an economic model is
generally applied to evaluate investments because there are underlying beliefs about the nature of
what is important. In his description of the formulation of one of his models, Allison referred to
the concept of an analytic paradigm, “in the technical sense of that term developed by Robert K.
Merton for sociological analyses” (p. 32).
Merton, who provided the intellectual underpinnings of so many advancements in the
field of sociology – including (among many other concepts) the idea of the self-fulfilling
prophecy, the focused interview (later, focus groups), manifest and latent functions, social
dysfunctions – wrote extensively about the concept of using analytic paradigms as a way to
codify research materials.
In an essay about the codification of sociological theory, Merton (1996) wrote that
analysis of paradigms:
…bring out into the open air for all to see the array of assumptions, concepts, and basic
propositions employed in a sociological analysis. They thus reduce the inadvertent
tendency to hide the hard core of analysis behind a veil of random, though possibly
illuminating, comments and thoughts. (p. 57)
As part of another essay about functional analysis in sociology, Merton added that “above all, it
should be noted that the paradigm does not represent a set of categories introduced de novo, but
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rather a codification of those concepts and problems which have been forced upon our intention
by critical scrutiny of current research and theory” (1996, p. 81).
Merton (1957) later wrote that “With the appearance of Thomas S. Kuhn’s vastly
consequential book, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, the term paradigm has acquired a
substantially different set of meanings and far wider usage” (p. 61). Merton’s narrative goes on
to trace various meanings associated with the concept of the paradigm, including historical
references to Plato’s term paradeigmata and the seventeenth century usage to mean a pattern to
follow. According to Preston (2008), Kuhn used the term paradigm in more than one way;
however, the sense of the term that came to public consciousness is what Kuhn referred to as a
“disciplinary matrix,” meaning a larger more encompassing cognitive structure – “the entire
constellation of beliefs, values, techniques and so on shared by members of a given (scientific)
community” (p. 23).
Preston (2008) noted that Kuhn later took himself to task for using the term paradigm to
refer to a disciplinary matrix – but it is Kuhn’s notion of the paradigm as a disciplinary matrix
that seems relevant to all three models that I developed as part of my research. If it is true that
there is an underlying set of beliefs that informs an analysis of a problem, I wonder if it would be
possible to evolve that set of beliefs so that other factors originating within other paradigms
could also be considered. For example, could measures of human productivity ever be
assimilated in an economic view of a business case? Can management decision-making
competencies evolve to flow easily between economic perspectives to other social and socioeconomic frameworks? Perhaps more important, can management skills be expanded to flexibly
choose one frame over another, given the context? Or, I wonder, is it more the case that people
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tend to think in one frame of reference or another, and that it’s really quite difficult to assimilate
various perspectives in one model? Allison (1971) noted that:
Few analysts proceed exclusively and single-mindedly within a pure conceptual model.
Instead, they think predominantly in terms of one model, occasionally shifting from one
variant of it to another and sometimes appropriating material that lies entirely outside the
boundaries of the model. (p. 8)
Researcher’s Bias and the Idea That Measures are Constructions of Meaning
In a postscript related to his original text, Kuhn (2012) revisited his original assumptions
about the nature of paradigms because he was worried about what he referred to as “gratuitous
difficulties and misunderstandings” (p. 173). Kuhn acknowledged that he had used the term
paradigm in two different ways:
On the one hand, it stands for the entire constellation of beliefs, values, techniques, and
so on shared by the members of a given community. On the other, it denotes one sort of
element in that constellation, the concrete puzzle solutions which, employed as models or
examples, can replace explicit rules as a basis for the solution of the remaining puzzles of
normal science. (p. 174)
Kuhn’s second view of the paradigm was also relevant to my research with respect to my
assumption that different measures will flow out of different assumptions about the nature of
costs, benefits, and productivity. In this sense the paradigm is the basis on which other new (yet
related) elements are constructed. It may also be the case that new elements are differentiated
from other elements as a way to clarify meaning. For the purposes of my research, I thought of
measures as elements, and that the elements are part of a paradigm of thought, or – more to the
point – a modeled representation of a paradigm of thought. In my view, measures are
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themselves a codification of beliefs and a symbolic representation of meaning. This comes out
of my own experience working with information. I regularly work with people to understand
their meaning and then assemble information that is in response to that meaning. In other words,
I am biased in my view of the case as I see information as a construction of meaning. In my
view, to say that a number is “accurate” or “useful” is only relative to that context or the set of
assumptions in play.
Model Labels
Another important way that Allison inspired my proposed research relates to the way he
labeled his models. In one of Allison’s many detailed footnotes, he added that:
Earlier drafts of this argument have generated heated discussion about proper names for
the models. To choose names from ordinary language is to promote familiarity and to
court confusion. Perhaps it is best to think of these models simply as Model I, Model II,
and Model III. (p. 5)
Allison’s observation about the labels he chose for his models may very well apply to the labels
that I have associated with my own research. People may argue, for example, that the models
described are not purely economic or social, or they may reasonably argue that a socio-economic
construction of the business case should take into account additional external factors. For that
reason, it seems important to recognize that the terms Model I, Model II and Model III may be
more appropriate labels for each of the conceptual frameworks used in this study as well. There
were times, in fact, where my own learning journey led me to understand that the labels were in
many respects misleading. They remain here as a counterpoint to all that I learned and hope to
convey. In retrospect, I see that it should come as no surprise that I had applied my own
paradigms of thought to the construction of this study.
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Research Design
The research design that I employed included development of five components or
building blocks of analysis:
1) Review of the case to be examined
2) Development of three models or conceptual frameworks (economic, social and socioeconomic), each used as a lens or way to view the case
3) Development of units of measure associated with each of the three models
4) Development of a cross-model analysis
5) Discussion about findings as they relate to analytics
Building Block I: Development of the Case
At the time I began my research, management literature was full of information about
how companies were able to leverage data and analytic capabilities to improve their competitive
position and profitability in the marketplace. Because I have always worked in analytical
functions, I found these articles fascinating. I very much wanted to investigate those emerging
trends, and began to consider the list of people that I could talk to. Because of the complexity of
conditions across organizations, however, it seemed most practical to focus on a specific case
study in order to provide context for the analysis. I thought by focusing in on a very specific
situation with defined parameters, I could limit the scope of my research to a more practical
scale. Having worked through the complexity of issues implied by even a small case, I am very
glad that I took that path. I now see the issues associated with development of data and analytics
capabilities as more challenging than I originally imagined.
As a first step in my research, I was privileged to learn about the data and analytic
planning that was then taking place in a mid-size Minneapolis-St. Paul company. Because of the
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competitive environment surrounding use of data and analytics, the company name is
confidential. I have referred to the company as the Case Study Company, or CSC for short. In
choosing the company, I believed that the issues faced by the business leaders were
representative of the issues associated with analytic capability building that was then described
in the literature. Like other organizations, CSC was working to develop new data and analytics
capabilities, which represented very large investments of its financial resources. At the time –
and very likely now – the company had a community-minded focus, and regarded its obligations
to its customers to keep its product costs as low as possible. The company also wanted to ensure
that customers experienced high product quality and excellent customer service. At the time, the
company planned that analytics would aid business leaders to ensure that price, quality and
service remained in balance.
As part of my research, I reviewed four artifacts provided by the company. First, I
reviewed the proposal outlining the costs associated with the software purchase. A CSC
business leader told me that the high costs outlined in the software proposal meant that it
received special scrutiny by the company’s executives. I also reviewed research conducted by
technology consultants, who had conducted a review of the technology that was then in use by
the majority of the company’s analysts. After careful consideration and discussion, the
consultants had recommended an upgrade to the company’s software, along with some additional
investments. Third, I reviewed the company’s Data & Analytics Charter, which was developed
as a way to govern the large scope of work that the company envisioned. Finally, I also
reviewed the Power Point deck that was presented to CSC executives for discussion.
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Building Block II: Development of the Models/ Conceptual Frameworks
In order to develop the models and conceptual frameworks as part of Building Block II, I
reviewed the literature associated with each of the three views – economic, social, and socioeconomic. For each of the three views, I developed the following themes:


Narrative describing the literature associated with each view



Exploration of the ontological and epistemological underpinnings of each view



Conceptual model or framework that would be applied to business case development

Building Block III: Development of Factors or Measures Associated with Each Model
A third component of my research was to develop the schematic business case derived by
each model. In other words, I treated each of the three models as conceptual frameworks. My
premise was that each model would emphasize some factors over others, and that each would
employ different measures of costs, benefits and productivity. As noted earlier, it is my
experience that measures are a construction based on meaning and context. I did find that there
were different perspectives about costs, benefits and productivity associated with each model.
The measures were also used to develop a schematic view of the business case associated with
each model. My premise was that the business case used in decision making is itself a
construction of assumptions.
Building Block IV: Cross-Model Analysis
Once the three models were in place, I developed cross-model comparisons. I wanted to
show these comparisons schematically. I also wanted to show overlaps between views; for
example, I found that both the social and socio-economic views contain elements from the
economic view. I found it very interesting to see where those intersections occur. Although I
hoped to convey the similarities and differences in a visual way, I did not know at the beginning
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if it would be feasible. In this respect I am gratified that I have been able to prepare schematic
diagrams that make it easier to see how the business case is framed by alternative perspectives.
While my calculations showed that there were differences in the total costs and benefits, I
viewed it as most important to show the differences in the factors that were considered, and
highlight similarities and differences.
Validity: In order to construct the models so that the structure of the analysis is
consistent across all three conceptual frameworks, I relied upon a book written by Jaccard and
Jacoby (2010) entitled Theory Construction and Model-Building Skills. The authors emphasized
the idea of focusing concepts as a way to ensure the validity of analysis. Focusing concepts, as
defined by the authors, help to clarify the key ideas that are part of each of the three models.
Since the business case commonly in use for decision making weighs costs vs. benefits, I thought
that I should work with costs, benefits and productivity as focusing concepts. I thought that the
use of focusing concepts would also make the findings more relevant to the discussion about
organization capability building as it relates to data and analytics.
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Chapter Four
Findings
In retrospect, I see that exploratory research is a journey. As a researcher, I defined my
starting point but I did not have enough perspective to know if others had already traveled over
the same ground. There was even a point in time when I was concerned that the literature might
be too limited, and that I would not be able to find enough information to complete my work.
Instead, I encountered the opposite problem: there was so much literature that I realized that I
could only provide a schematic view of each of the three models. As I reviewed the scope of
work that had already been done, I began to feel that I had become a fellow traveler – part of an
expedition that had been underway for years. In this respect, my initial proposal to review the
work of Rensis Likert, Henri Savall and Richard Swanson was a lucky break. Their books
became a kind of home base for me. Time and again I returned to their writings, and once
grounded, headed out on the trail again. After reading their books, I began to think very
differently about the cost paradigm that is so much a part of my experience of organizational life.
I think that the transformation in my own understanding about costs, benefits and productivity
has given me more insight into the meaning of the word paradigm. While I intended to be
objective, I also see the way that my own values and beliefs can frame the way that I assess a
problem, make decisions, and develop measurements.
The Case Study Company View of the Case
I began my analysis by revisiting a business situation that had occurred within a midsized organization in the Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan area. The company regards its
obligation to customers and other stakeholders to keep costs as low as possible, while
maintaining high quality and excellent service. The company’s focus on costs meant that any
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proposal that had the potential to increase expenditures was scrutinized by leadership. The
organization had already debated the relative merit of purchasing software for use by its analysts.
At issue was the cost of the software. The organization’s leadership had rejected previous
proposals, concluding that the software would only add to administrative costs without any
expected return on investment. When the proposal was again submitted for review, the
company’s decision making approach was again used to model and evaluate the costs and
benefits associated with purchase of the software. As before, the costs associated with the
software were clearly articulated, and offsetting benefits such as improvements in the
productivity of people or improvements in analytic capabilities were deemed as soft and not
taken into account. The case study company ultimately decided to purchase the software, but the
decision-makers emphasized that plans to hire two additional analytic resources would need to
be re-evaluated. In other words, the business leaders planned that the cost of the software could
be offset by the financial savings associated with elimination of plans to hire two open positions.
The savings associated with not hiring two people is considered “hard” savings because
projections for administrative expenses (part of overall costs) could be reduced.
Model I: The Economic View
Expenditures for new technology are among the largest investments that an organization
will make – and not only because of the money involved, but also because of the implications for
change within the organization. Decisions about technology may affect a large number of
organizational departments and processes, especially when people are asked to work differently
or to accommodate a new process. The changes may also affect external business partners,
customers or vendors. Because of these potentially far-reaching impacts, investments in
technology maybe distinct from other kinds of investments in fixed assets (Peppard & Ward,
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2005). “There is a risk,” warned Peppard and Ward, “of bringing the business to a grinding halt
if it fails” (p. 53).
Business leaders generally agree that it is important to link investments to business
strategy. Although technology improvements are of potentially high strategic value, business
leaders typically find themselves in a situation where they have few tools or roadmaps to aid
their decision making process (Peppard & Ward, 2005). Traditional approaches such as
payback, return on investment (ROI), net present value (NPV) are often used to evaluate
technology investments. These tools capture “hard” benefits, which usually relate to cost
reduction. Although the tools are specifically designed to assess the bottom-line financial impact
of an investment, they largely ignore benefits that are more difficult to quantify (Patel & Irani,
1999). The inability to incorporate important benefits may lead to the dilemma, as Peppard and
Ward (2005) pointed out, that the return on investment may be insufficient – at least in the view
of company financial managers and other stakeholders.
Ironically, even the benefits associated with strategic innovation – presumably based on
plans that emerged out of a careful process of business analysis – are deemed as soft benefits in
the sense that there is a risk that the benefits may not materialize. Consider, for example, a
potential list of benefits that may be associated with technology investment: improved customer
service, better management control, organizational change, facilitation of new management
strategies, and competitive advantage (Giaglis, Mylonopoulos, & Doukidis, 1999). These
benefits may be deemed as soft, but they are not trivial considerations for business leaders.
In the economic view of the CSC case, the assessment of costs included the expenses for
the software license and maintenance fees, consulting fees related to implementation, and
training costs, as shown in Table 1.
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Table 1
Summary of Costs for New Technology and Training
Year
One
Software Cost
License fees for current software
License fees to upgrade software
Software license maintenance fees
Consulting Fees
Set up technical environments
Implement software upgrade
Training Costs
In-house training
Cost Avoidance
Sunset existing software
Total

$ 70,000 $
$ 150,000 $
$
$

Two

Three

$
$
40,000 $

Four-Year
Total

Four

$
$
40,000 $

$
$
40,000 $

70,000
150,000
120,000

$ 200,000 $
$ 50,000 $

-

$
$

-

$
$

-

$
$

200,000
50,000

$

20,000 $

-

$

-

$

-

$

20,000

$

(10,000) $

-

$

-

$

-

$

(10,000)

$ 480,000 $

40,000 $

40,000 $

40,000 $

600,000

An important point about the costs that are summarized in Table 1 is that they are costs
that would be incremental to the company. Other costs that might be associated with the
investment – most notably the salaries and benefits associated with the people that will use the
software – are not considered because they are already included in the company’s analysis of net
income. If the company leadership agreed to the proposal, the costs in Table 1 would potentially
reduce the company’s assessment of net income – assuming that all other assumptions stay the
same. When the CSC business leaders agreed to the proposal, they also decided to offset the
increase in costs shown with a reduction in salary expense. Plans to hire two new staff members
were put on hold. In other words, the business leaders considered that the decision to spend the
$600,000 for the software would add to administrative expenses, and reduce net income. By
putting plans to hire the two analysts on hold, the incremental costs for new technology were
neutralized over the four-year period, as shown in Table 2.
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Table 2
Neutralization of Incremental Costs
Year

Technology and training costs
Decision to not hire two analysts
Net Expenses

Four-Year
One
Two
Three
Four
Total
$ 480,000 $ 40,000 $ 40,000 $ 40,000 $
600,000
$
$ (200,000) $ (200,000) $ (200,000) $ (600,000)
$ 480,000 $ (160,000) $ (160,000) $ (160,000) $
-

Even though the benefits of the proposal were considered soft, the CSC business case did
outline a number of ways that the company’s analysts would benefit from the investment. Most
notably, the proposal identified that there were a number of technical difficulties that analysts
encountered because of the need to work with multiple software tools. Implementation of new
software would mean that analysts would be able to work within one tool for most tasks. While
these benefits were important considerations, they were regarded as “soft” benefits, and not as a
potential financial offsets to costs. Roulstone and Phillips (2008) explained that soft benefits are
intangible measures, which “cannot or should not be converted to monetary values” (p. 231). In
their view, though, that does not mean that they should not be monitored or considered in the
evaluation process. “In some projects,” the authors wrote, “the intangible benefits can be more
important than tangible measures” (p. 231). They added, “The challenge is to efficiently identify
and report them” (p. 231).
In addition to the difficulties business leaders face as they attempt to quantify soft
benefits, there is also the problem that large scale investments occur in a changing context (Patel
& Irani, 1999). Investment in other kinds of assets is more fixed in the sense that there is defined
point in time that is being considered. Technology investments, on the other hand, are more
contextual and are associated with evolving the business over time.
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Technology implementations may also be problem-based or innovation-based (Peppard
& Ward, 2005). Problem-based implementation, according to the authors, is generally used to
remove constraints or overcome an existing disadvantage against competitors. Innovation-based
interventions, in contrast, are “dependent on a combination of the new technology, the
organization’s technical expertise, and the ability of the organization to change in order to make
effective use of the new capabilities” (p. 58). An example of an innovation-based intervention is
development of new analytic capabilities, where business leaders work to integrate and leverage
diverse sources of information and then apply analytic modeling for competitive advantage.
Alternative decision-making approaches that take into account social, organization and
contextual factors have been developed, but are generally regarded as a risky way to make a
decision. Most business leaders continue to rely on payback, ROI and NPV approaches. This
means that business leaders place more priority on information that they perceive to be objective,
as opposed to subjective. Yet problems in evaluating technology investments continue to persist.
Business leaders have identified a litany of problems, specifically noting the difficulties in the
areas of identification and quantification of costs, opportunity costs, and benefits (Ballentine &
Stray, 1999).
Model I in Review: As I began my research, I had labeled Model I as the “economic”
view. As I reviewed the literature, I realized that the traditional cost-benefit analysis used in
decision-making in organizations is not really economic at all, but rather an accounting construct
that I had confused with economics. I had originally reasoned that even introductory economics
classes begin by showing the relationship between costs and benefits. In the accounting view,
though, it is only certain benefits that can be weighed against certain costs. There is also a
distinction between benefits that are associated with tangible vs. intangible accounting standards.
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Financial statements of net income are primarily based on tangible assets, which are tangible in
the sense that they are physical. Of course, employees are tangible in the sense that they can be
seen, but for the purposes of financial reporting in most organizations, employee salary and
benefits are considered costs.
Model I reveals some important ways that traditional decision making processes
incorporate detailed information about costs, but leave out factors related to potential benefits
and improvements in productivity. Table 3 summarizes the Model I decision factors and
quantifies the magnitude of each factor. Table 3 also provides a cross-reference to the table that
shows the decision factor and magnitude. Figure 1 visually shows the factors related to costs, as
well as the factors related to cost avoidance.
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Table 3
Summary of Model I Decision Factors
Decision
Factor

Consideration

Item

Magnitude

CrossReference
Table
(340,000)
1
(250,000)
1
(20,000)
1

Incremental
Costs

The license costs for software, consulting fees,
and training costs would be accounted for as
expenses within the Case Study Company's
financial reports. The costs are incremental in
the sense that they add to the company's record
of expenses. The additional expenses will
reduce net income by a corresponding amount.

Software
Consulting fees
Training Costs

$
$
$

Cost
Avoidance

If the new software is purchased, some expenses
can be eliminated. Incremental costs can be
offset if older software is eliminated and new
employees are not hired.

Sunset existing software
New hires on hold

$
$

Benefits

Benefits relate to reduction in costs.

Factor not quantified

$

-

Not
applicable

Productivity

The impact of the software and training on
employee productivity and value of analytic
projects to the organization is not quantified.

Factor not quantified

$

-

Not
applicable

10,000
600,000

1
2

Training Costs
Consulting fees
Software

New hires on hold

Benefits

Sunset existing software

Soft savings, not quantified

Productivity

Cost Avoidance

Incremental Costs
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Soft savings, not quantified

-$400 -$200

$0

$200

$400

$600 $800
Thousands

Figure 1. Summary of Model I measurements of costs, benefits and productivity. Measures of
costs, benefits, and productivity are represented graphically to show the relative value of the
factors used in decision making. Costs affecting net income (modeled as incremental costs) are
shown as negative amounts. Offsetting factors that result in cost avoidance are modeled as
positive amounts.
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Model II: The Social View
In a meeting about upcoming organizational changes, an executive looked out over the
large group of employees that had gathered in the auditorium. His gold watch glinting under the
lights, he opened the meeting with a sweeping gesture that seemed to dismiss all of us
simultaneously. “We like to say,” he said, “that our employees are our most valuable asset. But
that of course would be disingenuous. Actually, it’s our high-performing employees that are our
stars – our most valuable assets. Only fifteen percent of you are in that category. The rest of
you need to carefully consider how you can increase your value to the organization.”
The meeting had been set up to focus on upcoming organizational changes, but as the
group somberly filed out of the meeting it was apparent that the executive had made his point.
The meaning of the word “asset” had suddenly taken on a different connotation – and, at least for
me, replaced the feeling that I was a valued and respected person in the workplace with the
unsettling idea that my salary was a payment for personal performance, and that my personal
performance must be sufficient to ensure financial returns for the organization. In my mind at
least, there was also an implication that someone somewhere was watching. Back in my work
area, I noticed the tension as people went about their work. The days following the warning
from the executive wore on in heavy silence. Where there had once been an atmosphere of
teamwork and camaraderie, there was now a sense of competition and survival of the fittest.
After many months of angst, the organization cut hundreds of people from the payroll in a move
to reduce costs.
The seeming disconnect between the assumption that “people are an organization’s most
valuable asset” and the reality that layoffs of people are “a cost-cutting measure” has perhaps not
received the scrutiny that it deserves. How can an employee be referred to as an “asset” one day,
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and a “cost” the next? Even Webster’s dictionary defines the word “asset” as “anything
advantageous” as a primary definition (Morehead & Morehead, 1995). Yet the meaning of the
word, according to the dictionary, derives from “the Anglo-French phrase aver asetz, to have
enough (as enough to pay one’s debts)” (p.50). This is the source of the secondary definition of
the word asset, which refers to “items of property available” and “total resources.” And yet,
upon review, the literature is full of references to the concept of employees as assets vs. costs –
and has been for decades.
When the executive claimed that “employees are our greatest asset,” he really meant that
in his organization, expenses for salaries and benefits outweighed the expenses for all other kinds
of costs. The idea that accounting systems show salaries and benefits as costs, and not as assets,
is consistent with accounting standards that were designed to capture information about financial
and physical capital. Financial and physical capital are regarded as tangible assets – meaning
those expenses that have a physical form. Of course, people have a physical form, but in the
accounting view tangible assets include consideration for items such as computer hardware,
buildings, land, and equipment. Tangible assets are also described as financial capital and cash.
Accounting standards for intangible assets, on the other hand, include a limited set of
non-physical items, such as copyrights, patents, computer programs, or other rights that give an
organization an exclusive or preferred position in the marketplace (Davidson, Stickney & Weil,
1979). Although these standards are still in practice, a review of the literature shows that there
is a large body of commentary about the importance of managing intangible assets. Some of
these researchers point out that in companies where costs are predominantly related to the
salaries and benefits for people, traditional measures of performance may actually be misleading.
For example, Flamholtz, Bullen and Hua (2002) explained that financial accounting treats human
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resource costs as current expenses that reduce the net income of the company. Investments are
not thought of as related to people, but rather physical assets that will provide future benefits to
the company. It is the physical or tangible assets that are recorded on a company’s balance
sheet, and not the intangible assets. The authors explained that
Accounting today is still based on an industrial paradigm in which only physical and
tangible property is considered an asset. But organizations now need systems that
continually assess and re-assess the people they employ, including their skills, talents and
behavioral attributes, while paying attention to how human resources impact the bottom
line (p. 951).
While it is affirming to think of the value of each person, it may also be true that not all
people are perceived to add value in an organization. As many people in organizational life have
witnessed, people can be thought of valuable one day and a cost the next. Mayo (2012)
explained the difference in perspectives:
Can we say that people truly are ‘the most valuable assets we have’? Or should this
engender the cynical response that it often gets? Without people, for sure, no value for
stakeholders will be provided and increased. In this sense, they are the foundation of the
whole value creation enterprise, whether commercial or public. But the clichéd statement
is trite, because it is some aspects of some people which are the assets. There can be
people who actually subtract value from stakeholders (p. 52).
Some would go beyond the notion of the value of people to the concept of people as
human capital. Human capital is regarded as intangible in the sense that the collective
knowledge, skills and expertise of people cannot be seen. At the same time, human capital is
regarded as an intangible asset because it is the collective knowledge, skills and expertise that
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have the potential to add value to the organization. In other research, the term human capital
refers to a combination of factors about people, including traits such as intelligence, ability to
learn, or motivation to share information and knowledge (Fitz-enz, 2009). “The great irony,”
wrote Fitz-enz, “is that the only economic component that can add value in and by itself is the
one that is the most difficult to evaluate” (p. xviii). In considering people as “human capital”
management not only recognizes the importance of people in the organization, but also the need
to manage people effectively to improve performance. Fitz-enz explained, “the fundamental
question has become, how do we improve the return on investment in human capital?”
Some researchers are advocating that the concept of intangible assets should be expanded
to regard all forms of knowledge within an organization as an asset. Some would go so far as to
include not only the knowledge and skills of the workforce, but also the technological
capabilities of the organization, and the nature of the relationship of the organization to its
customers (Fitz-enz, 2009). As part of this framework, the sum of all of a company’s
knowledge, capabilities and relationships would be part of a larger framework called intellectual
capital. In this view, intellectual capital would be parallel in importance with financial capital,
and give managers a new set of tools to manage more effectively. For reference, a representation
of the relative alignment of these concepts is shown in Figure 2.
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Figure 2. Schematic diagram of the concept of financial vs. intellectual capital.
Traditional accounting measures differentiate between tangible assets and intangible assets.
Tangible assets include physical items such financial capital, plants and equipment, employee
salaries and benefits, and cash. Intangible assets include non-physical properties that are unique
to the organization, such as copyrights and patent protections. There is longstanding debate
about the need to expand the concept of intangible assets to include measures of the value of the
knowledge and skills of people, the organization’s capabilities, and customer relationships.
Schematically, financial capital would be parallel in importance with intellectual capital.

While the traditional view of intangible assets is still in use in contemporary accounting
systems, there is growing recognition that the meaning of intangible assets should be expanded
to include human capital, organization capital, and customer capital. For an increasing number
of industries, the expenses for employee benefits and salaries have surpassed other kinds of costs
(Barber & Strack, 2005). “Strictly defined,” wrote Barber and Strack, “these are operations –
whether entire companies or business units – with 1) high overall employee costs, 2) a high ratio
of employee costs to capital costs, and 3) limited spending on activities, such as R&D, aimed at
generating future revenue” (p. 82). In a business where expenses are dominated by people, the
authors wrote, capital-oriented metrics developed in an industrial era are not much help. Barber
and Strack explained further:
When a business has relatively high employee costs, traditional capital-oriented
performance measures such as return on assets can be irrelevant, if not misleading. An
alternative approach, based on a company’s existing financial information but focused on
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employees, can tell you how the business is truly doing and suggest ways to improve
performance. (p. 88)
Barber and Strack’s suggested definition of economic profit would focus on the productivity of
people rather than capital. The authors wrote:
Instead of asking how much capital is used in the business and what the productivity of
that capital is compared with its cost, you ask how many employees work in the business
and what their productivity is in comparison to their cost. While both methods yield the
same measure of economic profit, the employee-oriented calculation, by highlighting the
productivity of people rather than capital, isolates the main driver of performance in a
people-oriented business. (p. 88)
Management of intangible assets (meaning the knowledge and skills of people) would
consider both current and future benefits to the organization. In the majority of people-oriented
businesses, where a company’s employee costs can be three or more times capital costs, people
are generally working to create value in the present. Barber and Strack (2005) pointed out that
managing people who are working to create value in the present depends upon use of employeeoriented performance metrics, a focus on operational improvements to drive performance, and
short-term variable compensation such as bonuses. In other people-oriented companies, though,
people are working to generate value that will occur in the future. Examples of work products
that have value might include development of new software, the research needed to formulate a
new medication, or the work to build a new brand. In this view, management of people
businesses depends on the different ways that people in the organization are working to create
value.
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The literature also suggests that there may be very significant differences of opinion
about the ways that tangible and intangible assets should be measured and monitored, how
accounting standards would need to change, and – especially – the measurement problems that
would need to be overcome. Kaplan and Norton (2004b) regarded measurement of intangible
assets as problematic for a number of reasons. First, value is relative to the organization’s
objectives in a fast-changing competitive environment. For example, a company may have
significant technological capabilities, but those capabilities are viewed as relative to the
capabilities of competitors. For example, analytic capabilities do not stand alone in an
organization; in order to create value, analytic capabilities must be leveraged in combination
with other organizational processes or technology applications.
Ontology. While on the surface it may appear that measurement of organization
performance is best left to a company’s finance professionals, it is important to consider that the
debates about what to measure are, in part, ontological. The division between tangible and
intangible assets may represent an ontological dividing line that differentiates between measures
that are deemed objective vs. those that are subjective. Managers trained to think from an
objectivist perspective may regard “tangible” assets as a knowable reality and “intangible” assets
as invisible and therefore subjective. In the objectivist view, financial data and measurements
do not require the same critical scrutiny as other forms of information. Managers who view the
nature of truth through a social constructionist lens, on the other hand, may be more comfortable
with many forms of information – even the accounting measures. Presumably, those trained to
manage from a rationalist perspective may be better equipped to critically evaluate the quality of
the information, no matter what the source. Yet, ironically, the rationalist paradigm influences
the belief that the accounting measures should be accepted as facts, and that other measures
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should be dismissed as subjective. The current divide in the accounting debate has likely
highlighted the difficulty of turning information about the performance of people into accounting
data – and in the process has only reinforced the idea measurement of the value of intangible
assets is subjective.

A schematic representation of this perspective is shown in Figure 3.
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Figure 3. Objectivism and ontological perspectives about the meaning of financial performance
measures. The emphasis on rationalism in business management has influenced the perspective
that some measures of financial performance can be accepted as truth, while other measures are
subjective.

Gowthorpe (2008) pointed to an evolution in the objectivity of financial reporting, from a
focus on cash flows to a focus on balance sheets and income statements to the more recent
debate about expanding the scope of intangible assets in reporting. One reason that development
of intangible assets remains incomplete, the author explained, is that managers are still
uncomfortable with subjective judgment. The focus on rational decision making, according to
Spender and Marr (2006), has meant that business leaders view knowledge about organizational
performance as “a knowable reality,” and the organization as “purposive and goal oriented” (p.
11). Yet the increasing complexity and competitiveness of the business environment has meant
that as more information becomes available, it can be very difficult to differentiate between
objective and subjective information. Accounting debacles such as Enron – and of course the

50
dramatic and still unfolding impacts of the worldwide economic crisis – may have influenced
business leaders to be more skeptical of accounting numbers, and to realize that at least some
financial reporting can be more of a construction of assumptions than truth.
But running a business is also a personal quest, and many ethical people work from an
inner sense of passion, creativity and artistry. Market conditions are turbulent, and the way
forward is, most of the time, unclear. Business leaders have increasingly looked to other sources
of knowledge, other indicators, and other perspectives. Most managers have also observed the
iterative decision making process displayed by top executives, who – after careful review of
objective information – creatively chart a remarkable and inspiring course forward. These
decision makers assimilate multiple sources of information and then bring all of it to life to by
imbuing it with meaning that is specific to the organization. Strategic plans are developed, and
the data is used to support new strategic imperatives for the organization. Having witnessed
these critical assessments and other commitments displayed by leadership, most line managers
would hesitate to suggest that the strategic plans generated by a review of data are anything less
than rational. Paradoxically, the meaning that top executives associate with objective data
becomes – at least for those employees that willingly follow the new course – the new rationalist
view.
The problem, according to Vlismas and Venieris (2011) is not so much that management
is unwilling to make the ontological shift (meaning a shift from objectivism to social
constructionism), but rather that there has not been enough exploration of the underlying
ontology and epistemology associated with intellectual capital. In addition, the lack of research
has stalled development of new theory. According to Vlismas and Venieris, there is a causal
relationship between intellectual capital and economic performance that needs to be better
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understood. In other words, there is a need to understand whether intellectual capital develops
within the organizational context, or whether it is intellectual capital that empowers an
organization to achieve performance. Acaniz, Gomez-Bezares and Roslender (2011) similarly
pointed to a “continued absence of a critical perspective on intellectual capital” and a
“potentially valuable space for a further round of theoretical activity” (p. 104).
Emphasizing the subjective nature of intellectual capital in the literature, O’Donnell
(2004) wrote that:
It is increasingly accepted that intellectual capital is probably becoming the primary
source of organizational value – notwithstanding the fact that we have yet to clearly
define it. This complex, dynamic and still very fuzzy construction is viewed here as
simply a dynamic process of situated collective knowing that is capable of being
leveraged into economic and social value. (p. 295)
Referring to concept of intellectual capital, O’Donnell (2004) also wrote about the ambiguity of
the term:
Intellectual capital, similar to other abstractions such as ‘economy’ or ‘organization’ or
‘management’ is a human construction, reproduced by a wide variety of texts, discourses
and practices that help us to make some sense, or perhaps nonsense, of our worlds. (p.
296)
Epistemology. If current management debate over ways to account for economic
performance is, in part, ontological, there is at least as much controversy over epistemology.
The conception of intangible assets as the cumulative knowledge and capabilities of the
organization has likely fanned the flames of what can only be described as an epistemological
debate. Williams (2008) suggested that there is a need for research that would explain the nature
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of knowledge, and explore the concept of knowledge as an asset – as well as the ways that
knowledge can be operationalized or leveraged for economic gain. Williams also added that
“there is a need to find a way to manage, measure and communicate the value of intellectual
capital assets” (p. 83).
Admittedly, the argument that knowledge is a corporate asset can be a bit circular. On
one hand, a focus on organizational performance can enhance employee knowledge and
capability. On the other hand, employee knowledge and capabilities can enhance organizational
performance. Either way, business leaders are also looking for ways to measure the value of
knowledge and organizational capabilities, and are seeking to ways to leverage that knowledge to
enhance organizational performance. Some researchers have also pointed out that organizational
knowledge should be developed in concert with organization capabilities (Moustaghfir, 2009).
Moustaghfir wrote that:
There is a need to explain how knowledge assets, through learning mechanisms, are
linked, renewed, and leveraged into socio-technical processes or organization routines,
that in turn form the basis of organizational capabilities. As they are socially constructed,
these organizational capabilities, when leveraged into products and services, generate
value and provide firms with a sustainable advantage and long term superior
performance. (p. 339)
Spender (2006) pointed out that there has been a transition in management perspectives
about the value of knowledge, and the idea that business leaders are increasingly working with
both positivistic and interpretive sources of information in order to understand and enhance the
performance of the organization. As business leaders have become more comfortable with
various sources of information, they have also begun collecting information that is from external
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sources. This has also led to a conception of the organization as a complex system, where
business leaders regard knowledge as organic. The new focus on analytics is just one example of
ways that business leaders are working to uncover patterns and relationships in data, and
leveraging those data relationships for competitive advantage.
Relationship to organization development practice. If organizational development
practitioners happened to be listening on the sidelines of these ontological and epistemological
debates about the drivers of organizational performance, they may be tempted to join the
discussion. As organizational development practitioners know, the inter-relationships between
people, organizational structures and organizational performance have been the subject of
organization development research for decades. For example, Lewin began to conduct research
in organizations in the 1940’s, and looked at the nature of resistance as people encountered the
need to change (Lewin, 1997). Perhaps more to the point of this research, organizational
research has also addressed the problem of measurement. Over fifty years ago, in fact, Likert
(1967) observed that the lack of information about the value of people had led to mis-informed
decisions about strategies of importance to the organization, such as development of new
systems of management, cost reduction strategies, and managerial compensation:
Accounting procedures at present ignore a substantial proportion of the incomeproducing assets of firms. As a result, all levels of management are handicapped by the
inadequate and at times inaccurate information now available to them. The costs to the
firm from the adverse consequences of this inadequate information are greatest at the
highest levels in the corporation. (p. 115)
Likert (1958) described two key reasons for the way that accounting processes had
evolved. First, traditional theories of management largely ignored motivational and other human
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behavior variables. Second, the social sciences were not developed enough to provide methods
for measuring the quality of the human organization. Likert explained that the traditional
methods were related to the theory of scientific management, cost accounting and related
developments, and general administrative concepts taken from military organizational theory.
“As a consequence,” he wrote, “it (traditional accounting) calls for measurements that are
concerned with such end result variables as profits and costs, or with such process variables as
productivity” (p. 42-43).
Likert’s writings also highlighted social sciences research that showed how management
could influence productivity, performance, and earnings. He pointed out that the highest
performing organizations had “mobilized both noneconomic motives and economic needs so that
all available motivational forces create cooperative behavior focused on achieving organization’s
objectives” (1967, p. 106). “If human asset accounting were added to the usual accounting
process,” Likert wrote, “the management of business and governmental organizations would be
appreciably improved” (p. 115).
Likert was also engaged in research that evaluated changes in organizational performance
over time. He found that traditional measures of accounting, which only show a composite view
of earnings and productivity, had obscured the true impact of the changes. The most productive
organizations, he wrote, “apparently require an appreciable period of time before the impact of
the change is fully manifest in corresponding improvement” (1967, p.81). Likert also pointed to
research that showed the positive impact of a shift in managerial behavior to achieve higher
productivity and reduce costs. In organizations where only economic needs were considered, he
found that cost-reduction had involved a tightening of hierarchical controls and increasing
pressure to increase productivity. There was also pressure to lower costs through personnel
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limitations, budget cuts, and the introduction or tightening of work standards. Citing numerous
studies that had been conducted to evaluate the impact of cost-cutting in organizations, Likert
wrote
When the unfavorable trends in productivity, waste, costs, and labor relations caused by
the usual cost-reduction procedures finally becomes evident, there are no measurements
which point to the true causes of the adverse shifts. As a consequence, a wrong diagnosis
is commonly made; the wrong causes are blamed, and the corrective steps are often
focused on the wrong variables. (p. 84)
Likert and Seashore, who studied what they characterized as “the cost-reduction sequence
in organizations,” showed how changes in management behavior had a long-term effect on
employee attitudes and performance, which ultimately deteriorated the quality of products and
services, and ultimately customer reactions and loyalty (Likert & Seashore, 1963). The authors
pointed to research that showed that the highest producing managers did not believe that
successful and sustained cost reduction could be achieved through cost cutting programs.
Instead, the high-performing managers focused on high productivity goals where people were
motivated to reduce waste and costs, and where cost concern had become a continuous
characteristic of the organization.
In other research, Likert (1961) documented an extensive series of studies focused on
achievement of organizational goals. Based on this research, Likert emphasized the importance
of cooperative relationships, goal setting, and also the idea that the highest levels of productive
and cooperative motivation are obtained when noneconomic motives are made compatible with
economic motives. Other organizational researchers and scholars had similarly linked the
behavior of people to economic performance. Douglas McGregor, who conducted research to
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uncover the most effective ways to manage people, may have influenced Rensis Likert’s
assessments of high performing managers. McGregor’s Theory X – which contends that
employees must be commanded and controlled in order to perform – and Theory Y – which
contends that employees are self-motivated and self-directed – has shifted the thinking from a
focus on the productivity of people to an expanded view that the productivity of people is related
to the quality of management (McGregor, 2006). Later, Will Schutz – who wrote extensively
about simplicity, joy and truth – emphasized the importance of the quality of relationships at
work, as well as the relationship between personal empowerment and productivity (1994).
Schutz is also noted for the development of Element B (then FIRO-B), which is a survey
measuring awareness of self and others that is still in use today.
Given the research showing the relationship between the productivity of people and
organizational performance, Likert advocated for human asset accounting as a way to enhance
traditional accounting measures. The new measures that Likert proposed were developed to take
into account “the productive capacity of a firm’s human organization” and also “the value of its
customer goodwill” (1967, p. 148). Likert advocated that new procedures could be developed to
assess a number of factors, such as the level of intelligence and aptitudes, level of training, level
of performance goals, motivation to achieve organizational success, quality of leadership, and
quality of decision making.
Likert (1967) had envisioned that it would be necessary to collect data over time so that
management could work with the information, understand the meaning of the measures, and also
work to build the information sources so that the measures could be computed on a continuous
basis. Perhaps even more interesting, Likert also envisioned that human asset accounting, in
combination with methodologies and substantive findings from social science research, could
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make great contributions to management. In his research, Likert found that high producing
managers used a combination of tools. The best managers, in his view, had not only leveraged
the cost accounting tools, but they had also integrated other factors such as confidence and trust,
motivation, loyalty and communication (Likert, 1958).
At the time Likert proposed human asset accounting, accounting professionals had
already recognized the importance and value of people and customer goodwill to organizations.
However, the cost to change over to new accounting practices was high, and they had trouble
justifying the additional work effort to their business leaders. Likert (1967) responded to these
concerns with a concern of his own:
In considering the desirability and expense of undertaking the work required for human
asset accounting, it should be recognized that the present practice of treating, with great
precision, a fraction of a firm’s assets and completely ignoring assets of roughly the same
or greater magnitude represents a serious imbalance. (p. 152)
The cost to develop the new measures and develop new accounting practices was only
part of the problem. Accountants were also concerned about the fact that the measures would
need to be tracked over time in order to ensure the stability and validity of the new approach.
More than that, there was no consensus about the measures themselves. There were many
proposals and papers, but there were no approved standards to adhere to. Without standards,
many worried, there would be a danger that new measures of performance could be very
subjective and could themselves be misleading (Flamholtz, Bullen & Hua, 2002).
Despite the many concerns raised by accounting professionals, Likert continued to
develop concepts and methods of accounting for human resources, and began to collaborate with
other researchers. One of the outcomes of that research was that idea that human resource
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accounting (HRA) could also be leveraged as a managerial tool or way to enhance managerial
effectiveness. Additional research focused on HRA as a framework that could be used to
facilitate decision making (Flamholtz, Bullen & Hua, 2002). Results from some focused studies
showed that HRA data affected managerial decisions, both at the choice and process levels.
Flamholtz, Bullen and Hua (2002) also wrote about more contemporary research conducted in
Sweden. The authors pointed to findings from that research showed that HRA information is
critical for increased accuracy in investment-related decisions -- especially in knowledgeintensive organizations.
During the same timeframe that Likert was working to propose the new performance
measures, Theodore Schultz had written about an economic concept that he had termed “human
capital” (Fitz-enz, 2009). Schultz, who was then the President of the American Economic
Association, structured his presidential address to describe the economic impact of investment in
human capital (Schultz, 1961). In his address, Schultz explored the idea that economic growth
could not be explained by growth in financial capital alone. Human capital, he wrote, “has
surely been increasing at a rate substantially greater than reproducible (nonhuman) capital” (p.
5). Schultz explained that there were two sets of forces that probably accounted for the
discrepancy. One, he explained, was increasing returns to scale, and the second was related to
improvements in human capacity. Both factors, he added, had been excluded from economic
analyses.
Schultz was also careful to address the sensibilities of his 1961 audience, which he
recognized had been greatly affected by the social forces that had led to catastrophic world
events and the deep spiritual chasms related to discrimination of people. Worried that his use of
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the word “human capital” would imply a return to the idea that people were only a commodity –
or, worse, a head count in production – Schultz (1961) explained that:
The failure to treat human resources explicitly as a form of capital, as a produced means
of production, as the product of investment, has fostered the retention of the classical
notion of labor as a capacity to do manual work requiring little knowledge or skill, a
capacity with which, according to this notion laborers are endowed about equally. This
notion of labor was wrong in the classical period and it is patently wrong now. Counting
individuals who can and want to work and treating such a count as a measure of the
quantity of an economic factor is no more meaningful than it would be to count the
number of all manner of machines to determine their economic importance either as a
stock of capital or as a flow of productive services. (p. 3)
In his speech, Schultz (1961) further explained that laborers had become “capitalists”
because of the acquisition of knowledge and skill that have economic value. He added, “This
knowledge and skill are in great part the product of investment and, combined with other human
investment, predominantly account for the productive superiority of the technically advanced
countries” (p. 3). Nearly two decades later in 1979, Schultz won the Nobel Prize for his work on
the plight of the world’s under-developed countries. His claim was that improving the welfare of
poor people did not depend on land, equipment or energy, but rather on knowledge (Fitz-enz,
2009).
The social view as a paradigm. The interaction between people and structure has
always been part of the core beliefs of human resource development (HRD) and its underlying
theory. Richard Swanson (2001b), a highly respected scholar in the area of HRD, defined HRD
as “a process of developing and/ or unleashing human expertise through organization
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development and personnel training and development for the purpose of improving
performance” (p. 304). In Swanson’s view, organization development is “the process of
systematically implementing organization change for the purpose of improving performance” (p.
304). In addition, training and development is “the process of systematically developing
expertise in individuals for the purpose of improving performance” (p. 304). With
organizational performance in mind, Swanson also described a set of core HRD beliefs (2001b):


Organizations are human-made entities that rely on human expertise in order to
establish and achieve their goals.



Human expertise is developed and maximized through HRD processes and should be
done for the mutual long-term and/or short-term benefits of the sponsoring
organization and the individuals involved.



HRD professionals are advocates of individual and group, work process and
organizational integrity. (p. 304)

Swanson (2001b) also explained that HR professionals leverage theory from psychology,
economics, and systems theory in order to understand, explain and carry out its process and
roles. These theories are integrated across people, structure and the external environment and
then into disciplined thinking and action. Swanson also differentiated between levels of
performance, and considered the organization, work process, and group/ individual as separate,
yet related, domains.
Despite the depth of the underlying theory and the integration of core beliefs, there is
increasing concern among HRD professionals that there is too much focus on fine-tuning the
inter-relationships between people and structure, and not enough focus on leveraging the
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collective capabilities of the organization to improve organizational performance. Swanson
(2001b) expressed concern that:
On average, HRD practice does not come close to what we know from sound theory.
Systematically filling the performance improvement theory-practice void is fundamental
to the maturation of the profession and it is the work of both practitioners and scholars. In
conclusion, I contend that the demand for HRD theory is increasing, that our present
available theory has taken us about as far as we can go and that what we do is too
important to wallow in theoretical explanations. (p. 309)
In another essay, Swanson (1999) also elaborated that:
The simple need confronting many performance improvement professionals today is to
think about performance, with or without the human lens. The willingness to let go
temporarily of the human lens in favor of a performance lens is the key to elevating
performance improvement to its fullest potential (p. 4).
The implication of setting aside economic theory, in Swanson’s view, is a like removing
one of the legs of a three-legged stool – where the three legs are economic theory, psychological
theory, and systems theory (1999). The economic principles that have been neglected, in
Swanson’s view, include 1) management of scarce resources, 2) creation of sustainable longterm economic performance, and 3) development of relevant organizational knowledge and
expertise in individuals or groups.
Organization development scholars have similarly emphasized the relationship between
people and technology, and the idea that is people and not machines that create value. Early
organization studies of the impact of technology and job design were focused on the productivity
of people. The early depictions of the relationship of people to technology, for example, focused
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on productivity as related to a particular job function and job design, and the way that technology
could speed up or slow down production or other kinds of processes. In today’s conversations
about people and technology, it is the focus on organizational performance that is important. In
other words, the relationships between people and structure (where technology is one example of
structure) produce an economic outcome -- and that outcome should be the focus.
One key problem, Swanson (1999) noted, is that the economic theory so central to
performance had, over time, become minimized within OD literature. “As a result,” Swanson
pointed out, “what is called organization development is reduced to individual development,
team development, or the pursuit of change in the hopes of achieving improved organizational
performance” (p. 11). Breitfelder and Dowling (2008) acknowledged that “HRD often gets
trapped in a policing role, mediating grievances, monitoring compliance with employment laws,
and enforcing codes of conduct” (p. 43). The “new” HRD, they emphasized, is more focused on
factors that affect performance. They added anecdotally that “What an enlightened consulting or
financial services firm does today, most companies will do tomorrow” (p. 43). There is also
increasing recognition within among HRD professionals that human resources functions can
become both a catalyst and a facilitator of cross-functional development. Within a peopleoriented business, business leaders are focused on ways to demonstrate value – even to other
stakeholders within the organization.
Although HRD is (or could be) a big part of discussions about performance, there is still
an ontological and epistemological division between those measuring economic performance and
those managing it. Barber and Strack (2005) wrote that some standard measures offer little
information about the real drivers of business performance. “In order to identify where and how
value is being created – or squandered – people-intensive businesses need performance metrics
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that are as financially rigorous as economic profits but that highlight the productivity of people
rather than capital” (p. 81).
The new focus on management of intellectual capital – especially human capital – is
more concerned with how the interaction between people and structures drives the organization
toward their goals. Fitz-enz (2009) outlined three levels at which the leverage of human capital
might be measured. First, and perhaps most important, there is a relationship between human
capital and the goals of the organization. Second, there may be changes in quality, innovation,
productivity, and service outcomes within business units. Third, there are effects of human
resources departments on planning, hiring, compensating, developing, engaging, and retaining
the enterprise’s human capital. Fitz-enz used this framework to develop a set of metrics that
express the link between people and financial results. He has coined this body of work with the
term “Human Capital ROI” (2009, p. 50). For example, the calculation of Human Capital
Return on Investment (HCROI) looks at the profitability of the firm adjusted for pay and
benefits:
HCROI = Revenue - (Expenses - Pay and Benefits)
Pay and Benefits
(p. 50)

Similarly, Fitz-enz (2009) showed how the same thinking can be applied to measure Human
Capital Value Added (HCVA), which essentially shows a measure of profitability adjusted for
pay, benefits, and number of FTE’s:

HCVA = Revenue - (Expenses - Pay and Benefits)
FTE's
(p. 49)
The derivation of the value of the work performed by people is another way of formulating
return on investment, where “return” is the value-add, and “investment” is the cost of the salaries
of people. Although the intent of these calculations is to manage the performance of the
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organization overall, some business leaders conceptually apply the formulation to individuals –
especially when cost-cutting is under consideration.
The increasing focus on economic value-add in organizations is also part of the reason
that some contemporary researchers are also focused on the idea that processes can be assets of
the enterprise. Again, traditional accounting treats these processes as expenses (Fitz-enz, 2009).
As Fitz-enz (2009) pointed out, “This ignores the fact that a process is more accurately an asset if
it generates value” (p. 70). It also follows, according to Fitz-enz, that those processes that have
the potential to add value should always show a direct link from the process outcome to an
organizational goal.
The social view of the CSC proposal. The writings of Rensis Likert, Jac Fitz-enz, and
Richard Swanson imply that if economic performance is the key driver of business, then the
proposed purchase of analytic software is only relevant in context with the work of people. All
three might experts might have rejected the CSC proposal as it was originally submitted, and
recommended a future agenda that included discussion about the reasons that the analysts would
use the software. “Tell us about the work that the analysts will do,” they might have insisted,
“and then tell us how the software will help.” The problem with the CSC business case,
Swanson might have explained, is that the decision-making tools still have a bottom-line
orientation – meaning that the decision-making process is focused on the impact of the decision
on costs. In an earlier article, Swanson (2001a) had written:
Lacking the appropriate analysis tools, decision makers attempt to apply to HRD the costbenefit tools that they have traditionally applied to capital investments, despite the fact
that human competence does not depreciate on a scheduled basis. In fact, human
knowledge, attitudes, and skills can be expected to grow. (p. 10)
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To correct this problem, Swanson emphasized that new measures are needed. Swanson
(1999) proposed the Core Financial Analysis Method (FAM). The FAM method includes
consideration for (a) the performance value resulting from the performance improvement
program, (b) the cost of the program, and (c) the benefit resulting from the program. Although
both Fitz-enz and Likert would have had their own performance measures in mind, they might
have agreed that it would be easier for the CSC staff to work through the calculations using
Swanson’s worksheets. The worksheets had been specifically developed for Swanson’s students
so that they could better understand the formulations. Tables 4 through 8 show the results of
this analysis.
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Table 4
Summary of Costs for New Analytical Capabilities
Program/ Intervention Cost Worksheet
Program/ Intervention: Technology Investments for Analysts
Internal Time Assessment: Development of Program/ Intervention
Technology
Investment

Option name:

Training
Investment

Total
Investment

Analyze & Contract
Analyze
Contract
Proposal to Management

$
$
$

5,000
1,000 $
1,000 $

$
1,000 $
1,000 $

5,000
2,000
2,000

Diagnose & Feedback
Diagnosis
Feedback

$
$

20,000 $
5,000 $

1,000 $
1,000 $

21,000
6,000

$

5,000 $

10,000 $

15,000

$
$

40,000 $
10,000 $

20,000 $
10,000 $

60,000
20,000

24,000
155,000

Plan, Design & Develop
Plan
Design
Develop
Implement
Manage
Deliver
Evaluate & Institutionalize
Assess Results
Report Results
Institutionalize
Other - Quarterly User Group

$

8,000 $

$
$
$
16,000 $

Total Internal Costs

$

95,000 $

60,000 $
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Table 5
Summary of Benefits and Costs, With and Without Technology and Training Investments
Program/ Intervention Summary
Program/ Intervention: Technology Investments for Analysts

Without
Technology
Investement

Option:

With
Technology
Investment

With Technology
&
Training
Investment

Performance Value
Algorithm development
Dashboard development
Research to inform product development
Accelerate processes
Information to support decision making
Identification of cost savings opportunities

$
$
$
$
$
$

-

$
$
$
$
$
$

140,000
105,000
122,500
70,000
35,000
175,000

$
$
$
$
$
$

280,000
210,000
245,000
140,000
70,000
350,000

Total Performance Value

$

-

$

647,500 $

1,295,000

Costs (costs include years 1 through 4)
Software Cost
License fees for current software
License fees to upgrade software
Software license maintenance fees

$
$
$

-

$
$
$

70,000 $
150,000 $
120,000 $

70,000
150,000
120,000

Consulting Fees
Set up technical environments
Implement software upgrade

$
$

-

$
$

200,000 $
50,000 $

200,000
50,000

Training Costs
In-house training

$

-

$

Cost Avoidance
Sunset existing software

$

-

$

(10,000) $

(10,000)

Internal Time To Develop New Capability

$

95,000 $

60,000 $

155,000

$

640,000 $

755,000

$

7,500 $

540,000

Total Costs
Benefits

$

-

-

$

20,000
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Table 6
Contribution of New Technology and Training on Planned Analytic Projects Over Four Years
Analytic Project

Expected Benefits

Algorithm
Development

Development of computer programs that incorporate
an agreed-upon set of logic and and other statistical
factors; used to identify fraudulent transactions.

$280,000

CrossReference
Table
20

Dashboard
Functionality

Develop computer programs that will make
dissemination of compay metrics available to
additional work groups. Users will also benefit from
reporting capabilities that are currently prepared
manually.

$210,000

21

Product
Performance

Develop analysis of product performance, identifying
areas of opportunity for changes in product design
and innovation.

$245,000

22

Savings
Opportunities

Assess current costs; identify opportunities to reduce
costs.

$350,000

23

Process
Improvement

Assess current operations; identify opportunities to
reduce costs.

$140,000

24

Support
Decision Making

Provide financial analysis to executives as part of
strategic planning process

$70,000

25

Four-year Total

Potential Value
Over Four Years

$1,295,000
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Table 7
Summary of Current vs. Expected Performance Value
Program/ Intervention Summary
Program/ Intervention: Technology Investments for Analysts

Without
Technology
Investment

Option:
Current Performance - Value
Algorithm development
Dashboard development
Research to inform product development
Accelerate processes
Information to support decision making
Identification of cost savings opportunities
Total

$
$
$
$
$
$
$

Expected Preformance - Incremental Impact
Algorithm development
Dashboard development
Research to inform product development
Accelerate processes
Information to support decision making
Identification of cost savings opportunities
Total

$
$
$
$
$
$
$

Performance Total Value
Algorithm development
Dashboard development
Research to inform product development
Accelerate processes
Information to support decision making
Identification of cost savings opportunities
Total

$
$
$
$
$
$
$

Percent Performance Gain

800,000
120,000
420,000
160,000
1,600,000
600,000
3,700,000

-

800,000
120,000
420,000
160,000
1,600,000
600,000
3,700,000
0.00%

With
Technology
Investment

With Technology
&
Training
Investment

$
$
$
$
$
$
$

940,000
155,000
542,500
230,000
1,635,000
775,000
4,277,500

$
$
$
$
$
$
$

1,080,000
190,000
665,000
300,000
1,670,000
950,000
4,855,000

$
$
$
$
$
$
$

140,000
105,000
122,500
70,000
35,000
175,000
647,500

$
$
$
$
$
$
$

280,000
210,000
245,000
140,000
70,000
350,000
1,295,000

$
$
$
$
$
$
$

1,080,000
260,000
665,000
300,000
1,670,000
950,000
4,925,000

$
$
$
$
$
$
$

1,360,000
400,000
910,000
440,000
1,740,000
1,300,000
6,150,000

15.14%

26.67%
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Table 8
Summary of Expected Performance Value vs. Employee Costs

Without
Technology
Investement

Option:

With
Technology
Investment

With Technology
&
Training
Investment

Performance vs. Employee Costs

Performance
Employee Costs

$
$

Ratio

3,700,000 $
1,500,000 $
2.5

4,925,000 $
1,500,000 $
3.3

6,150,000
1,500,000
4.1

Model II in review. The worksheets from Swanson’s book, Assessing the Financial
Benefits of Human Resource Development (2001b), were used to assess the costs, benefits, and
productivity associated with the case. Summaries of the analysis are shown in Tables 4 through
8. More detailed analysis related to the performance value of analytics projects is provided in
the Appendix in Tables 20 through 25. Overall, the Model II analysis emphasizes the interrelationship between costs, productivity and benefits. Benefits associated with technology and
training investments take into account the expected change in the value of the analytics projects
compared to the cost to achieve that additional value.
Model II factors also considered other dimensions of costs – especially as costs relate to
organizational capability building. For example, as people begin to plan, design and implement
new projects, the Model II analysis would suggest that it is important to ensure that the work
people are doing is of high value to the organization. From the Model II perspective, the
decisions made by the CSC business leaders would have had more impact if the focus had been
on prioritization of the analytic projects than on the incremental costs of the technology and
training investments.
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Table 9 summarizes the Model II decision factors, and also shows a cross reference to
tables 4 through 8, so that the decision factor is associated with the applicable worksheet. Figure
4 visually shows the magnitude of the Model II decision factors. Figure 4 shows that the factors
associated with productivity are greater in magnitude than the factors associated with costs.
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Table 9
Summary of Model II Decision Factors
Decision
Factor

Considerations

Item

Magnitude

Incremental
Costs

The license costs for software, consulting fees,
and training costs from Model I are incorporated
in Model II, but are de-emphasized as a factor in
decision making.

Software
Consulting fees

CrossReference
Table
$ (340,000)
1
$ (250,000)
1

Training Costs

$

(20,000)

1

Cost
Avoidance

If the new software is purchased, some expenses
can be eliminated. The cost avoidance
associated with sunset of software shown in
Model I is incorporated in Model II, but deemphasized.

Sunset existing software

$

10,000

1

Internal Costs

Model II highlights the work effort and
associated costs to build new analytical
capabilities within the organization.

Analysis and contracting
Diagnosis and feedback
Planning
Implementation
Institutionalize changes

$
$
$
$
$

9,000
27,000
15,000
80,000
24,000

4
4
4
4
4

Benefits

Model II highlights the value of the analytics
projects to the organization. The value of these
projects, though, is offset by the cost to develop
them. The value of the projects less the
development costs is defined as a benefit in
Model II. There is a relationship between
benefits, productivity, and costs. The increase in
productivity is offset by the increase in costs.

Project benefits, with
technology investment

$ 540,000

5

Productivity

Model II considers that the analytics projects
will have value to the organization, even without
the investment in new technology. With the
investment in new technology, the analytics
business leaders believe that projects can be
completed sooner -- or that more project scope
can be developed than originally planned.

Incremental impact of
investment, assuming
training

$ 1,295,000

6

Model II also conceptualizes productivity as
related to the knowledge and skills of people.
The value of analytics projects relative to costs
can be enhanced with investment in technology
and training, moving the ratio of value to costs
from 2.5 in current state to 4.1.

Ratio performance value
to costs, with technology
investment and training

4.1

7,8

Productivity

Benefits

Cost Avoidance

Incremental Costs

Internal
Development
Costs
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Technology
Training

Training costs
Consulting fees
Software

New hires on hold
Sunset existing software

Technology only
Technology & training

Technology only
Technology & training combined

-$600

-$200

$200

$600

$1,000
$1,400
Thousands

Figure 4. Summary of Model II measurements of costs, benefits and productivity. Measures of
costs, benefits, and productivity are represented graphically to show the relative value of the
factors used in decision making. Costs affecting net income (modeled as incremental costs) are
shown as negative amounts. Offsetting factors that result in enhanced productivity are modeled
as positive amounts. Productivity is enhanced with the addition of new technology. Benefits are
modeled to show the incremental increase in performance value, relative to the additional
investment in technology or training that it would take to achieve that increase.
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Model III: The Socio-Economic View
In the early eighties, Peters and Waterman (1983) wrote a best-selling book that predicted
“the fall of the rational model” (p. 22) in the United States. Based on extensive research, the
authors found that the most successful businesses – those they deemed the “excellent” companies
– could not explain their results based on the conventional business rationality taught in business
schools. The word “rational” they explained, implied a detached, analytical justification for all
decisions – the “right” answer if people could only cut through “all of that messy human stuff”
(p. 20). In their book, Peters and Waterman documented ways that leadership in the most
successful companies had defied rationalist convention and thought differently about what was
most important. “Conventional businesses rationality,” they wrote, “simply does not explain
what makes the excellent companies work” (p. 25).
Evoking Kuhn’s great work The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Peters and Waterman
(1983) appealed to business leaders to consider the limitations of the rationalist model, and
pointed out that the set of shared beliefs about the importance of rationality was a paradigm.
Kuhn, they explained, had put forward the profound idea that “scientists in any field in any time
possess a set of shared beliefs about the world, and for that time the set constitutes the dominant
paradigm” (p. 22). Even in the early 1980’s the rationalist paradigm had already lead to a long
list of problems in business – especially the idea that professionalism in management could be
equated with hard-headed rationality. Students with little practical experience emerged from
business schools with the idea that they could manage anything if they maintained a rationalist
mindset. The rationalist view, Peters and Waterman wrote, had also led to a “dramatic
imbalance in the way that we think about managing,” (p. 29) where social, ethical and innovative
ideas had been set aside to focus more narrowly on costs.
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The socio-economic view as a paradigm. Ten years earlier, in 1973, Henri Savall had
published his ground-breaking book Work and People in France (Savall, 2010). Savall
presented, in considerable depth, an analysis of the ways that the way that the rationalist model
and attendant focus on costs had distracted business leaders from creating value and working to
ensure the long term sustainability of the firm. Forty years later, the original argument presented
by Savall persists, and the associated values and beliefs are in direct counterpoint to the
rationalist paradigm. Three major points of emphasis are still highlighted prominently on the
Socio-Economic Institute of Firms and Organizations (ISEOR) website:


Human potential is the sole active factor in creating added value



Technical and financial capital are “inert” inner tools



The complementary nature of capital and labor, as opposed to substitutability

These three points of emphasis are the key tenets of the Socio-Economic Approach to
Management, or SEAM. Savall, along with his ISEOR colleagues, has now conducted SEAM
research in over 1,300 organizations all over the world (Conbere & Heorhiadi, 2011a). Even
after so many years of experience intervening in organizations, Savall is careful to propose the
SEAM paradigm – knowing first-hand from his research the many ways that the depth and scope
of management belief in rationalism manifests itself in management decision-making and
planning. Perhaps Savall’s use of the word propose is also a way for business leaders to become
aware that the SEAM approach is an alternative view or approach to decision making. As
Cristallini (2011) explained,
A model for analysis and decision making can be regarded as a theory or an ideology that
serves as a frame of reference. It covers the major issues that address the performance
and survival of an organization. This may include conceptions and representations about
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the strategy of the company, its investment decisions, the involvement of its members,
quality, productivity, control, improvement of performance change. Everyone can have
an opinion on how to address these issues, aided by multiple theories, concepts and
methods, sometimes very old, and in many cases not properly tested and proven. (p. 2)
In Savall’s view, the SEAM approach is not just another way to think about managing,
but rather part of a larger set of moral, legal, ethical and philanthropic responsibilities of the
organization (Savall, 2010). In adopting the rationalist paradigm, business leaders developed
models that not only framed the decision-making processes within the firm, but also framed the
relationship of the organization to society, to the community, to stakeholders and even to the
employees themselves.
Corporate social responsibility. Savall, a scholar of management literature, studied the
work of Archie Carroll, who was noted for his writings on business ethics, corporate social
performance, and strategic planning. In one article, Carroll (1999) had referenced Howard
Bowen’s definition of corporate social responsibility, which referred to the obligations of
business leaders to “pursue those policies, to make those decisions or to follow those lines of
action which are desirable in terms of the objectives and values of our society” (p. 270). Exactly
which values and objectives should be pursued, however, was a subject of additional academic
investigation. Carroll, who traced the evolution of the concept of corporate social responsibility
over time, found that in the early 1980’s the idea of corporate responsibility had become
intertwined with the drive toward profitability. At the time, even noted management theorists
such as Peter Drucker had concluded that responsibility was compatible with profitability
because profitability had benefitted society with well-paid jobs and personal wealth.
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Carroll also documented the work of other researchers who began to question the strength
of the relationship between corporate social responsibility and profitability (Aupperle, Carroll, &
Hatfield, 1985). Those who did study the relationships found varying results, but noted the
difficulty in determining appropriate criteria and standards of corporate performance. Still others
began to distinguish between the economic, legal, ethical and even philanthropic domains, and
questioned the interrelationships and relative importance to business of each domain (Schwartz
& Carroll, 2003). This line of questioning seemed to result in the idea that while economic and
legal responsibilities are required, ethical and philanthropic responsibilities were expected and
desired – and Carroll’s own observation that the most critical tensions were between economic
and legal, economic and ethical, and economic and philanthropic (1991). Later, Carroll
concluded that each responsibility had a “face” – an aspect of responsibility that contributes to
the whole (1998).
Perhaps one of the most relevant contributions of Carroll’s work to Savall’s framework is
that Carroll’s research had identified employees as stakeholders, and had emphasized the idea
that management has a responsibility to employees. Carroll (1991) even went so far as to
distinguish between immoral, amoral, and moral management. Carroll defined immoral
management, where employees are viewed as “factors of production to be used, exploited,
manipulated for gain” (p. 46). Carroll contrasted immoral management from amoral
management, in which employees are treated as the law requires – meaning that “organization
structure, pay incentives and reports are all geared toward short and medium-term productivity”
(p. 46). Immoral and amoral management, according to Carroll, could be contrasted with moral
management, where the goal of management would be to use a leadership style that would result
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in mutual confidence and trust. “If management is moral,” Carroll wrote, “then employees will
be treated with dignity and respect” (p. 46).
Influenced by the idea of moral management, Savall (2010) similarly focused on the idea
of human potential and the idea that organizations should create conditions under which people
will want to maximize their talents on behalf of the organization. Anthony Buono, referring to
contemporary thinking about organization diagnosis and intervention, referenced Savall’s
concept that there is an interaction between the quality of functioning in an organization and
economic performance. According to Buono, Savall emphasized that “the North American
tendency to cast people as human ‘resources’ misses the essential point that human beings cannot
be considered as simply another resource at the organization’s disposal. People are free to give
or withhold their energy as they desire” (p. viii).
Savall (2010) also observed that factors such as educational attainment, affinity for art,
literature, language, culture or travel may influence the roles that people play in society, which
may be quite different than the roles that people assume in an organization. In Savall’s view,
The whole of a man’s life makes capital out of his experience and his know-how but his
economic value is the result of a multitude of variables, many of which belong to and
which fluctuate with the evolution of the system. A man’s productivity depends very
largely on his role in society, in the enterprise, and in his environment. (p.173)
The Taylor-Fayol-Weber (TFW) virus. Most U.S. organizations, however, do not seem
to regard their employees quite so holistically, and even organizational department labels such as
“Human Capital” suggests the idea that people are regarded as commodities. This practice,
according to Conbere and Heorhiadi (2011b) comes from Marxist and neo-classical economics,
in which the calculation of value is a function of labor or capital. The socio-economic view is, in
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this respect, critical theory – a contemporary reassessment of early ideas about labor and capital,
and the idea that one could be substituted for the other. In the early 1900’s, for example,
Frederick Taylor wrote that work could be rationalized by reducing or suppressing initiative and
other incentives, except wages (Savall, 2010). Savall, who critically appraised Taylor’s work,
found both positive and negative ideas, but concluded that Taylor’s scientific analysis of work
had influenced the idea that labor could be substituted for capital. In addition, Taylor’s early
concept that productivity could be optimized – the idea of the “best man for the job” – still
persists today as business leaders look for people who are the right “fit” for the job, or as job
profiles are developed and the scope of accountabilities and responsibilities are defined.
Both Frederick Taylor and Henri Fayol had also presented the concept that work was best
communicated and controlled through a hierarchy – a militaristic view in the sense that
ultimately one person was thought to be in command and could lead the organization in all its
competitive battles. Max Weber, who also influenced the early development of management
science, regarded “man at work as an emotionally ascetic being, whose personal motives
coincide with the objectives of the enterprise” (Savall, 2010, p. 64). In other words, the
assumption was that people were willing to be subservient to the organizational hierarchy, as if
they were soldiers in service to their country. As contemporary business leaders know, the
romantic notion that people will subordinate themselves to the needs of the organization is, for
the most part, far from the reality of the actual case. Yet somehow the perception that people are
subordinate to management has persisted -- at least in the psyche of management. Perhaps
business leaders, trained as they are to manage as part of the hierarchy, believe that it is their
obligation to be in control – and to deal with messy people problems and out-of-control
situations as inappropriate displays of insubordination.
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From Savall’s perspective, the early management views of people, capital, and
hierarchical command and control that were put forward by Taylor, Fayol and Weber have led to
some perverse effects in the contemporary workplace. Savall (2010) likened these effects to a
kind of virus that has, on many levels, infected almost every organization. This is especially true
as it relates to the introduction of technology in organizations. Savall pointed out that Taylor’s
studies of the amount of work that could be done by a single man ultimately made the transfer of
work to the machine easier. Savall also noted that paradoxically, the perfection of tools led to
more sterile and unfulfilling work for people. The increase in productivity, at least in those early
cases, could not be distinguished between the machine and the person working with the machine.
Savall wrote:
Current observation reveals that numerous unskilled workers cannot keep to the imposed
work rhythm and this tends to invalidate the programming of work-time. It reveals that
many of them resort to absenteeism and job-turnover as a temporary respite from the fact
of being programmed. (p. 52)
In addition to the perverse effects of the TFW virus that Savall noted in the early 1970’s,
the virus has also manifested in cost cutting and layoffs in contemporary times. Most people
working as part of large organizations in the United States are subject to “at will” employment
policies that permit both the employee and the employer to terminate the employment agreement
at any time, and for almost any legal reason. Organizations that are faced with the need to
control costs will often cut people because wages make up such a high percentage of an
organization’s cost structure (Savall, Zardet, & Bonnet, 2008). In the socio-economic view,
however, it is management’s responsibility to manage the organization effectively. If layoffs are
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needed, it is the fault of management and not the employee. “Ironically,” as Conbere and
Heorhiadi (2011b) pointed out,
The people who did not make the choices that led to poor organizational performance are
fired, but the leaders who made poor decisions and failed to manage well, stay. People
in power tend to keep their power, regardless of ethical issues or justice. (p.7)
Even if organizations are financially successful in cutting costs by cutting people, the
socio-economic view is that this approach is only a short term solution. Savall, Zardet and
Bonnet (2008) argued that even if layoffs enable an enterprise to reduce some visible costs, there
are side effects such as loss of know-how, disorganization and a decrease in confidence in the
organization. In this sense, the TFW virus is “insidiously dangerous,” as Savall and Zardet
(2008a) pointed out, because it can have adverse effects on economic performance (p. 10).
Savall and Zardet (2008a) explained that they published the book Mastering Hidden Costs and
Socio-economic Performance as a way to save businesses and jobs:
Most business strategies were quite alarming, based on downsizing, labor shedding, and
cuts and withdrawal – in a word, based on defensiveness. Today, while the context may
have changed in an era of globalization and hyper-competition, such defensive strategies
are still all too commonplace. Such strategic helplessness may result from errors in
strategic analysis and misunderstandings of the underlying sources of economic
performance. (p. xvii)
Human potential is the sole active factor in creating added value. A key tenet of the
socio-economic view is that human potential is the sole active factor in creating added value.
Savall (2010) observed:
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People are animated by the motivations, drives, sympathies and other behavioral traits of
emotional existence… (and) above all by the cognitive, perceptual and decision-making
processes which form the principal link between man and his work, between the
‘psychological’ and ‘physiological’, between individual desires and the execution of a
task. (p. 63)
In other words, the behaviors of people result from factors such as the individual’s
characteristics, the structural characteristics of the individual’s environment, and the critical
events that have occurred in the organization.
The socio-economic view is that an organization is a complex entity made up of
structures and behaviors of people. Organizational structures can take many forms, including
physical, technological, organizational, demographic -- and even mental, which would include
factors such as the organizational mindset, management styles, and work atmosphere.
Behaviors, according to the socio-economic view, are observed human actions that have an
impact on the physical and social environment (Savall & Zardet, 2008a). Employees exercise
their informal power to either slow down or speed up the pace of change. The interrelationship
between behaviors and structures means that there is always a gap between planned and actual
functions, which in turn results in unanticipated costs and sub-optimal performance (Savall,
Zardet, & Bonnet, 2008). These gaps are considered dysfunctions, which are classified into six
categories: working conditions, work organization, time management, communicationcoordination-cooperation, integrated training and strategic implementation (Savall & Zardet,
2008a).
Technical and financial capital are “inert” inner tools. While Savall emphasizes the
word “active” to convey the idea that it is people who have the capability to add value to the
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organization, he uses the word “inert” to convey the idea that financial capital and technology
cannot by themselves (without the contributions of people) produce value for the organization.
As such, Savall emphasized that technology and financial capital are only tools, and that it is
people that add value.
The complementary nature of capital and labor, as opposed to substitutability. When
Savall (2010) described the active nature of people vs. the inert qualities of tools such as
technology or financial capital, he advocated for an integration of perspectives. The third tenet
of the SEAM paradigm emphasizes complimentary relationship between labor and capital, as
opposed to the idea of substitutability of labor and capital that is part of the rationalist paradigm.
“It is clear,” he wrote, “that the purpose and meaning of work in the post-industrial society will
be determined through a complex and subtle interplay of human, technological, and economic
factors” (p. xii).
Ontology and epistemology. The Socio-economic Approach to Management is multifaceted and multi-disciplinary approach to transformation and change within organizations that is
predicated on research within the organization. SEAM research is conducted is based on
epistemological principles, or ways of knowing about the nature of reality (Conbere &
Heorhiadi, 2011b). Broad descriptions are summarized in Table 10.
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Table 10
Three Key Principles of the SEAM Epistemology
Principles
Generic Contingency

Definition
The information gathered as part of SEAM case studies shows
that while many organization development problems may seem
to be unique to the organization, many kinds of dysfunctions are
common across all organizations.

Contradictory Inter-subjectivity

SEAM intervener-researchers understand that among
organizational actors there will be different understandings of
what is true and real, and that those differences are acceptable.

Cognitive Interactivity

An interactive process between SEAM intervener-researchers
and actors in the organization which builds knowledge about
organizational dysfunctions through disciplined inquiry into the
organization, and through a succession of feedback loops.

Contradictory Inter-subjectivity. The process used by SEAM intervener/researchers to
conduct research in organizations reflects an underlying belief each person sees truth differently,
and that different ideas about truth co-exist within the minds of people in the organization. In the
first phase of the SEAM process, the intervener/researchers interview participants – generally
beginning with the leaders of each functional area. The data is assimilated and themes are
developed. The themes, along with actual quotations from people, are then fed back to the
participants in a meeting that SEAM has aptly labeled “the mirror effect” because it is a clear
reflection of what the participants had to say.
On the surface, the first phase of the process is not so different than other forms of
organization development practice, where the practitioner interviews people to find out more
about the organization. The clarity about the ontological underpinnings of the intervention is
what makes the SEAM process unique. While concepts like objectivity, awareness of self and
self as instrument are stressed in most organizational development approaches, most are not as
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clear about the ontological roots of the intervention – the nature of reality and what is deemed
“truth.” The focus on objectivity and consultative behaviors for the organization development
practitioner, for example, may give the impression that the practitioner can be neutral and does
not have an impact on the intervention or an effect on the data collection and analysis. This
thinking may also lead to the idea that differences in viewpoints can be resolved or remediated.
For some, the assumptions about the neutrality of the researcher (and the research) may be part
of the objectivist ontology, which is based on the belief that reality is unchanging and can be
discovered through experimentation.
In the SEAM approach, in contrast, researcher/ interveners are trained to see not only
their own truth, but also the very different set of truths held by the people in the organizations
that they work with. Conbere and Heorhiadi (2011b) explained that in SEAM interventions,
there is a concept of contradictory inter-subjectivity, which refers to the idea that “actors
perceive truth differently, and they all right, according to their beliefs and perceptions” (p. 4).
“Contradictory inter-subjectivity,” they added, draws on the ontological belief that truth is
socially constructed, and therefore not an objective and unchanging fact” (p.4). Conbere and
Heorhiadi also found that this aspect of the SEAM approach is rooted in the social
constructionist ontology. “Social constructionism,” according to Conbere and Heorhiadi
(2011b), “is the belief that human meaning is created by societies, and thus there is no one true
human meaning. Each society creates its own, true understanding of human meaning” (p. 3).
SEAM interventions occur in phases over a long period of time, in order to allow time for the
participants to think and react to findings that are reflected back to them as part of the process.
Cognitive interactivity. SEAM findings from an intervention in an organization are
combined with the findings from similar research conducted in other organizations. To
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researchers familiar with case study design, this is impressive because the SEAM database now
contains findings from interventions conducted in over 1,300 organizations (Conbere &
Heorhiadi, 2011b), or – in other words – the findings from 1,300 case studies where data is
collected in a similar manner. The combined set of findings, accumulated over a period of 30
years, has made it possible for SEAM intervener/ researchers to look at common themes
emerging from all organizations. Since 1986, the ISEOR team has been modeling knowledge
about business dysfunctions, and looking at the costs of those dysfunctions along with potential
solutions (Zardet & Harbi, 2007, p. 34). Data elements captured in the database include
information about the intervention, the profile of the company, findings, and the innovation
projects developed to reduce dysfunctions. The ISEOR researchers can analyze this data to find
patterns across organizations, within certain types of organizations, or to conduct a benchmark
analysis, where findings from one organization are compared with other similar organizations.
The results of innovation projects can be used to assess different ways to reduce costly
dysfunctions.
Conbere and Heorhiadi (2011b) explained that the combined findings from organizational
interventions can also be used to develop theory. With the benefit of additional findings from
other interventions, the theory is either reinforced or challenged. The analysis of the new
findings may inform development of new tools or practice used by the SEAM intervener/
researchers, which in turn results in a new cycle of findings, revision of theory, and practice. “In
SEAM language,” wrote Conbere and Heorhiadi, “the cycle is called cognitive interactivity,
which is an interactive process (between intervener-researcher and company actors) of
knowledge production through successive feedback loops, with the steadfast goal of increasing
the value of significant information processed by scientific work” (p. 4).
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Generic contingency. Other aspects of the SEAM logic appear to be associated with
positivism. The detail that has been accumulated over the years in the SEAMES database
(Socio-economic Approach to Management Expert System) makes it possible to see that even
though the problems of an organization may seem unique to the actors involved, the dysfunctions
exhibited by the organization are common across all organizations. “In SEAM language,”
explained Conbere and Heorhiadi (2011b), “this is called generic contingency, which is the
principle that allows for the uniqueness of each organization, and postulates the existence of
invariants that constitute generic invariants. We would say that generic contingency and analytic
generalization are parallel concepts” (p. 5-6). SEAM employs both positivistic and interpretive
approaches are used to understand and assess the organization. Conbere and Heorhiadi
explained that “The SEAM approach is a complex theory-building research done in the postpositivistic epistemology within a social constructionist ontology using both qualitative and
quantitative methods of data collection and analysis (using the SEAM language, qualimetrics)”
(p. 4).
The inter-relationship of behavior and structure. SEAM organizational interventions
were developed to address the dysfunctions caused by inter-relationships between structures and
behaviors. Savall (2002) wrote that:
There is an inevitable on-going interaction between the organization structure and the
employee’s behavior. This interaction is both a driving force, essential to the production
of goods or services, as well as the cause of dysfunctions. In other words, it is an
explanation of the differences between the observed operations and the operations
expected by the actors, who have specific and conflicting objectives. (p. 33)
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Savall used the word “inevitable” to describe the idea that every company, no matter how
well-run, requires regular maintenance and review. Savall wrote that “The degeneration
(atrophy) of structures and behaviors leads to bloated dysfunctions and hidden costs, which
handicaps economic performance” (p. 35). SEAM interventions help business leaders to reduce
dysfunctions and move the organization to an ideal level of performance, which SEAM
intervener/ researchers refer to as ortho-functioning.
Structures. The socio-economic view is that organizational structures can be classified
into five categories, including physical, technological, organizational, demographic and mental
structures. These different structures can themselves be inter-related.
Behaviors. Behavior is the observed human action that has an effect on the physical and
social environment (Savall & Zardet, 2008a).
Dysfunctions. The ISEOR analysis of the inter-relationship between behaviors and
structures identified six categories of dysfunctions – including working conditions, work
organization, communication-coordination-cooperation, time management, integrated training,
and strategic implementation.
Hidden costs. The ISEOR researchers conducted research to understand the nature of
hidden costs, and found that people spent about a third of their time on unproductive activities.
The causes of hidden costs, they discovered, were related to complex patterns of behavior as
people interacted with organizational structures. The researchers associated hidden costs with
each of the six categories of dysfunctions. There are six categories of hidden costs: excess
salary, overconsumption, overtime, non-production, non-creation of potential, and risks.
The ISEOR findings challenged existing theory that claimed a deterministic relationship
of structure over behavior. The deterministic view of the importance of structures still persists,
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as business leaders regularly reorganize people in order to carry out organization objectives.
There are also similar deterministic beliefs about the importance of behavior vs. structure. Savall
and Zardet (2008a) explained that in behavioral theory, determinism is shifted to emphasize the
relationship between behavior and results. Savall and Zardet pointed out that:
Management modes inspired by the behaviorist current mainly utilize ‘psychological
manipulation’ techniques under the guise of such ‘noble’ notions as responsibility,
motivation, and professional conscientiousness; that is, they resorted surreptitiously to
coercive principles borrowed from certain morality or value systems. (p. 8)
In contrast to the prevailing ideas that the structural or behavioral characteristics of an
organization can be deterministic, ISEOR found that it is the inter-relationship between
structures and behaviors that can cause dysfunctions. Dysfunctions create hidden costs – and
hidden costs, it follows, affect economic performance.
The socio-economic view of the case. The socio-economic view conceptualizes costs as
a fundamental area of management focus and decision making. Information about organizational
expenses recorded as part of accounting processes can be an important determinant of financial
performance, as well as identification of areas that require focus and improvement. Cost analysis
is used for many purposes; for example, financial managers focus on costs in order to establish
product prices, market strategies, and even relationships with clients (Mirian & Adrian, 2009).
In fact, the base function of the informational systems within the enterprise is to produce
information used in decision making (Mirian & Adrian, 2009).
Visible vs. hidden costs. The socio-economic view takes the position that while
accounting systems represent visible costs in the organization, there are also hidden costs that
drive performance. The concept of hidden costs is based on the socio-economic view that there
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are always gaps between expected performance and actual performance. Savall and Zardet
(2008a) observed that business executives intuitively recognize this difference. For example, a
business leader may notice that significant investments have been made without a noticeable
improvement in operations or productivity. It may also be that reverse is true; in other words,
organizations may invest in innovations and succeed in lowering operating costs; however, the
improvement in performance cannot be explained by an analysis of costs alone.
One problem with accounting information is that it oversimplifies the complexity of
business situations (Trepo & de Geuser, 2002). Despite the ready availability of data and
reports, business leaders make decisions in contexts where there is a great deal of ambiguity.
Over 50 years ago, Margolis made the same argument, and stated that “the information and
calculability necessary for the management of a firm to move to its equilibrium profitmaximizing price-output combination are clearly not available. Uncertainty and ignorance are
omnipresent” (1958, p. 189). Although business leaders generally acknowledge that accounting
systems are limited, the reliance on accounting data as the source of truth about costs persists.
The ISEOR research conducted as part of SEAM organizational interventions has
reinforced the idea that accounting tools and systems are inadequate to uncover the reasons for
variances in expected performance vs. actual performance. Accounting systems, according to
Savall and Zardet (2008a), are usually limited to collecting information at the level of work units
and departments. Another factor, according to Savall and Zardet, is that accounting systems tend
to collect information about costs by their nature (e.g. personnel costs) and object (e.g.
production department). In the socio-economic view, these limitations create the need to
differentiate between visible costs and hidden costs. Hidden costs may be included in
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accounting information, but dispersed across categories, or else diluted as part of aggregate
totals. Table 11 summarizes the SEAM conceptualization of visible vs. hidden costs.
Table 11
SEAM Conceptualization of Costs

The SEAM literature describes the concept that there is a relationship between the cost of
organizational activities and an associated value to the organization of those activities (Savall &
Zardet, 2008b). The socio-economic view emphasizes the importance of developing strategies
that will create economic value to the organization – whether that value is aimed at development
of new products or services, entry into new markets, or finding new ways to meet the needs of
customers. The emerging focus on analytics as a way to become more competitive is an example
of organization strategy that will create value. Of course, investments in technology have
contributed significantly to organizational productivity over the course of many decades. The
emphasis on big data – and huge investments in data warehousing, cloud computing, hosted
solutions, and emerging hardware and software represent extremely large investments in capital
for organizations, relative to other investments of funds. What make the focus on analytics
different is that development of new analytic capabilities depends largely on the talents,
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knowledge and commitment of people – and the way that the knowledge of people contributes to
economic performance.
The CSC business case outlined a technology strategy that would support new corporate
goals that depended on analytics. The strategy envisioned development of a new data
infrastructure, analytic tools and governance process that would support these new objectives.
The organization decided to set aside investment dollars in order to fund these new projects. As
new expenses were identified, an executive committee met to discuss each business cases that
had been developed. One such business case was developed for analytic software that would be
used by the analyst community within the organization.
Costs. The business case considered costs associated with different purchasing options,
training, administration of the software, and implementation costs. The socio-economic view
would also consider those costs but conceptualize them as visible costs.
Visible costs. Visible costs identified by the case study company included consideration
for software license fees, consulting costs to set up technical infrastructure and server
environments for analysts, and training costs. The case study company also identified offsetting
savings associated with the sunset of software that would become obsolete once the new
software was implemented. The socio-economic view would take into account the visible costs
listed by the case study company, as summarized Table 12. The overall visible costs are at least
$600,000 over a four-year period of time.
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Table 12
Summary of Visible Costs
Year
One
Software Cost
License fees for current software
License fees to upgrade software
Software license maintenance fees
Consulting Fees
Set up technical environments
Implement software upgrade
Training Costs
In-house training
Cost Avoidance
Sunset existing software
Total

Two

Three

Four

Four-Year
Total

$ 70,000 $
$
$
$ 70,000
$150,000 $
$
$
$150,000
$
$ 40,000 $ 40,000 $ 40,000 $120,000
$200,000 $
$ 50,000 $

-

$
$

-

$
$

-

$200,000
$ 50,000

$ 20,000 $

-

$

-

$

-

$ 20,000

$ (10,000) $

-

$

-

$

-

$ (10,000)

$480,000 $ 40,000 $ 40,000 $ 40,000 $600,000

Hidden costs. The socio-economic view includes all of the costs shown in Table 12, but
conceptualizes them as visible costs. In addition to visible costs, the socio-economic view also
conceptualizes a second category of costs called hidden costs. Table 13 shows components of
hidden costs along with a description of the way that each hidden cost is conceptualized. Each
component of hidden costs represents a dysfunction that creates a drag on the economic
performance of the organization.

94
Table 13
Components of Hidden Costs
Components of Hidden Costs
Excess Salary

SEAM Concept
Excess salary occurs when an employee who could be doing
higher value work instead works on lower value activities. There
is a cost when the lower value activity is performed by an
employee who earns more than another employee who could
have done the work.

Overconsumption

Overconsumption refers to the idea that there are costs
associated with waste.

Overtime

Overtime is the amount of time that people spend correcting
problems due to dsyfunctions, rather than working on other
activities that have value to the organization.

Non-production

Non-production refers to the idea that even if machines break
down or work stops and products can't be produced, the
company still has to pay for fixed costs such as facilities,
salaries, and overhead expenses.

Noncreation of potential

Noncreation of potential refers to the idea that people are not
spending enough time planning for the future or developing
strategies that will ensure the long-term success of the
organization.

Risks

Risks to the organization may have associated costs. For
example, fines for non-compliance may be imposed.

In the socio-economic view, the conceptualization of hidden costs may take on additional
typologies, or conceptual categories. More important to the case study example, there are unique
typologies associated with the work involved in technology and software development. Zardet
and Harbi (2007) wrote that SEAM diagnostics performed within development teams have
identified a number of dysfunctions that could be related back to a lack of rigor at the
development conception phase, when “strategic choices of allotment and distribution of human
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and financial resources” (p. 358-359) were determined. The lack of precision in roles and
responsibilities can also lead to dysfunctions and hidden costs. In addition, Zardet and Harbi
found that technical experts involved in computer support experienced a high degree of isolation.
On the flip side, non-experts experienced a high degree of dependency on the experts. The
quality of the expert and non-expert relationships suffered as a result, and the dysfunctions
related to deteriorating quality communications were quantified at one hour per person per day.
Hidden costs associated with technology include both non-quality and direct productivity.
Based on extensive ISEOR research, the hidden costs associated with computer technology are
potentially very high in all organizations, with frequent and costly dysfunctions occurring in
computer operations, specialized services, support, and information and communications
technology. The ISEOR research showed that hidden costs associated with non-quality are
between 10,000€ and 50,000€ per person per year (Zardet & Harbi, 2007).
Hidden costs associated with non-quality. Within the case, there are many potential
sources of hidden costs associated with non-quality. One of the key concerns of the case study
company business leaders in establishing their Data and Analytics strategy was quality and
consistency of data, and the need to develop best practices, standardization of processes and use
of common data definitions. Although lack of quality was a concern and business leaders
acknowledged that problems existed, examples were anecdotal. ISEOR research using the
SEAMES database identified a typology of hidden costs for non-quality. The ISEOR typology
for hidden costs associated with non-quality is shown in Table 14, along with non-quality
examples that had been identified by CSC business leaders. In the socio-economic view, these
examples of non-quality merit further investigation and work effort to reduce the hidden costs
associated with the problems.

96
Table 14
Hidden Costs Associated with Non-Quality
Indicator: Nonquality
Type of Hidden Cost
Based on ISEOR Findings
Technical documents and instructions not
appropriately handled and filed

CSC Examples - Current State
Limited documentation available to system users

Development tasks reperformed in certain projects
due to lack of autonomy

Multiple sources of data; similar data elements with
varying meaning; lack of integration

Unreliable software

The software that analysts use to transfer files across
servers is unreliable; the data may only partially
transfer or the data transferred may be corrupted

Lack of technical mastery of certain hardware and
software

Not all analysts have familiarity with all sources of
data, and tend to use the sources that they know
best -- as opposed to the best source for the
project

Difficulties experienced by users

Difficulties may arise from non-quality of the data -such as invalid, unexpected or missing values

Central computer breakdowns

Applications sometimes down or unavailable

Machine breakdowns (printing, forwarding,
unwinding, etc.)

Servers at capacity and frequently crash

Information system breakdowns during certain
transactions

Load errors may mean that source systems are
incorrect

Central processing incidents

Processing incidents are common, and include (1)
abnormal stoppage of programs, (2) job control
language errors, (3) beyond capacity files that are
corrupt and (4) time wasted in processing

Program errors

Mistakes in programming can result in incorrect data
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Hidden costs associated with non-productivity. As with the typology of hidden costs
associated with non-quality, ISEOR researchers developed a typology for the hidden costs
associated with non-productivity. A summary of all CSC hidden costs associated with the
ISEOR typology is shown in Table 15, along with estimated benefits if analysts could leverage
the software. This table summarizes costs associated with use of the current set of analytic tools
available for use by analysts. Table 15 is based on assumptions that are shown in additional
tables in Appendix B. Table 15 also shows a cross-reference to tables in Appendix B that
document the assumptions used to estimate hidden costs.
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Table 15
Hidden Costs Associated with Non-productivity

Indicator: Direct Productivity Gaps
CrossReference
Table

Type of Hidden Cost
Based on ISEOR Findings
Excessive maintenance time

Estimated
Hidden Costs
$
115,200

Program development interrupted

$

322,560

27

Re-edition of reports and lists

$

138,240

28

Frequent interruptions by users

$

5,016

Lack of coordination between conception
and operation

$

9,216

30

Poor estimation of development and
intervention times with internal customers

$

40,000

31

Hardware/ software shared by an entire
department

$

4,608

32

Total

$

634,840

26

`

29

Opportunity costs. Hidden costs represent important opportunities for improvement in
organizational performance, and may also be thought of as opportunity costs. In the socioeconomic view of the case there are two types of opportunity costs. First, there are potential
opportunity costs related to the idea that plans to hire two new analysts would be put on hold.
Second, there are potential opportunity costs associated with the decision to reassign analytical
resources to CSC’s IT group.
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The CSC decision to offset technology costs with a potential corresponding decrease in
labor costs was described in Model I. The socio-economic view would conceptualize this
thinking process as an example of the rationalist view, where the labor costs associated with
people are regarded as a form of capital (some may use the word commodity), and therefore
interchangeable with technology or financial capital. People, according to the socio-economic
view, are the only active and creative factor of sustainable economic value, whereas technology
is an inert tool (Savall & Zardet, 2008b). In other words, the costs associated with people are
not interchangeable with the costs associated with technology.
In the socio-economic view, the CSC decision to not hire analysts at a time when
company objectives and goals depended on analytics suggests a potential opportunity cost. In
other words, the two analysts can potentially generate value for the company, but the software by
itself would not. To illustrate, Table 16 assumes that the salaries of the two analysts would have
generated a 3:1 return – similar to the return generated for other kinds of short term investments
of capital. The 3:1 ratio represents the relationship between the expected value of the work
produced by the analysts compared to cost of the salaries for the analysts. In other words, for
every $100,000 in salary expense there would be a corresponding $300,000 in potential value to
the organization, or a value-add of $200,000 for each analyst.
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Table 16
Opportunity Cost Associated with not Hiring Two Analysts
Year
One

Two

Three

Four

Four-Year
Total

Hidden Costs
Salaries for two analysts
Return, assuming 3:1 ratio
Net value add

$
$
$

-

$ 200,000 $ 200,000 $ 200,000 $
600,000
$ 600,000 $ 600,000 $ 600,000 $ 1,800,000
$ 400,000 $ 400,000 $ 400,000 $ 1,200,000

Opportunity Cost

$

-

$ 400,000 $ 400,000 $ 400,000 $ 1,200,000

A second kind of opportunity cost relates to the redeployment of analyst resources to
perform IT functions. In the CSC analysis, it was acknowledged that resources to administer the
new software would be absorbed within the IT organization as well as within the analyst
community. The CSC business leaders did not regard reassignment of resources as a cost.
Instead, CSC thought of the reassignment of resources as neutral to the organization since there
was no incremental add to expense.
The socio-economic view, in contrast to the CSC view of the case, would investigate the
change in economic value add associated with the person’s tasks before and after assuming their
new responsibilities for the software. Although there may be additional hidden costs associated
with this category, it is difficult to quantify them. Administration of the software may well be a
value-add, since the person administering the software could presumably prevent a host of
dysfunctions from occurring. For example, an analyst may generate a return of 3:1 for their time
doing analytic work and there is a net value-add. If that analyst is reassigned to a software
administration role, the analyst may prevent hidden costs associated with dysfunctions from
occurring. Instead of generating value through analytics, the analyst is then preventing
dysfunctions that create a drag on the performance of other analysts who use the software. The
other analysts are able to generate more value than they otherwise would have been able to
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generate. On the flip side, if the analyst would have generated more value to the business by
continuing to focus on analytic tasks, then there would be hidden costs associated with the
change in job duties.
Benefits. In the socio-economic view, benefits are conceptualized as reductions in
hidden costs. Each one of the productivity gaps is associated with use of the existing software.
By making the investment in new technology, there is a potential that the productivity gaps could
be addressed, though not immediately closed. Based on a review of productivity gaps, a separate
assessment was conducted to estimate the impact of the new technology on the gap. Additional
consideration was given for the adoption of the software across analysts, especially given work
demands. Table 17 shows the estimated hidden costs along with the potential reduction in
hidden costs that might be achieved within the case study company. Similar to Table 15, Table
17 also provides a cross-reference to tables in Appendix B that contain more detail about the
assumptions used to develop the hidden cost estimates related to productivity.
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Table 17
Summary: Estimated Hidden Costs and Potential Reduction in Hidden Costs

Indicator: Direct Productivity Gaps

Future State: Proposed Year One
CrossReference
Table

Type of Hidden Cost
Based on ISEOR Findings
Excessive maintenance time

Estimated
Hidden Costs
$
115,200

Estimated Reduction
in Hidden Costs
$
38,016

Adjusted
Hidden Costs
$
77,184

Program development interrupted

$

322,560

$

161,280

$

161,280

27

Re-edition of reports and lists

$

138,240

$

37,440

$

100,800

28

Frequent interruptions by users

$

5,016

$

5,016

$

-

Lack of coordination between conception
and operation

$

9,216

$

4,608

$

4,608

30

Poor estimation of development and
intervention times with internal customers

$

40,000

$

20,000

$

20,000

31

Hardware/ software shared by an entire
department

$

4,608

$

4,608

$

-

32

Total

$

634,840

$

270,968

$

363,872

26

`

29
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Productivity. One of the core beliefs of SEAM intervener/ researchers is that there is
significant untapped potential in each organization (Conbere & Heorhiadi, 2011a). Rather than
cutting the costs associated with employees, the SEAM focus is on reducing hidden costs.
SEAM intervener-researchers also work with business leaders to identify activities that will add
economic value to the organization. By reducing hidden costs, business leaders can free up
people to focus on projects that will enhance the economic performance of the organization.
The socio-economic view of value considers econometric studies that show that capital
and labor account for only a portion of the value of production (Savall & Zardet, 2008b). There
are three key factors that create differences in value. First, hidden costs are addressed, so that
people can work on higher value-activities. Second, the organization invests in the development
of the employees. This is an intangible investment in the capabilities of people. Knowing if
people are adding value can be confounded by a multiplicity of factors, but in the socioeconomic approach people conduct their own time management assessment and they can see for
themselves the amount of time spent on work that is important. SEAM researchers have found
that when people analyze their own time, they can find ways to increase time dedicated to valueadded work. Third, participants co-create projects that will help the organization to achieve
strategic objectives. As part of an in-depth organizational intervention, the activities and plans
for each person are periodically negotiated and defined. Investments aimed at improving the
productivity of the organization are in effect self-financing in the sense that the company does
not need to borrow money or to reallocate resources that would affect revenue (Savall & Zardet,
2007).
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Investment in the potential of people. Investment in people is part of an aim to
improve the competitiveness of the company and ensure its long term stability. The idea of
human potential is central to the discussion of the socio-economic view because people are
regarded as the “the only active and creative factor of sustainable economic value” (Savall &
Zardet, 2008b, p. 5). In the socio-economic view, investment in people means allowing for the
time to study, train on new technologies, and apply what they learn in new ways that will benefit
the organization. Savall and Zardet (2007) wrote that each person is likely to contribute to the
realization of intangible investment activities. There are offsetting costs associated with these
activities, of course, but new innovations may be regarded as an asset – though an intangible one.
Ironically, accounting systems do not recognize new capabilities of the organization as an asset,
even though the new capabilities are really an outcome of the investments made. In this sense,
the new focus on analytics may require active management of intangible assets.
Focus on economic value-add activities. Since there may be many stakeholders in
cross-functional, matrixed organizations, alignment of analytic work is a key concern for anyone
managing the work of analysts. The key focus is on the value of new analytics projects to the
organization, relative to other work that the analyst is already doing. Alignment is not only a
matter of agreeing on priorities, but also deciding the scope and depth of the work that will be
done to serve those priorities. This is nothing new for information managers who have long
supported decision making in organizations with meaningful information. The new focus on
analytics, however, is driving more new work in other areas such as strategy development,
business process improvements, identification of underlying patterns in data, and performance
measurement.
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The relative prioritization across these areas of focus represents a kind of cost-to-value
relationship for the analyst. Again, this is nothing new: a good analytics manager is aware of
the relative priority of each work effort. A good manager is also aware of the salaries of people
and the idea that there is a return on the investment in time that the company is making. SEAM
intervener/ researchers would be similarly concerned, and would consider not only the salaries
associated with the people, but also the value of the work that the people are generating. What is
new is that the manager would be more supported in their efforts to ensure that their staff
members are working on the right thing. Instead of relying on the judgment and experience of
analytics managers to use resources wisely, the organization would be more active in deciding
how analytics projects align with priorities.
In an organization that has adopted SEAM management principles, the time spent on
tasks would be reviewed through an analysis of the way that people are utilizing their time. As
part of the SEAM organizational intervention, the mix of tasks would not only be identified but
also optimized through an effort to define projects, as part of the Periodically Negotiable
Activity Projects assessment. Because of the focus on value as opposed to costs, it is up to
management to ensure that the analyst is focused on the right work relative to the needs of the
organization. The SEAM principles emphasize that if people are not producing work of value,
then that is the responsibility of management – and not the individual employee.
To illustrate the cost-value relationships using the case study company context, Table 18
shows the general alignment of tasks (a) vs. the alignment of tasks that would be possible if the
analysts could leverage the software (c). The distribution of tasks can drive an increase in the
cost-to-value ratio associated with the work of each analyst. In the example in Table 18, the
cost-to-value ratio would increase from 2.75 to 3.15. Assuming that the average salary, benefits
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and overhead totals $100,000 for each analyst, then the value of the analyst’s work would, in
theory, increase from $275,000 to $315,000 if the analyst could leverage the software – a
difference of $40,000 per year for each person.
Table 18
Cost to Value Ratio Associated with Alignment of Analytic Projects
Without the Software
(a)
(b)

Case Study Company
Use of Analytics
Decision making
Strategy development
Development of cost savings strategies
Accelerate and/or automate business
processes
Evaluate and monitor key performance
measures
Aggregate

Percent of
Assumed
Analyst's
Cost-toTime
Value Ratio
20%
2.70
15%
3.45
10%
3.30

With the Software
(c)
(d)
Percent of
Analyst's
Cost-toTime
Value Ratio
15%
2.70
35%
3.45
25%
3.30

5%

3.15

15%

3.15

50%

2.40

10%

2.40

100%

2.75

100%

3.15

The application of analytics that is envisioned as part of business strategies from all areas
of the case study company points to the potential of increasing value of analytics projects. There
is an immediate need to move people to higher value-add tasks. The value to the organization in
ensuring this shift is $40,000 per analyst, per year – or $600,000 across the impacted team of 15
analysts. There is also a need to add the two analysts envisioned for year two, which would
need an additional $400,000 in net value-add. The net value-add would total $1,000,000,
assuming the alignment of people to the strategic projects, and the addition of the two analysts.
Model III in review. The Model III analysis shows that the inter-relationship between
behaviors and structures can impact the performance of the organization and create hidden costs,
or dysfunctions. From the Model III perspective, the costs associated with the technology and
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training investments need to be considered together with hidden costs. The performance of the
organization is improved when hidden costs are identified and then reduced through
organizational interventions. In Model III, reductions in hidden costs are regarded as benefits.
Productivity is enhanced when the work of each employee is aligned with the strategic objectives
and goals of the organization.
Table 19 shows a summary of Model III decision factors, along with a cross-reference to
the table that shows the corresponding analysis. Figure 5 shows a visual representation of the
magnitude of the Model III decision factors. Figure 5 also shows that the factors associated with
alignment of the analytics tasks and reduction in hidden costs are greater in magnitude than the
factors associated with costs.
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Table 19
Summary of Model III Decision Factors
Decision
Factors

Considerations

Item

Magnitude

CrossReference
Table

Visible Costs

Visible costs are those costs that can be
specifically tracked by business leaders.

Software
Consulting fees
Training costs
Sunset existing software

$
$
$
$

(340,000)
(250,000)
(20,000)
10,000

12
12
12
12

Hidden Costs

Hidden costs associated with the case study are
related to the technical difficulties that analysts
encounter as they work. Most of the issues
relate to the use of antiquated technologies and a
mis-match of software tools.

Non-productivity

$

(634,840)

15

Opportunity
Costs

Opportunity exists to increase organizational
performance with additional analytic capabilities.

Opportunity Costs New Hires on Hold

$

(1,200,000)

16

Productivity

Organizational performance could be improved if Shift work to value-add
business leaders priortize the work of the
activities
analysts, and align projects with organizational
objectives and strategies.

$

1,000,000

18

Benefits

Reduction in Hidden Costs

Close direct productivity $
gaps (over 3 years)

634,840

Reduction in Opportunity Costs

Close opportunity gaps - $
hire two analysts

1,200,000

15,17

16
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Figure 5. Summary of Model III measures of costs, benefits and productivity. Measures of
costs, benefits, and productivity are represented graphically to show the relative value of the
factors used in decision making. Costs are differentiated to show visible costs, hidden costs, and
opportunity costs. Costs are shown as negative amounts. Offsetting factors that either result in
enhanced productivity or reduce costs are modeled as positive amounts. Productivity is
enhanced if analytic projects are aligned with organizational objectives and strategies. Benefits
are modeled to show the potential reduction in hidden costs if new technology is incorporated in
analytic projects, and if plans to hire two additional analysts are reconsidered.
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Cross-Model Analysis
When I began this research, I thought that the three models could be categorized as
economic, social, and socio-economic. I had thought about the ways that businesses categorize
money and people as two mutually exclusive spheres – where cost factors are kept separate from
social factors – and naively thought that the socio-economic view would be a kind of
reconciliation of the two spheres. It would seem to be ideal, for example, if all of the separate
decision factors from each of the three models could be combined into one overall framework.
After all, what business leader would not appreciate a more comprehensive approach to decision
making? As I developed the models, however, I began to understand that I was trying to fit
together pieces that appear on the surface to the same, but – upon closer inspection – I found that
each model conceptualized costs, benefits and productivity very differently. I saw that the
different conceptualizations were based on different frames or views of the decision to be made.
Each model represented a different route to the decision about whether or not to invest in
software and training for analytic projects.
I think that the three models represent three different paradigms, where values and beliefs
drive conflicting views (or framing) of situations or strategy, and that the decision making
process follows from those views. In a parallel sense, I have observed the ways that people
sometimes “talk by” each other, each person thinking that the other party has completely
understood the conversation, but in reality each person’s conceptualization of the topic or issue is
completely different. Despite the different conceptualizations, there can of course be agreement
over a decision – but the agreement is incomplete in the sense that people just get to the same
conclusion via a different mental route. With that simple observation in mind, the cross-case
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analysis begins with a comparison of the ways that Model I, II and III decision makers would
conceptualize the case. Figures 6, 7 and 8 show the high-level decision frame for each model.
Conceptualization. Each model conceptualized the decision to be made based on a set of
values and beliefs about what is most important. Model I, for example, conceptualized the
decision making framework as one that is related to costs, and the need to maintain market
position in an increasingly competitive environment. The literature suggests that some
organizations had been able to cut costs through effective application of analytics. These
advances can place considerable cost pressure on an organization, especially if the time involved
to replicate the technical advances in analytics is longer in duration. Model II framed the
decision as one where new organizational capabilities in analytics would need to be developed in
order to maintain market position and competitiveness. Model II also recognized the importance
of analytic talent and training, and assumed that an investment in software could not be
considered without a corresponding view of the potential impact on the productivity of people.
Model III conceptualized the decision making process as strategic, where there was a need to
align resources with analytic projects that would add economic value to the organization. In
Model III, there was also emphasis was on reduction in dysfunctions that prevented people from
doing value-added work.
Decision factors. The three frameworks also show how different conceptualizations of
costs, benefits and productivity can result in different decision factors. The models show that the
meaning that decision makers associate with organizational context not only influences the way
that the decision making process is framed, but also the factors considered. In Model I, for
example, where the decision makers framed the decision making process as related to costs, the
decision factors considered were related to the costs of the new software and training. In Model
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II, the decision factors focused on the value of the analytic projects, relative to the costs involved
to achieve that value. In Model III, the decision factors were related to the relative reduction in
dysfunctions that could be achieved with additional investment in technology and people.
Codification. The choice about the decision factors that should be included in each of
the three models was developed based on the original conceptualization of the decision-making
framework. The choice of decision factors also affected the way the factors were quantified
within each of the three models. In other words, the quantification of decision factors is
essentially a symbolic representation or codification of different conceptualizations of costs,
benefits and productivity. Codifications that are represented within each of the three frameworks
are expressed as mathematical formulas. The variables that make up the structure of the
formulas may appear to be the same because they are similarly labeled, but in fact the variables
are different because they are associated with different meanings and conceptualizations. For
example, a Model I decision maker who is focused on costs and would want to know all about
the license fees and training costs associated with the new software. A Model III decision maker
would be similarly interested in the Model I decision factors; however, the Model III decision
maker would also assume that any discussion about costs would consider hidden costs, including
any existing dysfunctions related to non-quality or productivity. Similarly, a Model II decision
maker would not only be interested in the Model I cost factors, but also the internal costs to
develop new organizational capabilities. In other words, one could not simply solicit
information about costs without a corresponding discussion about the decision to be made and
the way that each variable (costs, benefits, productivity) should be quantified.
Monetization. Monetization is also an important consideration, since all three models
express the decision factors as dollar values. The monetization of the decision factors creates a
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way to express each decision factor relative to the other factors, so that it is easier for the
decision maker to assess the magnitude of each separate factor. In the case study example, the
Model II and Model III decision factors associated with hidden costs, opportunity costs and
productivity were greater in magnitude and impact than the factors related to costs.
Choosing among paradigms. The review of the literature associated with each model
also suggests that costs, benefits and productivity are driven by conceptualizations that are part
of different paradigms – and based on a different set of thoughts, beliefs and values. In other
words, different conceptualizations of costs, benefits and productivity are not complementary
views of the case, but rather they are alternative views of the case. The cross-case analysis was
the most analytically rewarding from the perspective that each model seems to clarify the other
two models as paradigms. Looking at each of the three models as alternative views provides
critical perspective about the factors used in decision making process. Both Models II and III
directly challenge the focus on costs that is so prevalent within mainstream cost-benefit
modeling in the sense that they include decision factors related to productivity and benefits. This
critical perspective on the relationship between costs and value is what differentiates Models II
and III from Model I.
But the point of the cross-case analysis is not so much to prove or disprove the existence
of separate paradigms. Rather the point is to show that it just won’t work to try to combine the
decision factors from one set of values and beliefs, or paradigm, with the set of decision factors
from another. Merton (1996) noted the way that paradigms provide a compact arrangement of
the central concepts and their interrelationships. He wrote that
…paradigms lessen the likelihood of inadvertently introducing hidden assumptions and
concepts, for each new assumption and each new concept must be either logically derived
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from previous components of the paradigm or explicitly introduced into it. The paradigm
thus provides a guide for avoiding ad hoc (i.e. logically irresponsible) hypotheses. (p. 59)
The cross-case analysis also shows that conceptualizations may seem nuanced until the
symbolic representation can also be seen. Merton (1996) noted that
…paradigms make for the codification of the qualitative analysis in a way that
approximates the logical if not the empirical rigor of quantitative analysis. The
procedures for computing statistical measures and their mathematical bases are codified
as a matter of course; their assumptions and procedures are open to critical scrutiny by
all. (p. 59)
Model I shows an important view; of course, business leaders have fiduciary
responsibility to understand the impact of decisions on the company’s financial statements and
reports. Yet I think most business leaders would agree that they have also have a responsibility
to effectively manage the productivity of the organization, to make sure that people are focused
on the right work, to remove barriers so that people can achieve their objectives, and to ensure
long-term growth and performance. In other words, the calculations that comprise each of the
three models are not as important as the thought process about what is most important. Business
leaders have the sophistication and capability to flexibly choose among frameworks of thought
that best apply to the business situation or context that they confront. But the case study example
implies that traditional decision-making processes that are essentially focused on the costs have
created a kind of mindset that omits other discussions about the productivity of people and
development of new organizational capabilities, knowledge and skill.
The review of the literature associated with Model I shows that the traditional focus on
costs is driven from an industrial-era focus on tangible assets, which emphasize the costs of
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production, and treat people as interchangeable with machines. Even for businesses focused on
production, this thinking has become obsolete. Of course, it is still true that advances in
technology may mean that the work of people can be replaced by machines. However, it is
increasingly more the case that people are able to leverage technology in new and important
ways. The new focus on big data and analytics shows that there has been a shift, where people
who were once subservient to advances in technology are now driving organizational change by
applying their knowledge and skill to effectively use tools. In the case study example, Model II
calculations showed how analytic projects could have significant potential value for the
organization. The value was not achieved solely through technology, but rather the way that
people innovatively use that technology to advance the organization’s objectives. Figure 9
shows how the decision factors associated with Model I are related to costs – and indirectly, on
tangible assets – and essentially leave out decision factors that may point to other potential
sources of value. In order to fully benefit from these new capabilities, decision making
processes will need to include factors associated productivity and other intangible benefits to the
organization.
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Model I Decision Frame
Organizational Context

Actions of competitors
Financial performance
relative to competitors

Meaning of
Organizational Context
as Applied to the Case
Competitive environment is
creating the need to
carefully control costs

Decision Framework

All new investments should
be reviewed to understand
the incremental impact on
costs

Assumptions About the
Decision Factors to be
Considered
Decision making process
must focus on costs; any
new or incremental costs
will reduce net income

Decision Factors

Codification

Monetization
(From Table 1)

New proposed costs:

License fees for software
plus
Consulting fees
plus
Training costs
minus
Cost avoidance
equals
New/ incremental costs

Year one
$ 480,000

Software costs
Consulting fees

Customer relationships
Strategic plans and
objectives

Rational decision making
process is best because it is
objective

Training costs
Cost avoidance

Important to have objective
information about costs;
each new proposed cost
should be quantified

Review costs over a fouryear period to see the
impact of the license
agreement

Year two
$ 40,000
Year three
$ 40,000
Year four
$ 40,000
Four-year total
$ 600,000

The benefits of the
proposal can't be
objectively measured until
they actually happen
The productivity of
people is confounded by
too many factors to be
objectively measured

Figure 6. Model I decision frame. This figure shows how organizational context might inform the beliefs of Model I decision
makers. Business leaders create meaning from the organizational context, and frame the situation as one where costs must be
carefully controlled. The decision making process is focused on incremental costs that may negatively impact profitability or the
organization’s financial ability to execute on its objectives. As a result, the analysis used in the decision making process is focused on
incremental costs, and sets aside consideration for other factors such as benefits and productivity. Measures of incremental costs are
developed for the decision factors to be considered as part of the business case, and codified as a formula. The measures are also
monetized in the sense that incremental costs are expressed as dollars.
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Model II Decision Frame
Organizational Context

Actions of competitors
Financial performance
relative to competitors
Customer relationships
Strategic plans and
objectives

Meaning of
Organizational Context
as Applied to the Case
Competitive environment is
creating the need to
compete on analytics
There is a need to develop
new analytical capabilities
within the organization
Big data creates new
strategic opportunities but
also technical challenges for
analysts
There is a need to retain,
develop, and recruit
analytic talent

Decision Framework

Strategic investments in
new organizational analytic
capabilities will need to be
reviewed and prioritized
Decision making about new
software tools and training
should focus on the analytic
projects that are part of
strategic plans
Analytic processes can
become strategic assets,
especially if process
outcomes are linked to
strategic goals

Assumptions About the
Decision Factors to be
Considered
People create value; it is
the collective knowledge,
skills and expertise that
have the most potential to
add value to the
organization
The productivity of
analysts can be enhanced
with new software tools
and training
The benefits of the
proposal are related to the
value of the analytic
projects to the
organization, net of the
administrative costs
associated with the
projects

Decision Factors

Codification

Monetization

Project costs include
(a) Cost of software
(b) Cost of training
(c) Cost of consulting fees
(d) Cost of the internal
development time to
develop new organizational
capabilities

Performance value:
Performance goal (units)
multiplied by
Estimated dollar value/ unit
equals
The expected
performance value of the
analytic project

Performance value:
current value without
technolgy or training
investments (from Table 7)

Productivity relates to the
expected value of the
analtyic projects with
investments in technology
and training, compared to
the value of the projects
without the investments

Productivity:
Performance value of
projects with investment
minus
Performance value of
projects without investment
equals
Productivity

Benefits relate to the
expected performance
value to the organization of
planned analytic projects,
net of costs

Benefits:
Performance value
minus
Project costs
equals
Benefits

$ 4,855,000
Productivity: Impact of
technology and training
investments on expected
performance value (from
Table 7)
$ 1,295,000
Benefits: Impact of
technology and training
investments on
performance value, net of
project costs (from Table
5):
$ 540,000

Figure 7. Model II decision frame. This figure shows how organizational context might inform the beliefs of Model II decision
makers. Business leaders create meaning from the organizational context, and frame the situation as one where the organization needs
to develop new analytic capabilities in order to remain competitive. The decision making process is focused on the impact on
performance value if the company invests in new software and training for analysts. Assessment of project benefits would consider
the incremental performance value, net of the additional costs needed to achieve that value. Decision factors are focused on
productivity and benefits.
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Model III Decision Frame
Organizational Context

Actions of competitors
Financial performance
relative to competitors
Customer relationships
Strategic plans and
objectives

Meaning of
Organizational Context
as Applied to the Case
There is an ongoing need to
boost economic
performance and to do
work that will ensure the
long term sustainability of
the organization

Decision Framework

There is a need to develop
strategic priority action
plans, including
consideration for analytic
projects
Time dedicated to analytic
projects must be prioritized
to ensure that people are
working on projects that
will create the most value
to the organization
There are existing gaps in
quality and productivity that
need to be addressed

Assumptions About the
Decision Factors to be
Considered
People create value; it is
the collective knowledge,
skills and expertise that
have the most potential to
add value to the
organization
The investment in software
and training does not by
itself create value; people
use the tools in order to
create value
Technology investments
must be considered
alongside the
corresponding need for
investments in people
It is the responsibility of
management to ensure that
people are working on
value-add activities

Decision Factors

Codification

Monetization

Visible costs include
(a) Cost of software
(b) Cost of training
(c) Cost of consulting fees

Hidden costs:
Frequency/ occurence of
problem
multiplied by
Work-around time
multiplied by
the cost per hour of time
equals
the hidden cost

Visible costs
(from Table 12):

Benefits
(from Table 17):

Benefits relate to
reduction in hidden costs if
the company invests in new
technology and training

Benefits:
Hidden costs with
investment
minus
Hidden costs without
investment

Productivity relates to
changes in economic valueadd if the company invests
in new technology and
training, and analytic
resources are able to focus
on projects with higher
economic value to the
organization

Productivity (expressed
as a ratio):
Value of economic projects
with investment, divided by
visible costs
divided by
Value of economic projects
without investment, divided
by visible costs

Hidden costs include an
assessment of dysfunctions
related to
(a) Non-quality
(b) Gaps in productivity
(c) Opportunity costs

$ 600,000
Hidden costs
(from table 17):
$ 634,840

$ 270,968
Productivity
(based on Table 18):
$ 600,000
$1,000,000
(if two analysts are hired)

Figure 8. Model III decision frame. This figure shows how organizational context might inform the beliefs of Model III decision
makers. Business leaders create meaning from the organizational context, and frame the situation as one where there is a need to
boost economic performance in order to remain competitive and to ensure the long term sustainability of the organization. The
decision making process is focused on the impact on economic performance value if the company invests in new software and training
for analysts. Assessment of project benefits would consider the reduction in hidden costs if there is investment in technology and
training. Productivity is concerned with alignment of resources on projects that will add the most economic value. Decision factors
are focused on reduction in hidden costs and increases in economic value-add.
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Model I Decision Factors

Considered
Tangible Assets
Financial
Physical
Capital
Assets

Not Considered
Intangible Assets
People

Organization

Customers

Productivity
Increase economic value of analytics projects
Ensure strategic alignment of resources

x
x

x
x

x
x

Benefits
Reduction in hidden costs
Reduction in opportunity costs
Enhancement of performance relative to costs
Training

x
x
x
x

x
x
x
x

x
x
x
x

Costs
Staff
Software
Consulting fees
Training Costs

x
x
x
x

Figure 9. Scope of factors considered in traditional cost-benefit decision models. Model I decision making is focused on incremental
costs that impact the net income of the organization. In the case study example, Model I costs included the salary and overhead costs
associated with new employees, as well as the investment costs associated with new software, consulting fees, and training costs.
Indirectly, the decision making process is focused on management of tangible assets, and regard people as costs. The focus on costs
leaves out other decision factors related to the potential productivity of people and benefits to the organization. Contemporary
thinking about management would balance the focus on tangible assets with intangible assets, which would include consideration for
the knowledge and skills of people, the technology and processes that are unique to the organization, and relationships with customers.
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Chapter Five
Discussion/Interpretation
The new focus on data and analytics has prompted the need for alternative decisionmaking frameworks that take into account the potential value of analytic projects and the
productivity of people. More traditional cost-benefit decision frameworks (as represented by
Model I) are focused primarily on the costs associated with new investments. Development of
alternative models that are meaningful to business leaders will take some time and effort. This
study highlights three areas of potential focus, including (a) development of alternative decision
models, (b) the relative magnitude and importance of costs, benefits and productivity as decision
factors, and (c) the way that the values and beliefs of decision makers can affect development of
the decision framework.
Development of alternative decision models. First, the study shows how alternative
decision frameworks (as represented by Models II and III) could be developed that would take
into account other relevant factors, including the value of analytic projects and the productivity
of people. These models were developed in parallel with a more traditional cost-benefit model.
As a practical consideration, the models were limited to assessments of costs, benefits and
productivity. While the study showed three examples of potential decision frameworks, the
decision frameworks actually in use within organizations are highly variable. The point of the
development of the three models was not so much prescriptive – in the sense that the intent was
not to describe how to develop the models – but rather the point was to show alternative views of
the same case. By showing alternative views of the same case, the differences between the
traditional decision making model and the alternative models are easier to see.
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The relative magnitude of costs, benefits and productivity as decision factors.
Second, the study shows the relative magnitude of the alternative decision factors, compared to
the factors that are part of traditional cost-benefit decision frameworks. The analysis associated
with Model I highlighted the way that traditional cost-benefit decision models focus primarily on
factors related to costs, and omit factors related to the productivity of people and value of
analytic projects to the organization. Models II and III, in contrast, emphasized the productivity
of people and value of the analytic projects as the most important decision factors. The Model II
and III assessments showed that that the relative magnitude of decision factors associated with
productivity and benefits can be more important (in terms of relative monetary value) than the
decision factors associated with costs. These models also showed that decision making factors
related to alignment of work with the strategic objectives of the organization were among the
most meaningful of all the factors considered.
The values and beliefs of decision makers affect the development of decision
frameworks. Third, the study illuminated the way that different approaches to business case
development may be founded in different paradigms of thought. The cross-model analysis
showed how different values and beliefs may affect the way business leaders make sense of
context, the way decisions are framed, the choice of decision factors, and even the way the
decision factors are defined and calculated. For example, traditional cost-benefit models are
primarily focused on costs, but they may also incorporate additional decision factors related to
benefits and productivity. However, the meaning associated with those decision factors is
different than the meaning associated with similarly-labeled decision factors in the two
alternative models.
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The different meaning associated with similarly labeled decision factors implies that
there may be a danger in mixing the separate decision factors from the three different decision
models. While it may be tempting to just append some new decision factors to traditional costbenefit modeling, the factors associated with each model are not necessarily compatible. The
analysis of Models II and III showed that the initial conceptualization of the decision framework
– as well as the decision factors associated with the productivity of people and value of projects
– belongs to a different set of values and beliefs.
Significance of the Study
The study is significant in three ways. First, it suggests the presence of a cost paradigm
in organizations that is manifested in the decision making process. Second, it shows that in order
to introduce new areas of organizational focus that are related to the knowledge, skills, and
productivity of people, decisions about those investments will require more up-front design of
the decision framework. Third, the evolution from industrial to knowledge-based businesses will
drive the need to move from a focus on costs to a new focus on economic performance. A focus
on the economic performance of the organization will mean that business leaders will be
increasingly focused on management of intangible assets, including development of the
knowledge and skills of people, technological assets, and relationships with customers and other
external entities.
The cost paradigm. The review of the traditional cost-benefit analysis model (as
represented schematically by Model I) showed that the factors considered in the decision making
process are influenced by accounting for tangible assets. In Model I, the focus of the decision
making process was based on decision factors related to new or incremental costs. From an
accounting perspective, an increase in costs would result in a corresponding decrease in income,
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net of costs. While the traditional decision-making process may acknowledge the possibility of
increased productivity of people or other benefits to the organization, those factors are omitted
from the cost-benefit analysis because those factors are regarded as intangible.
The Model I analysis would imply that the accounting framework also drives values,
beliefs and assumptions about costs, benefits and productivity in the organization – along with an
associated set of measures, reporting and professional practice standards that are taught in
management classes all over the United States. The entire set of values, beliefs, assumptions,
measures, reporting and standards represents a cost paradigm. In this view, the salaries and
overhead costs associated with people represent significant expense that must be actively
managed.
The Model I analysis also shows that there is no association of salary and overhead costs
with the potential productivity of people. The disassociation of the cost of people from the
productivity of people in decision making is just one way that traditional decision making
models may not work for organizational capability-building in analytics. More important than
that, though, the cost paradigm may have perpetuated the industrial-era notion that people are
interchangeable with machines – and the related idea that people can be cut in order to improve
profitability. The analysis of Models II and III, in contrast, would suggest that the decision
factors associated with the productivity of people are more important (in the sense of relative
magnitude) than the factors related to costs.
The business literature that glamourizes use of big data and analytics has not been clear
about the nature of investment in people that needs to be made. Almost all of the new
applications of data and analytics for competitive advantage depend primarily upon the
knowledge and skills of people. For many organizations, there is a need to recruit, train and
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retain analytic talent – which is also fueling demand for analytic talent in the marketplace.
However, if organizations are looking for ways to cut costs, then the need to recruit, train and
retain analytic talent may seem to be an incompatible idea. More important, there is no place in
the Model I decision framework for an assessment of the productivity gains that could occur if
investments in analytics are made.
Design of the decision framework. Given all the issues organizations face in
developing new organizational capabilities, there are many potential ways decisions could be
framed. The CSC decision was based on a traditional model, but that decision frame fit the
decision makers’ assessment of the organizational context. The case study decision makers
wanted to think about whether additional software and training would be a good investment
relative to the considerable investments that had already been made in the company’s technology
portfolio. The decision makers involved were not focused on the work to build new analytic
capabilities, nor were they trying to boost the performance of the company’s analytic resources.
They were making a decision about the costs for technology and training, and they were working
to ensure that (a) the expenditure of funds was not redundant with other technology, (b) the
investment was consistent with other technology strategies and investments, and (c) that there
was a clear use case related to the new technology vs. other technologies already in use. And so
the CSC analysis was focused on costs alone, without other considerations related to potential
benefits or improvements in the productivity of people.
While the case study company was equipped with the decision tools that it needed, other
decision makers in other organizations may be responsible for executing on analytic strategies
that are considered key to the long-term success of the organization. In order to create new
analytic capabilities, these business leaders will need a way to make ongoing decisions about the
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costs, project benefits and productivity that they are managing. They will need an alternative
decision-making framework, along with relevant decision factors.
Some technology vendors point to the need to link analytics with strategy in order to
make the business case for investments in software and training, and to ensure that there is a link
to the potential value for the organization. This thinking likely assumes that the potential value
of strategic initiatives has already been quantified, and that the costs associated with technology
improvements would have been considered in the planning process. A vendor may seize upon a
strategic initiative with the hope that technology costs will already be a budgeted line item. But
again, decisions that link technology investments to strategy are essentially focused on costs.
After all, if an organization has already planned for an expense as part of a strategic planning
process, then there is no need to discuss the messy issues associated with development of the
skills and knowledge of people or to debate the new organizational capabilities that need to be
developed. While the focus of this paper has been on software and training investments, it also
important to consider that development of new analytic capabilities does not necessarily depend
on technology investments – though given all the challenges with big data some analytic leaders
may disagree. Rather, the success of analytic projects – with or without technology investments
– will largely depend on the talent, commitment and knowledge of people.
Decision frameworks focused on economic performance. For knowledge-based
businesses, the decision factors associated with costs are of course critical. But the emerging
need to manage intangible assets – especially the knowledge and skills of the workforce – will
mean that business leaders will need to design new decision frameworks that are aligned with
economic performance, and not just costs. While business leaders may well have the intellectual
ability to think more flexibly about the nature of decisions to be made, the strength and
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importance of the cost paradigm creates an almost unavoidable basis for both action and
inaction. It is as if business leaders must first pass through the Model I gate in order to get to the
decision factors that are part of Models II and III. Given the time involved to evaluate new
opportunities, the traditional models may create a kind of brake on the organization’s ability to
evolve work that depends of the knowledge and skills of people. In addition, traditional costbenefit decision making models that are focused solely on costs will not provide decision makers
with information that is appropriate for the kinds of investments in people that are considered.
Even more important, Models II and III show that the underlying beliefs about the value of
people are different – making it very difficult to reconcile traditional decision making models
with other models that include decision factors related to the productivity of people or the value
of analytic projects and related work.
A continued focus on Model I decision factors will likely create a kind of creative tension
in knowledge-based organizations, where the Model I decision factors no longer seem
applicable, but at the same time new decision factors are not compatible because they are
founded in a different set of values and beliefs about people. Kuhn wrote extensively about this
kind of tension in his essays about scientific history and advances in scientific knowledge. In a
famous speech given to The Third University of Utah Research Conference on Identification of
Scientific Talent in 1959, Kuhn (1977) described “the essential tension” in innovation and
research, and the idea that “convergent thinking is just as essential to scientific advance as
divergent” (p. 226). In his speech, Kuhn further explained:
But revolutionary shifts of a scientific tradition are relatively rare, and extended periods
of convergent research are the necessary preliminary to them. …That is why I speak of
an “essential tension” implicit in scientific research. To do his job the scientist must
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undertake a complex set of intellectual and manipulative commitments. Yet his claim to
fame, if he has the talent and good luck to gain one, may finally rest upon his ability to
abandon this net of commitments in favor of another of his own invention. Very often
the successful scientist must simultaneously display the characteristics of the
traditionalist and of the iconoclast. (p. 227)
Kuhn’s observation that an expert can be both a “traditionalist” and an “iconoclast”
suggests that it is the people working within an existing paradigm who are in the best position to
either perpetuate or change it. On one hand, the traditionalist is an expert in the current state of
what is already known and practiced. Because of the traditionalist’s expertise, the existing
discipline of practice is perpetuated and reinforced. Kuhn (1977) explained that in the sciences,
“it is often better to do one’s best with the tools at hand than to pause for contemplation of
divergent approaches” (p. 225). On the other hand, the traditionalist’s practice of objectivity
may be expansive enough to take in information that is contrary to what is already known or
practiced. Kuhn said that as the scientist assimilates new additions to existing knowledge, he
must also discard “some elements of his prior belief and practice while finding new significances
in and new relationships between many others” (p. 227). In other words, it is the shift in beliefs
and the incremental changes in professional practice that morphs the expert from traditionalist to
iconoclast. If there is sufficient acceptance and consensus among the community of experts
about suggested changes in practice, then the iconoclast may again be regarded as a traditionalist.
Significance of the Study for Organizational Change and Development
The influence of the cost paradigm on organizational decision making also has
significance for the professional practice of organization development. First, the implication is
that in order to effect change in organizations, practitioners must acknowledge the underlying
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values and beliefs that drive it. Second, and perhaps more important, the values and beliefs of
business leaders may be different than the values and beliefs associated with the practice of
organization development.
If it is true that an organization is caught in the mental box of the cost paradigm, then
organizational change initiatives related to the productivity of people or organizational capability
building might be incompatible with the view that people are costs. For example, Model I
decision makers may appear to be in agreement as organization development practitioners talk
about the importance of productivity and the value of people, but in reality Model I decision
makers are working from a different set of values and beliefs. That is, a Model I decision maker
might mentally filter the concept of productivity gains as (a) reductions in the number of people
and (b) a corresponding increase in net income. The organization development practitioner, in
contrast, might be thinking that if employees can be freed up from existing tasks then the
employees can take on new projects that will add more value. These differences in underlying
beliefs may appear on the surface to be subtle, but in fact may ultimately affect the perceived
success of organization change initiatives.
At the same time though, there is increasing recognition that cost-cutting in organizations
– while associated with quick financial wins – has not necessarily produced desired results over
the long term. In order to ensure the long term sustainability of the organization, some
organizations are applying collective brain power to boost economic performance. Some of this
new thinking about economic performance is not really new at all, but rather part of a long
legacy of research in the field of organization development. The legacy of organization
development research includes information about the ways that the economic performance of
organizations could be improved. Because mainstream decision making is so focused on costs
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and management of tangible assets, however, organization development practitioners have been
somewhat marginalized – relegated to executing on change related to reductions in workforce,
followed by the seemingly inevitable need to bring in the best talent to deal with unfolding
operational problems or drops in the productivity of remaining staff. Given the legacy of the
organization development profession, I think that there is a new opportunity to return to a focus
on economic performance – especially as it relates to the knowledge, skills and productivity of
people. Many business leaders have been trained to manage costs, but have missed out on the
significant body of organization development research related to economic performance. The
new focus on data and analytics is only one example of an area where economic performance is
important, but there are many others.
Recommendations for Action
The review of the three decision frameworks show how factors related to costs, benefits,
and productivity can be interrelated and complex. In order to frame decisions related
organizational capability building in analytics, there is a need to focus on the value of analytics
projects, and to ensure that analysts are equipped with the right tools and training. There is also
the need to consider the internal effort involved to develop new capabilities, as the time to
develop technology-related projects is longer in duration than most other projects and also very
costly. Perhaps one of the most important issues, though, is the importance of challenging the
status quo – and essentially challenging prevailing beliefs about costs vs. economic performance.
These challenges imply that data and analytics is an area where organizations would
greatly benefit from the socio-economic approach to management. The socio-economic view not
only takes on the issue of costs, but expands upon that view by introducing new dimension of
costs that may otherwise remain hidden. In addition to the extra scrutiny on costs, the socio-
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economic view challenges the status quo. SEAM practitioners intervene in the organization to
help business leaders plan and execute projects in alignment with the strategic aims of the
organization. The SEAM interventions are more holistic than other, more traditional
organization development approaches. The SEAM interventions combine what otherwise may
be many separate and disjoint organization interventions into one overall change process.
Perhaps even more important, SEAM interventions are informed by a data collected as part of
similar interventions all over the world.
Limitations
Although the three models permitted an in-depth exploration of a single case, it is
perhaps redundant – and at the same time important – to restate the obvious: the focus of this
research was limited to a single case. The decision making process obviously varies greatly –
not only across different kinds of organizations, but also across different kinds of proposals – and
of course different kinds of decision makers with different kinds of interests. The work here
cannot be extrapolated as true and correct for any other case. The intent of this research is
simply to show how other approaches to the decision making process would look if they had
been fully developed, and to demonstrate the impact of paradigms on the decision making
framework, decision factors considered, and calculations of the factors.
An Observation about My Research Process
When I constructed my original research question, I wanted to show how a simple
business case would look if it included consideration for not only costs, but also other factors
related to the productivity of people and the benefits to the organization. I wanted to do this
research because in my role as a business leader I had tried to make the case for investments that
would remove technological barriers for my staff members, and make it easier for them to
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develop their analytic projects. In showing alternative views of a simple business case related to
investment in analytic software and training, I was able to demonstrate that the decision factors
related to productivity and benefits that had been deeded as “soft” can be just as important (and
even more important) than factors related to costs. Based on a review of relevant literature, I
was also able to show how alternative views of the business case could be developed and
different decision factors could be developed.
In the process of developing alternative views of the case, I came to see more clearly the
cost paradigm that underlies traditional decision making in organizations. As the cost paradigm
emerged in my own thinking and reading, I also began to see how my own values and beliefs as
a business leader – which had originally inspired the ideas for this research – had, ironically,
obscured my ability to see the cost paradigm. In fact, my own sense of personal knowledge and
skill is grounded in what I have deemed in this paper to be the Model I approach. Like the
Model I business leaders that I wrote about, I would also be reluctant to give up what I know to
adopt an alternative set of decision factors. My ability to conceptualize costs vs. benefits
represents a kind of knowledge that far surpasses the skill it takes to develop the calculations
associated with each of the three models developed for this study. Knowing is not the same as
calculating. I say that with humor, but also with the deeper understanding that measures and
numbers become familiar in their patterns. Would a physician, for example, throw out the
temperature or pulse of patient as relevant metrics just because they do not explain everything
about the status of the person’s health? In a similar way, I already know the issues that may
impact my assessment of costs at different points in time or in specific situations. In my
experience, small changes in metrics can be meaningful, and – at times – enough to provoke
additional investigation.
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While I emphasized that it is not possible to combine the decision factors from the three
models, I think it is also true that it is important to be grounded in the Model I decision
framework in order to understand the differences in Models II and III. At the same time, I found
it very interesting to consider that the literature that underlies Models II and III was developed,
in part, as critical theory about the cost paradigm that is driving decision making in
organizations. After following the logic of these alternative arguments, I found that my own
thinking was transformed. I began to see evidence of the cost paradigm wherever I looked, and
in most of what I read about contemporary actions and strategies of organizations. The worldwide economic crisis has created an unprecedented level of cost cutting – and most of the cuts in
costs have greatly affected the livelihood of people in all walks of life. I could no longer think of
reductions in workforce as reductions in costs, but rather as potential reductions in the overall
productivity of the organization. I have since accumulated many anecdotal stories about people
who have been cut from organizations, only to be asked back to work when costly problems start
to emerge and overall productivity is affected. All of this research and anecdotal evidence led
me to challenge my Model I values and beliefs, and to understand the limitations of my thinking
as I formulated the models.
Similarly, the Model III concept of hidden costs has also affected my thinking about the
definition of costs in an organization. Of course, the concept of opportunity costs has always
been part of my traditional view of situations and problems. However, extensive SEAM research
has demonstrated that hidden costs manifest themselves in many ways that may not be readily
apparent to business leaders. Once I understood the concept of hidden costs, I began to see
dysfunctions in many situations – and especially how loyal employees can be in the middle of
bad situations and problems that are unaddressed by management. Why, I wondered, do

133
business leaders assign more people to work on problems, instead of working to improve the
underlying technology or process? Model III shows more clearly the ways that people are still
regarded as interchangeable with machines. Again, the review of Model III literature and my
own subsequent observations of organizational life challenged my traditional beliefs. After
reading the relevant literature, I found that I began to see hidden costs everywhere I went.
Given the transformation in my thinking, I can see how my values, beliefs and
experiences could have impacted and limited the scope of my research. Living as I do in my
own mental box, I may have even missed some essential points that I should have associated
with each model. Yet the fact that I am myself grounded in the cost paradigm makes it important
for me to translate between Model I and Models II and III: I believe that I have a kind of
responsibility to point out the way that the cost paradigm can affect decision making and omit
factors that are important to organizational change and development. While I have good and
altruistic intentions, I can also see how my grounding in Model I could have affected my analysis
and interpretation of findings.
Suggestions for Further Research
There are many areas of additional investigation that I think would be meaningful. First,
and perhaps most obvious, is the need to conduct research that will create a deeper understanding
of the cost paradigm. Second, given the current focus on data and analytics, it may be helpful to
revisit the socio-technical theory that is part of the legacy of organization development research.
Third, given that organizations are actively working to develop new analytic capabilities, it
would be valuable to learn from their experience and decision making frameworks.
Exploration of the cost paradigm. The early research of Likert and Seashore (1963) is
now outdated, but – given the practice of cost cutting – seems more relevant than ever. Have
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businesses cut costs at the expense of productivity? With the Likert and Seashore research in
mind, there are important research questions that could be developed:


What are the contextual factors that lead to cost cutting?



How do organizations know where to cut costs? Are factors related to the productivity of
people are considered?



How do executives assess the impact of cost cutting? What factors are considered? Are
there different assessments of the impact of cost cutting in the short term than in the long
term?



Are there organizations that actively manage intangible assets such as the knowledge and
skills of the workforce? If so, how are the organizations alike or different than their
peers? How are decisions framed?



What is the experience of people working in organizations that are focused on the
productivity of people and other kinds of intangible assets? To what extent do people
feel valued for their knowledge, skills and contributions? Are these experiences similar
or different than the experiences of people working in organizations focused on costs and
tangible assets?



What is the experience of people who are cut from organizations and then asked to
return? Do they choose to return? Why or why not? If they do return, what are their
experiences?
Revisit socio-technical theory. The early organization development research about the

interrelationships between people and machines was largely focused on the impact of technology
on job design, and the impact of technology on the roles and responsibilities of people. There
was also a focus on inputs and outputs, and the idea that both could be controlled if only they
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were understood. Although there was significant savings in the early days of desktop computing
as routine tasks were automated, today’s technical environment is far more complicated.
Analysts and other technical people work as part of cross-functional teams and contribute to the
development of strategy and other initiatives. It is very difficult to isolate changes in economic
performance to a single person or group. If anything, technological change has made the work of
people more difficult, because people are still doing work that machines cannot do. Yet, based
on this study, it seems that the old assumption that cost savings can be achieved through
automation of tasks still persists, and only reinforces the problem that people are viewed as
interchangeable with machines. With this concern in mind, it would be interesting to revisit
socio-technical theory:


How does existing socio-technical theory inform the new focus on data and analytics?
Are there areas where the theory is outdated and needs to be updated?



How have the interrelationships between people and computers and mobile devices
evolved over time? Are people subservient to their machines, or are people are now the
masters?
Management of analytic capability-building. Given the projections that indicate that

there will be shortage of analytic talent in the future, I think that there needs to be more research
to show how to attract and retain the best analytic talent. I also believe that the ability to manage
analytic talent is a unique skill set. In my experience, the best analytic managers have been able
to create new capabilities, but there is very little information about how they go about it. With
all these issues in mind, it would be valuable to find out what the most successful analytic
companies are doing.
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How do successful analytic companies go about deciding where and how to build new
capabilities?



How do decision makers decide where to focus analytic talent?



Given the challenges associated with big data, how do the successful analytic companies
decide where to make investments?



How does organizational structure influence capability building?



How do organizations work to improve cross-functional processes with analytics?
Conclusions
How can business leaders move beyond current management practices that are based on

costs to focus on development of people, structures and customer relationships? The evolution
from industrial to knowledge-based businesses may imply that organizations will go through a
parallel evolution of management thought, where there is an increasing tension related to
management of tangible vs. intangible assets. That is, there will be the need to manage costs and
at the same time manage other factors such as the productivity, knowledge and skills of people –
as well as relationships with customers and other external partners. As organizations work to
build new capabilities, the evolution may begin with a new focus on the decision-making
process, along with a renewed understanding of what is being decided and why. But more
important, the fact of the separate paradigms of thought associated with costs vs. economic
performance implies that the evolution of management decision frameworks will also be
ontological. Where accounting measures are now associated with objectivism in that they are
regarded as a source of truth, the evolution to new paradigms of management will imply a shift
to social constructionism. In this new ontological view, decision making processes will rely not
only on accounting measures, but will also rely on other factors that are now considered
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intangibles. With this ontological shift, the need for organization capability building will also
change, implying a greater need for more holistic approaches to organization development and
change management. In order to facilitate the change, however, organization development
practitioners will need to hold the creative tension between costs and economic performance, and
essentially walk the line between opposing paradigms of thought, values, and beliefs.

138
References
Alcaniz, L., Gomez-Bezares, F., & Roslender, R. (2011). Theoretical perspectives on
intellectual capital: A backward proposal for going forward. Accounting Forum, 35, 104
– 117.
Allison, G. T. (1971). Essence of decision: Explaining the Cuban missile crisis. New York, New
York: HarperCollinsPublishers.
Aupperele, K. E., Carroll, A. B., & Hatfield, J. D. (1985). An empirical examination of the
relationship between corporate social responsibility and profitability. The Academy of
Management Journal, 28(2), 446-463.
Ballentine, J. A., & Stray, S. (1999). Information systems and other capital investments:
Evaluation practices compared. Logistics Information Management, 12(1/2), 78-93.
Barber, F. & Strack, R. (2005). The surprising economics of a people business. Harvard
Business Review, 83(6), 80-90.
Bloomberg BusinessWeek Research Services. (2011). The current State of business analytics:
Where do we go from here? (Retrieved from the internet:
http://www.sas.com/resources/asset/busanalyticsstudy_wp_08232011.pdf).
Bose, R. (2009). Advanced analytics: Opportunities and challenges. Industrial Management &
Data Systems, 109(2), 155-172.
Breitfelder, M. D., & Dowling, D. W. (2008). Why did we ever go into HR? Harvard Business
Review, 86(7/8), 39-43.
Carroll, A. B. (1991). The pyramid of corporate social responsibility: Toward the moral
management of organizational stakeholders. Business Horizons, July-August, 39-48.
Carroll, A. B. (1998). The four faces of corporate citizenship. Business and Society Review,
100/101, 1-7.

139
Carroll, A. B. (1999). Corporate social responsibility: Evolution of a definitional construct.
Business Society, 38, 268-295.
Conbere, J. P., & Heorhiadi, A. (2011a). Socio-economic approach to management: A
successful systemic approach to organizational change. OD Practitioner, 43(1), 6-10.
Conbere, J. P., & Heorhiadi, A. (2011b). Some epistemological, ethical and theological aspects
of SEAM. [Academic paper dated 5/20/2011].
Cristallini, V. (2011). Role de la gouvernance dans la lute contre la pandemie mondiale du virus
techno economique. Sѐme Congrѐs de l’ADERSE (Association pour le Développement
de l’Enseignement et de la Recherche sur la Responsabilité Sociale de l’Enterprise), Paris
les 24 et 25 mars 2011, organisé par l’Université Paris Descartes.
Davenport, T. H., Mule, L. D. & Lucker, J. (2011). Know what your customers want before they
do. Harvard Business Review, 89(12), 84-92.
Davenport, T. H. & Harris, J. G. (2006). Competing on analytics. Harvard Business Review,
84(1), 98-107.
Davenport, T. H. & Harris, J. G. (2007a). Competing on analytics. Boston, Massachusetts:
Harvard Business School Publishing Corporation.
Davenport, T. H. & Harris, J. G. (2007b). The dark side of customer analytics. Harvard
Business Review, 85(5), 37-48.
Davenport, T. H. & Harris, J. G. (2010). Analytics at work. Boston, Massachusetts: Harvard
Business Press.
Davenport, T. H., Harris, J. G., De Long, D. W., & Jacobson, A. L. (2001). Data to knowledge
to results: Building an analytic capability. California Management Review, 43(2), 117138.

140
Davidson, S., Stickney, C. P. & Weil, R. L. (1979). Financial accounting: An introduction to
concepts, methods and uses. Hinsdale, Illinois: The Dryden Press.
Fitz-enz, J. (2009). The ROI of human capital: Measuring the value of employee performance.
New York, NY: AMACOM.
Flamholtz, E. G., Bullen, M. L., & Hua, W. (2002). Human resource accounting: A historical
perspective. Management Decision, 40(10), 947-954.
Giaglis, G. M., Mylonopoulos, N., & Doukidis, G. I. (1999). The ISSUE methodology for
quantifying benefits from information systems. Logistics Information Management,
12(1/2), 50-62.
Gilheany, S. (2011). Projecting the costs of magnetic disk storage over the next ten years.
(Retrieved from the internet: http://www.archivebuilders.com/whitepapers/22011p.pdf)
Gowthorpe, C. (2008). Wider still and wider? A critical discussion of intellectual capital
recognition, measurement and control in a boundary theoretical context. Critical
Perspectives on Accounting, 20, 823-834.
Jaccard, J. & Jacoby, J. (2010). Theory construction and model-building skills: A practical
guide for social scientists. New York, New York: The Guilford Press.
Kaplan, R. S. & Norton, D. P. (2004b). Measuring the strategic readiness of intangible assets.
Harvard Business Review, 82(2), 52-63.
Kuhn, T. S. (1977). The essential tension. Chicago, Illinois: The University of Chicago Press.
Kuhn, T. S. (2012). The structure of scientific revolutions [50th anniversary edition]. Chicago,
Illinois: The University of Chicago Press.
LaValle, S., Hopkins, M., Lesser, E., Shockley, R., and Kruschwitz, N. (2010). Analytics: The
new path to value. IBM Institute for Business Value, in collaboration with MIT Sloan

141
Management Review. (Retrieved from the internet:
http://sloanreview.mit.edu/feature/report-analytics-the-new-path-to-value).
Lewin, K. (1997). Resolving social conflicts: Field theory in social science [first published in
1948 by Harper & Row]. Washington D.C.: American Psychological Association.
Liberatore, M. J., and Luo, W. (2010). The Analytics Movement: Implications for operations
research. Interfaces, 40 (4), 313-324.
Likert, R. (1958). Measuring organizational performance. Harvard Business Review, 36(2), 4150.
Likert, R. (1961). New patterns of management. New York, New York: McGraw-Hill Book
Company.
Likert, R. (1967). The human organization. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, Inc.
Likert, R., & Seashore, S. E. (1963). Making cost control work. Harvard Business Review,
41(6), 96-108.
Manyika, J., Chui, M., Brown, B., Bughin, A., Dobbs, R., Roxburgh, C., and Byers, A. H.
(2011). Big data: The next frontier for innovation, competition and productivity.
(Retrieved from the internet:
http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/mgi/research/technology_and_innovation/big_data_th
e_next_frontier_for_innovation).
Margolis, J. (1958). The analysis of the firm: Rationalism, conventionalism, and behaviorism.
The Journal of Business, 31(3), 187-199.
Marian, T., & Adrian, R. (2009). The importance of knowing the enterprises hidden costs.
Retrieved from the internet 7/28/13:

142
http://steconomice.uoradea.ro/anale/volume/2009/v3-finances-banks-andaccountancy/202.pdf
May, T. A. (2009). The new know. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons.
Mayo, A. (2012). Human resources or human capital? Retrieved 8 September 2013, from
<http://www.myilibrary.com?ID=338275>
McAffe, A., and Brynjofsson, E. (2012). Big data: The management revolution. Harvard
Business Review, 90(10), 60-68.
McGregor, D. (2006). The human side of the enterprise [Annotated edition; first published in
1960]. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc.
Merton, R. K. (1996). On social structure and science. Chicago, Illinois: The University of
Chicago Press.
Morehead, A., and Morehead, L. (1995). The new American Webster handy college dictionary.
Third edition prepared by Philip D. Moreland. New York, NY: Signet.
O’Donnell, D. (2004). Theory and method on intellectual capital creation: Addressing
communicative action through relative methodics. Journal of Intellectual Capital, 5(2),
294-311.
Patel, N. V., & Irani, Z. (1999). Evaluating information technology in dynamic environments: a
focus on tailorable information systems. Logistics Information Management, 12(1/2), 3239.
Peppard, J., & Ward, J. (2005). Unlocking sustained business value from IT investments.
California Management Review, 48(1), 52-70.
Peters, T. J., & Waterman Jr., R. H. (1983). Beyond the rational model [Excerpt from the book
In Search of Excellence]. McKinsey Quarterly, Spring Issue, 19-30.

143
Preston, J. (2008). Kuhn’s “The structure of scientific revolutions”: A reader’s guide. New
York, New York: Continuum International Publishing Group.
Ranjan, J. (2008). Business justification with business intelligence. The Journal of Information
and Knowledge Management Systems, 38(4), 461-475.
Roulstone, D. B. & Phillips, J. J. (2008). ROI for technology projects: Measuring and
delivering value. Burlington, Massachusetts: Butterworth-Heinemann.
SAS Institute. (2011). Annual report. (Retrieved from the internet:
http://www.sas.com/company/annual-report-current.pdf).
Savall, H. (2002). An updated presentation of the socio-economic management model. Journal
of Organizational Change, 16(1), 33-48.
Savall, H. (2010). Work and people: An economic evaluation of job-enrichment. Charlotte,
North Carolina: Information Age Publishing, Inc.
Savall. H., & Zardet, V. (2007, June). L’importance stratégique de l’investissement incorporeal:
Résultats qaulimétrics de cas d’enterprises [The strategic importance of intangible
investment: Qualimetric results of case companies]. L’er congres transatlantique de
compatabilité, audit, contrôle de gestion, gestion des coûts et mondialisation, - Instituit
des Coûts (ILC) American Accounting Association – ISEOR, Lyon.Savall, H., & Zardet,
V. (2008a). Mastering hidden costs and socio-economic performance. Charlotte, NC:
Information Age Publishing.
Savall, H., & Zardet, V. (2008a). Mastering hidden costs and socio-economic performance.
Charlotte, NC: Information Age Publishing. (Originally published in French in 1987).

144
Savall, H., & Zardet, V. (2008b, April). Le concept de coût-valeur des activités. Contribution de
la théorie socio-économique des organization [The activity cost-value concept]. Revue
Sciences de Gestion-Management Sciences-Ciencias de Gestion.
Savall, H., Zardet, V., & Bonnet, M. (2008). Releasing the untapped potential of enterprises
through socio-economic management. Turin, Italy: International Training Centre of the
ILO.
Schultz, T. W. (1961). Investment in human capital. The American Economic Review, 51(1),
1-17.
Schutz, W. (1994). The human element: Productivity, self-esteem and the bottom line. San
Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass Inc.
Schwartz, M. S., & Carroll, A. B. (2003). Corporate social responsibility: A three-domain
approach. Business Ethics Quarterly, 13(4), 503-530.
Spender, J. C. & Marr, B. (2005). A knowledge-based perspective on intellectual capital. From
Marr, Barnard (Ed.) Perspectives on Intellectual Capital, 183-195. Thousand Oaks, CA:
Sage.
Spender, J. C. (2006). Method, philosophy and empirics in KM and IC. Journal of Intellectual
Capital, 7(1), 12-28.
Stake, R. E. (1995). The art of case study research. Thousand Oaks, California: SAGE
Publications.
Swanson, R. A. (1999). The foundations of performance improvement and implications for
practice. In R. Torraco (Ed.), The theory and practice of performance improvement. (125). San Francisco, CA: Berrett-Koehler Publishers, Inc.

145
Swanson, R. A. (2001a). Assessing the Financial Benefits of Human Resource Development.
New York, NY: Basic Books.
Swanson, R. A. (2001b). Human resource development and its underlying theory. Human
Resource Development International, 4(3), 299-312.
Trepo, G., & de Geuser, F. (2002). Managing the unmanageable: How can SEAM give back to
employees and work situations their anthropological original substance? Journal of
Organizational Change, 16(1), 99-106.
Tyagi, S. (2003, May/June). Using data analytics for greater profits. Journal of Business
Strategy.
Vesset, D., McDonough, B., Wardley, M. and Schubmehl, D. (2012). Worldwide business
analytics software 2012-2016 forecast and 2011 vendor shares. (Retrieved from the
internet: http://www.idc.com/getdoc.jsp?containerId=235494).
Vlismas, O. & Venieris, G. (2011). Towards an ontology for the intellectual capital domain.
Journal of Intellectual Capital, 12(1), 75-110.
Williams, R. (2008). The epistemology of knowledge and the knowledge process cycle: Beyond
the “objectivist” vs. “interpretivist.” Journal of Knowledge Management, 12(4), 72-85.
Wilson Center. (2012, October 15). Is the world more dangerous 50 years after the Cuban
Missile Crisis? [Webcast]. Available from http://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/the-worldmore-dangerous-50-years-after-the-cuban-missile-crisis#field_files.
Yin, R. K. (2009). Case study research: Design and methods. Thousand Oaks, California:
SAGE Publications, Inc.
Zardet. V., & Harbi, N. (2007). Mastering computer technologies: Contributing to researchexperimentation with users and computer specialists. In Buono, F. & Savall, H. (Eds.)

146
Socio-economic intervention in organizations: The intervener-researcher and the SEAM
approach to organizational analysis (355-372). Charlotte, NC: Information Age
Publishing.

147

Appendix A
Detailed Tables Constructed as Part of Modeling for the Social View

148
Table 20
Summary of Expected Performance Value for New Analytical Capabilities: Algorithm Development

Performance Value Worksheet
Program/ Intervention: Technology Investments for Analytic Capability Building
Algorithm Development, page one
Option name:
Data required for calculations:
(a) What unit of performance are you measuring?

(b) What is the performance goal per worker/ group/
system at the end of your HRD program?

(c) What is the performance per worker/ group/ system
at the beginning of the HRD program?

(d) What dollar value is assigned to each performance
unit?
(e) What is the development time required to reach the
expected performance level?

(f) What is the assessment period? (Enter the longest
time (e) of all options being considered.)

(g) How many workers/ groups/ systems will participate
in your HRD program?

Without Technology Investement

With Technology Investment

With Technology and Training Investment

algorithm development
unit name

algorithm development
unit name

algorithm development
unit name

algorithms
unit name

5
units

per year
time

algorithms
unit name

6
units

per year
time

algorithms
unit name

7
units

per year
time

5
number

algorithms
units

per year
time

5
number

algorithms
units

per year
time

5
number

algorithms
units

per year
time

algorithm

$

40,000

algorithm

40,000

algorithm

$

40,000

$

1
number

years
time

1
number

years
time

1
number

years
time

4
number

years
time

4
number

years
time

4
number

years
time

1
number of work groups

1
number of work groups

1
number of work groups
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Table 20, continued
Summary of Expected Performance Value for New Analytical Capabilities: Algorithm Development

Performance Value Worksheet
Program/ Intervention: Technology Investments for Analytic Capability Building
Algorithm Development, page two
Option name:

Without Technology Investement

With Technology Investment

With Technology and Training Investment

Calculations to determine net performance value:
(h) Usable units worker/ group/ system produce during
the HRD program. If no, enter -0-. If yes, enter known
performance rate or calculate average performance
reate [(b+c)/2]

5
number

algorithms
units

5.5
number

algorithms
units

6
number

algorithms
units

(i) What are the total units per worker/ group/ system
produced during the development time?
(h * e)

5

5.5

6

(j) How many units will be produced per worker/ work
group/ system during the assessment periord? {[(f - e) *
b] + i}

20

23.5

27

(k) What is the value of the worker's/ group's/ system's
performance during the assessment period? (j*d)

$

(l) What is the performance value gain per worker/
group/ system? [k - (c * d * f)]

$

(m) What is the total performance value gain for all
workers/ groups/ systems? (l * g)

$

800,000

$

940,000

$

1,080,000

-

$

140,000

$

280,000

-

$

140,000

$

280,000
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Table 21
Summary of Expected Performance Value for New Analytical Capabilities: Dashboard Enhancements

Performance Value Worksheet
Program/ Intervention: Technology Investments for Analytic Capability Building
Enhance Dashboard Functionality, page one
Option name:
Data required for calculations:
(a) What unit of performance are you measuring?

(b) What is the performance goal per worker/ group/
system at the end of your HRD program?

(c) What is the performance per worker/ group/ system
at the beginning of the HRD program?

(d) What dollar value is assigned to each performance
unit?
(e) What is the development time required to reach the
expected performance level?

(f) What is the assessment period? (Enter the longest
time (e) of all options being considered.)

(g) How many workers/ groups/ systems will participate
in your HRD program?

Without Technology Investement

With Technology Investment

With Technology and Training Investment

enhancements
unit name

enhancements
unit name

enhancements
unit name

enhancements
unit name

3
units

per year
time

enhancements
unit name

4
units

per year
time

enhancements
unit name

5
units

per year
time

3
number

enhancements
units

per year
time

3
number

enhancements
units

per year
time

3
number

enhancements
units

per year
time

$

10,000 enhancements

$

10,000 enhancements

$

10,000 enhancements

1
number

years
time

1
number

years
time

1
number

years
time

4
number

years
time

4
number

years
time

4
number

years
time

3
number of work groups

3
number of work groups

3
number of work groups
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Table 21, continued
Summary of Expected Performance Value for New Analytical Capabilities: Dashboard Enhancements
Performance Value Worksheet
Program/ Intervention: Technology Investments for Analytic Capability Building
Enhance Dashboard Functionality, page two
Option name:

Without Technology Investement

With Technology Investment

With Technology and Training Investment

Calculations to determine net performance value:
(h) Usable units worker/ group/ system produce during
the HRD program. If no, enter -0-. If yes, enter known
performance rate or calculate average performance
reate [(b+c)/2]

3
number

enhancements
units

3.5
number

enhancements
units

4
number

enhancements
units

(i) What are the total units per worker/ group/ system
produced during the development time?
(h * e)

3

3.5

4

(j) How many units will be produced per worker/ work
group/ system during the assessment periord? {[(f - e) *
b] + i}

12

15.5

19

(k) What is the value of the worker's/ group's/ system's
performance during the assessment period? (j*d)

$

(l) What is the performance value gain per worker/
group/ system? [k - (c * d * f)]

$

(m) What is the total performance value gain for all
workers/ groups/ systems? (l * g)

$

120,000

$

155,000

$

190,000

-

$

35,000

$

70,000

-

$

105,000

$

210,000
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Table 22
Summary of Expected Performance Value for New Analytical Capabilities: Product Performance Evaluations
Performance Value Worksheet
Program/ Intervention: Technology Investments for Analytic Capability Building
Product Performance Evaluations, page one
Option name:
Data required for calculations:
(a) What unit of performance are you measuring?

(b) What is the performance goal per worker/ group/
system at the end of your HRD program?

(c) What is the performance per worker/ group/ system
at the beginning of the HRD program?

(d) What dollar value is assigned to each performance
unit?
(e) What is the development time required to reach the
expected performance level?

(f) What is the assessment period? (Enter the longest
time (e) of all options being considered.)

(g) How many workers/ groups/ systems will participate
in your HRD program?

Without Technology Investement

With Technology Investment

With Technology and Training Investment

evaluations
unit name

evaluations
unit name

evaluations
unit name

evaluations
unit name

3
units

per year
time

evaluations
unit name

4
units

3
number

evaluations
units

per year
time

3
number

evaluations
units

evaluations

$

$

35,000

evaluations evaluations
time
unit name

per year
time

35,000 evaluations

3
number

5
units

per year
time

evaluations
units

per year
time

$

35,000 evaluations

1
number

years
time

1
number

years
time

1
number

years
time

4
number

years
time

4
number

years
time

4
number

years
time

1
number of work groups

1
number of work groups

1
number of work groups
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Table 22, continued
Summary of Expected Performance Value for New Analytical Capabilities: Product Performance Evaluations
Performance Value Worksheet
Program/ Intervention: Technology Investments for Analytic Capability Building
Product Performance Evaluations, page two
Option name:

Without Technology Investement

With Technology Investment

With Technology and Training Investment

Calculations to determine net performance value:
(h) Usable units worker/ group/ system produce during
the HRD program. If no, enter -0-. If yes, enter known
performance rate or calculate average performance
reate [(b+c)/2]

3
number

evaluations
units

3.5
number

evaluations
units

4
number

evaluations
units

(i) What are the total units per worker/ group/ system
produced during the development time?
(h * e)

3

3.5

4

(j) How many units will be produced per worker/ work
group/ system during the assessment periord? {[(f - e) *
b] + i}

12

15.5

19

(k) What is the value of the worker's/ group's/ system's
performance during the assessment period? (j*d)

$

(l) What is the performance value gain per worker/
group/ system? [k - (c * d * f)]

$

(m) What is the total performance value gain for all
workers/ groups/ systems? (l * g)

$

420,000

$

542,500

$

665,000

-

$

122,500

$

245,000

-

$

122,500

$

245,000
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Table 23
Summary of Expected Performance Value for New Analytical Capabilities: Assess Savings Opportunities

Performance Value Worksheet
Program/ Intervention: Technology Investments for Analytic Capability Building
Assess Savings Opportunities, page one
Option name:
Data required for calculations:
(a) What unit of performance are you measuring?

(b) What is the performance goal per worker/ group/
system at the end of your HRD program?

(c) What is the performance per worker/ group/ system
at the beginning of the HRD program?

(d) What dollar value is assigned to each performance
unit?
(e) What is the development time required to reach the
expected performance level?

(f) What is the assessment period? (Enter the longest
time (e) of all options being considered.)

(g) How many workers/ groups/ systems will participate
in your HRD program?

Without Technology Investement

With Technology Investment

With Technology and Training Investment

assessments
unit name

assessments
unit name

assessments
unit name

assessments
unit name

3
units

per year
time

assessments
unit name

4
units

per year
time

assessments
unit name

5
units

per year
time

3
number

assessments
units

per year
time

3
number

assessments
units

per year
time

3
number

assessments
units

per year
time

assessments

$

$

50,000

50,000

assessments

$

50,000

assessments

1
number

years
time

1
number

years
time

1
number

years
time

4
number

years
time

4
number

years
time

4
number

years
time

1
number of work groups

1
number of work groups

1
number of work groups
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Table 23, continued
Summary of Expected Performance Value for New Analytical Capabilities: Assess Savings Opportunities

Performance Value Worksheet
Program/ Intervention: Technology Investments for Analytic Capability Building
Assess Savings Opportunities, page two
Option name:

Without Technology Investement

With Technology Investment

With Technology and Training Investment

Calculations to determine net performance value:
(h) Usable units worker/ group/ system produce during
the HRD program. If no, enter -0-. If yes, enter known
performance rate or calculate average performance
reate [(b+c)/2]

3
number

assessments
units

3.5
number

assessments
units

4
number

assessments
units

(i) What are the total units per worker/ group/ system
produced during the development time?
(h * e)

3

3.5

4

(j) How many units will be produced per worker/ work
group/ system during the assessment periord? {[(f - e) *
b] + i}

12

15.5

19

(k) What is the value of the worker's/ group's/ system's
performance during the assessment period? (j*d)

$

(l) What is the performance value gain per worker/
group/ system? [k - (c * d * f)]

$

(m) What is the total performance value gain for all
workers/ groups/ systems? (l * g)

$

600,000

$

775,000

$

950,000

-

$

175,000

$

350,000

-

$

175,000

$

350,000
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Table 24
Table 24
Summary of Expected Performance Value for New Analytical Capabilities: Process Accelerations

Performance Value Worksheet
Program/ Intervention: Technology Investments for Analytic Capability Building
Process Accelerations, page one
Option name:
Data required for calculations:
(a) What unit of performance are you measuring?

(b) What is the performance goal per worker/ group/
system at the end of your HRD program?

(c) What is the performance per worker/ group/ system
at the beginning of the HRD program?

(d) What dollar value is assigned to each performance
unit?
(e) What is the development time required to reach the
expected performance level?

(f) What is the assessment period? (Enter the longest
time (e) of all options being considered.)

(g) How many workers/ groups/ systems will participate
in your HRD program?

Without Technology Investement

With Technology Investment

With Technology and Training Investment

process development
unit name

process development
unit name

process development
unit name

processes
unit name

2
units

per year
time

processes
unit name

3
units

per year
time

processes
unit name

4
units

per year
time

2
number

processes
units

per year
time

2
number

processes
units

per year
time

2
number

processes
units

per year
time

20,000

processes

processes

$

$

$

20,000

20,000

processes

1
number

years
time

1
number

years
time

1
number

years
time

4
number

years
time

4
number

years
time

4
number

years
time

1
number of work groups

1
number of work groups

1
number of work groups
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Table 24, continued
Summary of Expected Performance Value for New Analytical Capabilities: Process Accelerations

Performance Value Worksheet
Program/ Intervention: Technology Investments for Analytic Capability Building
Process Accelerations, page two
Option name:

Without Technology Investement

With Technology Investment

With Technology and Training Investment

Calculations to determine net performance value:
(h) Usable units worker/ group/ system produce during
the HRD program. If no, enter -0-. If yes, enter known
performance rate or calculate average performance
reate [(b+c)/2]

2
number

processes
units

2.5
number

processes
units

3
number

processes
units

(i) What are the total units per worker/ group/ system
produced during the development time?
(h * e)

2

2.5

3

(j) How many units will be produced per worker/ work
group/ system during the assessment periord? {[(f - e) *
b] + i}

8

11.5

15

(k) What is the value of the worker's/ group's/ system's
performance during the assessment period? (j*d)

$

(l) What is the performance value gain per worker/
group/ system? [k - (c * d * f)]

$

(m) What is the total performance value gain for all
workers/ groups/ systems? (l * g)

$

160,000

$

230,000

$

300,000

-

$

70,000

$

140,000

-

$

70,000

$

140,000
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Table 25
Summary of Expected Performance Value for New Analytical Capabilities: Support Decision Making

Performance Value Worksheet
Program/ Intervention: Technology Investments for Analytic Capability Building
Support Decision Making, page one
Option name:
Data required for calculations:
(a) What unit of performance are you measuring?

(b) What is the performance goal per worker/ group/
system at the end of your HRD program?

(c) What is the performance per worker/ group/ system
at the beginning of the HRD program?

(d) What dollar value is assigned to each performance
unit?
(e) What is the development time required to reach the
expected performance level?

(f) What is the assessment period? (Enter the longest
time (e) of all options being considered.)

(g) How many workers/ groups/ systems will participate
in your HRD program?

Without Technology Investement

With Technology Investment

With Technology and Training Investment

Requests from Management
unit name

Requests from Management
unit name

Requests from Management
unit name

requests
unit name

40
units

per year
time

requests
unit name

41
units

per year
time

requests
unit name

42
units

per year
time

40
number

requests
units

per year
time

40
number

requests
units

per year
time

40
number

requests
units

per year
time

requests

$

requests

$

$

10,000

10,000

10,000

requests

1
number

year
time

1
number

year
time

1
number

year
time

4
number

years
time

4
number

years
time

4
number

years
time

1
number of work groups

1
number of work groups

1
number of work groups
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Table 25, continued
Summary of Expected Performance Value for New Analytical Capabilities: Support Decision Making
Performance Value Worksheet
Program/ Intervention: Technology Investments for Analytic Capability Building
Support Decision Making, page two
Option name:

Without Technology Investement

With Technology Investment

With Technology and Training Investment

Calculations to determine net performance value:
(h) Usable units worker/ group/ system produce during
the HRD program. If no, enter -0-. If yes, enter known
performance rate or calculate average performance
reate [(b+c)/2]

40
number

requests
units

40.5
number

requests
units

41
number

requests
units

(i) What are the total units per worker/ group/ system
produced during the development time?
(h * e)

40

40.5

41

(j) How many units will be produced per worker/ work
group/ system during the assessment periord? {[(f - e) *
b] + i}

160

163.5

167

(k) What is the value of the worker's/ group's/ system's
performance during the assessment period? (j*d)

$

(l) What is the performance value gain per worker/
group/ system? [k - (c * d * f)]

$

(m) What is the total performance value gain for all
workers/ groups/ systems? (l * g)

$

1,600,000

$

1,635,000

$

1,670,000

-

$

35,000

$

70,000

-

$

35,000

$

70,000
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Appendix B
Detailed Tables Constructed as Part of Modeling for the Socioeconomic View
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Table 26
Hidden Costs Associated with Non-Productivity: Excessive Maintenance Time
Indicator: Direct Productivity Gaps
Type of Hidden Cost
Based on ISEOR Findings
Excessive maintenance time

CSC Examples - Current State
Some of the most highly skilled analysts spend
most of their time on data management tasks,
which include preparation of data for analysis
and integration of disparate sources of data.
As new data structures emerge from this
process and new applications are sourced
from the data, there is an ongoing need to
refresh the data structures. The time involved
may be days or weeks.

Regulation of Non-Productivity

Estimated Hidden Costs
Once new data structures are well established
and stable, the ongoing maintenance should be
moved to a production process. However,
most data management processes continue to
be managed independently by analysts. Not all
analysts in the case have responsibility for data
management, which creates heavy
dependencies on those that do. Estimated
hidden costs: $115,200
Hidden Cost Assumptions:
(a) Development of analytic data structures
average five days per month
(b) 12 projects per year * 5 days per month *
8 hours = 480 hours
(c) Average analyst salary, benefits and
overhead $100,000 / 2,080 = $48 per hour
(d) Excess development time 480 hours * $48
= $23,040 per analyst
(e) Number of FTEs performing data
management is 5
(f) Total costs estimated at 5 * $23,040 =
$115,200

Future State
The new software language is more easily
adapted to production processes. Estimated
savings: $38,016
Savings Assumptions:
(a) Transition of data management functions to
production processes will require some upfront development investments
(b) Resources to develop the new production
processes may not be available to work on all
potential data managemement projects due to
other priorities
(c) Given time and availability constraints, a
third of the costs could be saved by
automating development of analytic data
structures and moving some data management
processes to a scheduled production process
(d) Savings would be 0.33 * $115,200 or
$38,016.
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Table 27
Hidden Costs Associated with Non-Productivity: Program Development Interrupted
Indicator: Direct Productivity Gaps
Type of Hidden Cost
Based on ISEOR Findings
Program development interrupted

CSC Examples - Current State
Overly complicated interface to the
development environment makes it difficult for
users to view results of analysis. Iterative
nature of the analytic development process
means that users are continually re-running
programs in order to view results, often
waiting in queues for hours for results that
should take minutes.

Regulation of Non-Productivity

Estimated Hidden Costs
Development effort on complicated projects
takes longer than it should: Estimated hidden
costs $276,480
Hidden Cost Assumptions:
(a) Complicated interface adds three days of
development time for each complex project
(b) One complex project per month
(c) 12 projects * 3 days * 8 hours = 288
hours
(d) Average analyst salary, benefits and
overhead $100,000 / 2,080 = $48 per hour
(e) Excess development time 288 hours * $48
= $13,824 per analyst
(f) Number of analysts impacted: 20
(g) Total hidden costs 20 * $13,824 =
$276,480

Future State
New software has user-friendly development
interface. Users can see the data and/ or the
results of their analysis. Estimated savings:
$138,240
Savings Assumptions:
(a) Potential savings of $13,824 per analyst
per year.
(b) Assume that of the 20 impacted analysts,
at least half will adopt use of the new interface
in year one.
(c) 10 analysts * $13,824 = $138,240
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Table 27, continued
Hidden Costs Associated with Non-Productivity: Program Development Interrupted
Indicator: Direct Productivity Gaps
Type of Hidden Cost
Based on ISEOR Findings
Program development interrupted,
continued

CSC Examples - Current State
Analysts depend on multiple tools to complete
studies of medium to high complexity.

Regulation of Non-Productivity

Estimated Hidden Costs
Use of multiple tools creates additional manual
work effort to assimilate results from separate
analyses. Estimated hidden costs: $46,080
Hidden Cost Assumptions:
(a) Two projects per month medium
complexity
(b) 24 projects per year * 2 excess hours to
assimilate results = 48 hours
(c) Average analyst salary, benefits and
overhead $100,000/ 2080 = $48 per hour
(d) Excess development time 48 hours * $48
= $2,304 per analyst
(e) Number of analysts impacted 20
(f) Estimated hidden costs 20 * $2,304 =
$46,080

Future State
Transition from multiple tools to one tool.
New software creates seamless transition
between development interface, development
environment, statistical analysis and displays of
information. Estimated savings: $23,040
Savings Assumptions:
(a) Savings of $2,304 per analyst per year
(b) Assume 10 analysts migrate to exclusive
use of new tool, achieving efficiencies
(c) Estimated savings 10 * $2,304 = $23,040
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Table 28
Hidden Costs Associated with Non-Productivity: Re-edition of Reports and Lists
Indicator: Direct Productivity Gaps
Type of Hidden Cost
Based on ISEOR Findings
Re-edition of reports and lists

CSC Examples - Current State
Once processes are developed, they are
refreshed on a periodic basis. Given the
complexity of the work, analysts need to
conduct a technical review of the original
processes in order to refresh results.

Regulation of Non-Productivity

Estimated Hidden Costs
Technical reviews should be unnecessary if
processes are well documented. Estimated
hidden costs: $11,520
Hidden Cost Assumptions:
(a) One refresh per month
(b) Average of 12 projects per year per
analyst * 1 excess hour to review and ensure
the integrity of the process = 12 hours
(c) Average analyst salary, benefits and
overhead $100,000 / 2080 = $48 per hour
(d) Excess development time 12 hours * $48
= $576 per analyst
(e) Assume 20 analysts work to refresh one
project monthly
(f) Hidden costs 20 * $576 = $11,520

Future State
New software makes it possible to store all of
the processing steps in sequential order,
making it fast and efficient to refresh analyses.
The software also provides a visual
represtentation of the processes. Estimated
savings: $2,880.
Savings Assumptions:
(a) Potential savings of $576 per analyst per
year.
(b) Assume that 5 analysts will adopt the new
way of working in year one
(c) Estimated savings 5 * $576 = $2,880.
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Table 28, continued
Hidden Costs Associated with Non-Productivity: Re-edition of Reports and Lists
Indicator: Direct Productivity Gaps
Type of Hidden Cost
Based on ISEOR Findings
Re-edition of reports and lists, continued

CSC Examples - Current State
As new analytical projects are developed,
there are many situations where existing
processes developed by other analysts could
be leveraged.

Regulation of Non-Productivity

Estimated Hidden Costs
Development of new analytic processes takes
longer than it should, since the ability to share
programming code or processes is limited.
Estimated hidden costs: $34,560
Hidden Cost Assumptions:
(a) One modification per month
(b) Average of 12 projects per year per
analyst * 3 excess hours to develop logic that
someone else has already developed = 36
hours
(c) Average analyst salary, benefits and
overhead $100,000 / 2,080 = $48 per hour
(d) Excess development time 36 hours * $48
= $1,728 per analyst
(e) Total of 20 analysts modifying proceses
each month
(f) Hidden costs 20 * $1,728 = $34,560

Future State
New software makes it easier to share stored
processess and logic. Estimated savings:
$17,280.
Savings Assumptions:
(a) Potential savings of $1,728 per analyst per
year.
(b) Assume that 10 analysts will work to share
processes and code in year one
(c) Estimated savings 10 * $1,728 = $17,280
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Table 28, continued
Hidden Costs Associated with Non-Productivity: Re-edition of Reports and Lists
Re-edition of reports and lists, continued

Changes to existing processes are requested
as business needs evolve.

Excess time to modify analytical applications
to meet changing business needs. Estimated
hidden costs: $92,160
Hidden Cost Assumptions:
(a) One modification per month
(b) Average of 12 projects per year per
analyst * 8 hours to review and modify
existing processes = 96 hours
(c) Average analyst salary, benefits and
overhead $100,000 / 2,080 = $48 per hour
(d) Excess development time 96 hours * $48
= $4,608 per analyst
(e) Total of 20 analysts modifying processes
(f) Estimated hidden costs 20 * $4,608 =
$92,160

New software provides the ability to see a
visual representation stored processes, which
makes it easier to visualize the design and
implementation of changes. Use of one tool
vs. multiple tools means that changes occur in
one place vs. several. Estimated savings:
$17,280
Savings Assumptions:
(a) Assume that by using the new software,
the number of hours to review and modify
existing process changes from 8 to 2.
(b) New costs per analyst is 12 * 2 * $48 =
$1,152 per year
(c) Reduction in costs is $4,608 - $1,152 =
$3,456
(d) Total of 5 analysts adopting new approach
in year one
(e) Estimated savings 5 * $3,456 = $17,280
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Table 29
Hidden Costs Associated with Non-Productivity: Frequent Interruptions by Users
Indicator: Direct Productivity Gaps
Type of Hidden Cost
Based on ISEOR Findings
Frequent interruptions by users

CSC Examples - Current State
The use of multiple tools, complicated
development interfaces, lack of supporting
technical infrastructure and administrative
support results in frequent interruptions within
the IT service area -- most of an urgent nature
due to priorities within the business areas.
Frequently there are problems that can't be
resolved because the expertise does not exist
within the organization. These interruptions
impact not only leadership and technicians
within the computer service area, but also
leadership in the business who must address
delays on priority projects.

Regulation of Non-Productivity

Estimated Hidden Costs
Problem-solvingsome technical issues may
take hours or days, depending on the situation.
Communication of status can be time
consuming, especially if the root cause of the
problem itself is ambiguous. Estimated hidden
costs: $5,016.
Hidden Cost Assumptions:
(a) One issue per month that is of escalated
status.
(b) Average management time 2 hours * $65
per hour * 12 = $1,560 per year
(c) Average analyst time 6 hours * $48 per
hour * 12 = $3,456 per year
(d) Total hidden costs = $1,560 + $3,456 =
$5,016

Future State
More formal adoption of software will mean
that there is aditional administrative support of
analysts. Through better planning and
development of new support processes, users
will be able to resolve technical problems
faster -- and without interruption. Estimated
Savings: $5,016
Savings Assumptions:
(a) Defined administrative support eliminates
interruptions
(b) Total hidden costs of $5,016 eliminated
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Table 30
Hidden Costs Associated with Non-Productivity: Lack of Coordination Between Conception and Operation
Indicator: Direct Productivity Gaps
Type of Hidden Cost
Based on ISEOR Findings
Lack of coordination between conception
and operation

CSC Examples - Current State
Analysts who focus on data management have
an increasing need for the disk space needed
to process large volumes of data as well as
disk storage space to store the analytic
datasets once they are created. Very often
evolving business requirements may result in
an unanticipated level of processing or need
need for additional storage capacity.

Regulation of Non-Productivity

Estimated Hidden Costs
Delays in processing may occur until the
required disk capacity and disk storage is in
place. There may be other business people
waiting for information as part of key initiatives
or projects. Estimated hidden costs: $9,216
Hidden Cost Assumptions:
(a) Each analyst has 4 projects per year
requiring adjustments to infrastructure
(b) Estimated number of delays totals 4 *
delay of 3 days
(c) In addition to the one analyst responsible
for the data, there are, on average, 3 other
analysts are dependent on the information;
however they all work on lower priority tasks
while they wait for data
(d) Estimated opportunity costs associated
with sub-optimal use of the analysts' time is
estimated at 50% of time, or 0.5 * $48 per
hour * 3 days * 8 hours * 4 analysts * 4
projects per year = $9,21

Future State
Adoption of software will mean that there is
more formal administrative support of analysts.
Through better planning and development of
new support processes, users will be able to
be more proactive in planning. With added
infrastructure support for key initiatives, delays
will be minimized. Estimated Savings: $4,608
Savings Assumptions:
(a) number of delays due to infrastructure cut
in half during year one
(b) Total hidden costs of $9,216 * 0.5 =
$4,608
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Table 31
Hidden Costs Associated with Non-Productivity: Poor Estimation of Development and Intervention Times with Internal Customers
Indicator: Direct Productivity Gaps
Type of Hidden Cost
Based on ISEOR Findings
Poor estimation of development and
intervention times with internal customers

CSC Examples - Current State
Analysts are using multiple tools, and do not
follow a standard approach to development of
new projects. Development time varies
considerably, and there are frequent delays
due to unanticipated problems using existing
tools.

Regulation of Non-Productivity

Estimated Hidden Costs
Uncertainty about development time may lead
to miscommunication about status of business
priorities, and delay time to market. Estimated
hidden costs $40,000
Hidden Cost Assumptions:
(a) Ten analysts have has 4 projects per year
tied to important business priorities and plans
(b) One delay associated with each project *
4 projects per year * 10 analysts
(c) Each day of delay creates an opportunity
cost for the business, since time to market is
delayed. Estimated impact is $1,000 per
delay.
(d) Total hidden costs 10 analysts * 4 delays
* $1,000 per delay = $40,000

Future State
Use of the software will provide a way to
standardize the development process. With
added planning and project focus, the number
of delays will be minimized. Estimated
Savings: $20,000
Savings Assumptions:
(a) Number of delays cut in half during year
one
(b) Total hidden costs of $40,000 * 0.5 =
$20,000
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Table 32
Hidden Costs Associated with Non-Productivity: Hardware/ Software Shared by an Entire Department
Indicator: Direct Productivity Gaps
Type of Hidden Cost
Based on ISEOR Findings
Hardware/ software shared by an entire
department

CSC Examples - Current State
A few analysts have a copy of software that is
used for specific kinds of studies. The
software is loaded directly on the analysts'
systems, and is not accessible to others. Even
if the software could be accessed by others,
the license agreement does not permit sharing
of the software.

Regulation of Non-Productivity

Estimated Hidden Costs
Other users cannot access the software, and
sometimes develop manual work-arounds in
order to fulfill the requirements of their project,
or else use sub-optimal tools to accomplish
required tasks. Use of suboptimal tools
results in excess time to develop a project
Estimated hidden costs: $4,608
Hidden Cost Assumptions:
(a) Number of projects developed with suboptimal tools 6
(b) Average excess time required 2 days
(c) Hidden costs 6 projects * 2 days * 8
hours = 96 hours
(d) 96 hours * $48 per hour totals $4,608

Future State
New software will negate the need for the
specialized software loaded on a few
machines.
Savings Assumptions:
(a) All users will be able to access and use the
same software.
(b) Estimated savings: $4,608

